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ABSTRACT
Racial discrimination, though more subtle than in the past, is still an enduring
presence in 21st century America. Whether looking at education, health care, the
workforce, housing/lending practices, or the criminal justice system, studies routinely
confirm that racial prejudice and discrimination persist despite claims of a “post-racial”
America. Yet, despite the perseverance of racial prejudice and discrimination, policies
correcting racial injustice remain contentious, either failing to receive the requisite
support to pass reforms or receiving backlash from the public. This project explores
meta-stereotypes in the Black and white communities, and highlights meta-stereotypes’
potential impact when determining why some individuals support those types of policies
while other individuals oppose them. Meta-stereotypes are essentially stereotypes of
stereotypes; they assess how pervasive an individual believes specific stereotypes are.
Using an original survey experiment, this study investigates whether meta-stereotypes act
as a causal mechanism, dictating individuals’ policy preferences regarding two issue
areas related, whether directly or indirectly, to discussions of racial prejudice and
discrimination: affirmative action and criminal justice reforms. Additionally, by
exploring individuals’ meta-stereotypes as both an abstract concept, and also as a more
concrete, real-world concept, by way of hypothetical scenarios, this dissertation project
aims to determine whether meta-stereotypes alone are enough to impact racial policy
preferences, or whether individuals need to have those meta-stereotypes activated and/or
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linked to real-world scenarios, thus providing guidance to racial justice advocates trying
to gain allies and overcome complacency or opposition.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
On November 4th 2008, Barack Obama was elected president of the United States.
On May 25, 2011 entertainment mogul Oprah Winfrey aired the last episode of her
wildly successful talk show to focus on expanding her media empire. If anecdotes were
evidence, the amount of power wielded in the political and pop culture worlds by these
two individuals alone would be enough for many to conclude that racism in America is
dead. Of course, anecdotes are not evidence, and there are mountains of evidence that
suggest that racial prejudice is present in pretty much all aspects of life—the education
system, the health care system, housing and lending practices, the workplace, and the
criminal justice system.
Still, many individuals in America have embraced a post-racial narrative that
asserts that meaningful racial discrimination is largely a thing of the past. While wellintended, a post-racial narrative has the potential to have highly undesirable
consequences—for the Black community, specifically, but also for society at large. In
reaction to persistent racial discrimination, a number of policies aimed at correcting those
injustices have been proposed. This project uses meta-stereotypes to investigate whether
the misguided, yet oft-cited, post-racial narrative in the United States affects individuals’
support or opposition for those proposed racial policies.
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In doing so, this project contributes to the scholarly literature by expanding our
understanding of meta-stereotypes’ effects within the political world, and does so while
measuring meta-stereotypes in three distinct ways, allowing for a more thorough
exploration of their potential effects if applied to policies within a real-world political
environment. This project goes beyond these scholarly contributions as well and offers
guidance for racial justice advocates who have identified lingering problems in our
supposedly post-racial America, and who have identified potential policy solutions, and
yet are still attempting to identify ways to get more people on board with those plans.
What follows in this introductory chapter is a succinct inquiry of the current state
of race relations in America and the ensuing debate about our alleged emergence as a
post-racial society, followed by an overview of this dissertation project as a whole.
I.

The post-racial narrative on trial: Current events provide context for the
ensuing debate
“Race is like the weather. We tend to talk about the weather when it’s at
an extreme but it’s always present, impacting our days. Race is similar.”
-

Toure (Capehart 2013)

“weird stuff, i mean if a person were obsessed with the weather, 24x7, we
would definitely think of them as having a problem. Similar issues apply
to race.”
- Commentator response, The New York Times’ comments section
(Capehart 2013)
The state of American race relations has certainly improved since the Civil Rights
Era. Whereas unapologetic racially discriminatory policies were actively pursued by
politicians, and accepted by citizens, in the first half of the twentieth century, such
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policies have since been replaced with “color-blind” policies that are designed to be
neutral in terms of their applicability to race and ethnicity. Whereas physical and
rhetorical violence against Black Americans was not only acceptable, but celebrated, in
the first half of the twentieth century, such overt displays of bigotry have largely ceased.
And yet, in place of the de jure segregation of the early twentieth century which legally
sanctioned discrimination, a new form of discrimination—de facto segregation, stemming
not from legislation but from a combination of the spillover effects of past discrimination
and continuing subtle prejudices—has taken root, and the purportedly “color-blind”
policies that followed the turbulence of the Civil Rights Era have often fallen prey to
systematic racial biases and/or subtle personal biases which play out within the context of
the legislation and enforcement of those policies. And though overt bigotry has waned
significantly over the past fifty-plus years, more subtle forms of prejudice remain in
place.
The contentions that “color-blind” policies may differ in practice than in theory,
and that subtle forms of prejudice and discrimination remain a staple in twenty-first
century America, however, are quite controversial. It is this controversy—the debate
over whether or not America has attained post-racialism—that frames this project;
whereas some Americans are willing to accept that the triumph of American postracialism has become a reality—and are, in fact, quite hostile to assertions to the
contrary—other Americans reject the triumphant narrative and remain disappointed, if
not exasperated, when faced with assertions of a post-racial America.
This post-racial debate has come to a head a number of times in recent memory;
in fact, within the past twelve months alone Americans have grappled with this question,
3

and they have done so at both the elite level and the mass level. Politicians, activists and
media personalities, alike, have helped put this debate at the forefront by not only
chronicling the stories of George Zimmerman, Paula Deen, Richie Incognito, Richard
Sherman, a fake inter-racial Cheerios family, and ordinary Americans who donned
Halloween costumes of questionable taste at best, and of racist designs at worst, but also
by highlighting the reactions to these stories as sub-stories in and of themselves. And
citizens have, therefore, not only reacted to the stories by adopting attitudes and opinions
regarding Zimmerman’s guilt in the shooting of an unarmed Black teenager, Deen and
Incognito’s admission of racist language and subsequent apologies/explanations,
Sherman’s post-game showboating, the presence of an inter-racial couple in a television
commercial, and the motivations and humor underlying costumes depicting standard
“blackface,” a dead Trayvon Martin, and even straight up “niggers,” but they have also
reacted to the fact that these attitudes and opinions are even up for debate by alleging the
audacity of those who dare to disagree with them on the question of American postracialism. As a result, America has moved away from putting racism itself on trial, and
has more recently moved to putting post-racialism on trial.
In one corner of the debate sit those who accept that America has indeed become
a truly post-racial society. This side of the debate contends that race is not only
surmountable in twenty-first century America, but that is unlikely to be considered a
potential detriment or obstacle in the first place. In this account, achieving success is a
matter of merit, not favoritism and/or subtle biases, and achieving justice is a matter that
is defined by a tried and true outcome, not a flawed and/or biased process. Ironically,
these assertions then lead this side of the debate to muster other explanations for
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disparities in crime rates, educational success, unemployment and wages, etc. that
skeptics of the post-racial narrative then point to as proof of prejudice and racism being
alive and well. These opponents would label some explanations—such as that Black
Americans are simply, biologically less intelligent, more violent, etc.—as being overtly
racist, and other explanations—especially the “culture of poverty” explanation, which is
explained as an “internal cultural crisis in black America, exemplified by an increase in
single-parent homes, criminal violence in cities and an inadequate attachment to
dominant social norms and mores” (Wise 2010, 28)—as being racist as well, albeit
cloaked in a false sense of sympathy and, therefore, more subtle.
While proponents of the post-racial narrative point to the election of Barack
Obama as evidence of America’s official transformation into a truly color-blind society,
deniers of the post-racial narrative would point to the rhetoric during his presidential
campaigns and during his time in office to refute a complete transformation of America
with regards to race relations. Certainly, whether one asserts or rejects this narrative, the
election of Barack Obama to the highest office in American politics was a historic sign of
progress toward that color-blind society; yet, the ability of both sides to point to a single
moment, encompassing a single figure, and still come to different conclusions speaks
volumes about the debate at hand.
Yes, Barack Obama was born to a mixed-race family, raised by a single parent,
and still managed to attend one of the most prestigious universities in the nation, graduate
from a top-tier law school, and eventually win election to the U.S. Senate and the White
House—all points that are likely to be highlighted by proponents of the post-racial
narrative. But at the same time, opponents of the narrative would point out that many
5

Americans did not hesitate to assert the charges that Obama was a secret Muslim who
was born in Kenya, not the United States, as though they were facts—a sign, many would
suggest, of continued racial prejudice and “otherization”. Additionally, while using
Obama as an example of the post-racial narrative, some proponents of the narrative were
simultaneously arguing that if it weren’t for affirmative action policies Obama would not
have been as successful as he were, which actually diminishes the claim that he is a valid
example of a merit-based system leading to a Black president. And in August 2013,
protestors in Arizona were documented chanting “bye, bye Black sheep” (Wing 2013). It
would seem that many Americans are not only acutely aware of the president’s racial
makeup, but that they see it as a defining characteristic and one that is worth bringing to
light regardless of the issue at hand.
What’s more, Obama’s election and re-election would spark comments on social
media websites that would give serious pause to the post-racial narrative; from Twitter
(Morrissey 2012):
“Ok we pick a worthless nigger over a full blooded American what the
hell has our world come its called the white house for a reason”
“Niggers are voting #Obama2012 cause they afraid #RomneyRyan2012 is
gonna create jobs. Niggers hate to work & rather live off the “gub-mint.”
“Lets face it… Romney aint the best choice.. But hes a hell of alot better
than that sand monkey we call a president. #MITT”
“First thing my mom says this morning: did you hear the bad news? The
monkey is staying for another 4 years… #WeHateYouObama”
“Is this really our punishment for slavery? Wasn’t 4 years enough, can’t
we just call it even.”
Although these are only a handful of examples, and are no doubt more vitriolic
than what most Americans hear on a daily basis, there is reason to accept the
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expectation that Americans are witness to more subtle forms of racism on a fairly
regular basis. For example, when over six hundred white students at more than
two dozen college campuses were asked to keep a journal that recorded any racist
or racially insensitive comments, jokes, insults, etc. over a six to ten week period,
participants reported a rate of about twelve such comments per week (Houts Picca
& Feagin 2007, 7, 18 & 101; Wise 2010, 78).
And yet, regardless of the racist sentiments expressed above, Barack Obama is the
President of the United States and so there is at least some truth in the assertion that
America is moving toward a post-racial status. What’s more, proponents of the narrative
can point to other Black individuals who have gained success within politics, including
Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell. However, skeptics of the post-racial narrative
would assert that the number of influential Black policy makers in the country are still far
and few in between and that, when they do find a place in public office, there are often
groups who openly doubt their credentials and question whether their motives are truly
applicable to the common good (as opposed to being limited to working for their fellow
Black Americans, implicitly at the expense of white Americans). And it seems that
sentiments that are expressed within social media are now further driving skepticism of a
post-racial America and, perhaps, putting racism back on their radar so to speak; from the
comments section of the Huffington Post (O’Shea 2013):
Commentator 1: “I had thought that America was OVER it’s racism…
Until Obama was elected president. It’s been a real eye opener for ME,
and what I’m seeing hasn’t been very attractive.”
Commentator 2: “I totally agree. Knocked me for a loop. I thought I had
seen and heard everything… Where were these people hiding? So racist,
angry.”
7

Likewise, the debate over whether the United States has fulfilled its post-racial
promise brewed in a similar fashion during the aforementioned news stories of 2013 and
early 2014, none of which cuts to the heart of the debate quite as forcefully as the George
Zimmerman trial:
George Zimmerman was tried for the murder of Trayvon Martin during summer
2013; Zimmerman claimed that he used self-defense while detractors claimed that
Zimmerman only approached Martin in the first place because he equated being Black
with being suspicious and criminal. Coverage of the trial was largely shaped through
speculation of Zimmerman’s motives when approaching Martin and throughout the
ensuing conflict, and the differences in opinion over the possible—if not likely—motives
displayed by Zimmerman reflected the overall debate concerning the post-racial
narrative. Whether individuals thought he was guilty or not guilty, many also had an
opinion on whether they thought racial prejudice and/or animosity played a contributing
factor in the death of Martin. In many cases, perceptions of whether or not Zimmerman
was guilty coincided with opinions on the likelihood that he was acting—whether overtly
or subconsciously—out of racial prejudice against young, Black men, even though the
latter technically had little to do with the actual charges against Zimmerman.
Additionally, the “not guilty” verdict handed down by a jury of five white members (and
only one minority member) again fueled debate over whether there were subtle racial
prejudices at work in the Martin-Zimmerman story.
The debate concerning Zimmerman’s motives played out on national television,
as scholars, activists, politicians, celebrities, etc. argued the merits of a post-racial
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society, and again the debate spread to the masses. For example; via the comments
section of a Huffington Post article (Lederman 2013):
Commentator 1: Trayvon Martin was killed because he was walking and
skipping while black; many African-American men get profiled and
stopped everyday if they are driving or standing around while black. When
are the other Americans going to realize there is something wrong with
this picture?
Commentator 2: yeah braniac it is called RACISM and everyone that
constantly perpetuates these ideals of racism like you only perpetuate
racism… sad
Jonathan Capehart, a columnist at The Washington Post, published emails he received
from readers after he asserted in an op-ed piece that if the roles were reversed in the
case—and Martin and shot and killed Zimmerman—Martin would be found guilty by a
jury; among those responses he received (Capehart 2013):
“Would you do us all a favor and stop wearing your race on your sleeve.
You and many other blacks that have come out in droves in all the
networks to render their opinions about the Martin case, are coming across
as extremely biased; your opinions are tainted black… Race relations
WILL NEVER IMPROVE until the black community cuts the crap by
making everything racial… lose the colored glasses and you’ll be able to
see things clearly.”
“You sir are a racist. In reading the first paragraph of your racist piece, I
concluded that you were black. Sure enough, when I clicked on your
particulars, there you were. Only a black would use this case to stoke
racial fires even though Zimmerman is Hispanic. You see anti black
sentiment behind every affront claimed real or not and when it is black
against white, the answer is this is what is expected after years of
oppression. Sadly the Washington Post permits you to write such trash
promoting racial unrest. I expect to see you along with the Black Panthers
and Al Sharpton egging on demonstrators and riots after Zimmerman is
acquitted.”
“There’s a special place in Hell for race-baiting white-hating hypocrites
like you and Al the convicted slanderer Sharpton whose whole reason for
being is to promote racial discord. Trayvon Martin = Tawana Brawley
and you’re no different than David Duke.”
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“There seems to be little doubt, although the Post and others like to hid the
truth, that Trayvon was a punk wannabe gangster. He died that death.
Nothing you racebaiters can scream should drown that out. A hoodie is a
thug uniform as much as a hoods and robes represent the Klan.”
Capehart, in deciding to highlight the responses he received, was decisively admonishing
those readers by echoing the words of Toure (Capehart 2013): “It’s not racist to notice or
point out racism. To say that it is is an attempt to silence those who would talk about it.”
And yet Toure—a contributor to the New York Times—has been met with equal
accusations of reverse racism (Toure 2011):
“Perhaps the author suffers from the MOST COMMON RACISM that I
see in the United States today: Members of “minorities” ASSUMING
racism in the hearts and minds of “white” Americans.”
“Please, America—let’s not start talking about post-racism. It doesn’t
matter that we elected a black man as our president, and it doesn’t matter
that we have laws against discrimination, and it doesn’t matter that all
races are treated as equal before the law. The important thing to
remember is that, in these troubled economic times, whining about
discrimination and demanding special treatment based on one’s minority
status is a cottage industry, and it would be wrong to deprive Tore and his
fellow race-pimps of their chance to earn a living.”
“If the US is not yet “post-racial,” it’s because blacks keep screaming
“Racism” at every imagined injustice.”
The debate, therefore, often moves from discussion to accusations—for those who assert
that America has attained a post-racial status, the real racists are those who see racism,
whereas for those who deny the post-racial narrative, the denial of racism becomes a new
form of racism (Wise 2010), or at the very least allows racism to continue unabated. And
in doing so, the debate now encompasses not whether racism is bad, but whether racism
even exists, how it is manifested, and to what degree.
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II.

The post-racial narrative on trial: What the numbers say about
prejudice and discrimination in twenty-first century America
“We are not a nation devoid of racial discrimination nor are we a nation
where race does not matter. Race and racism are still critical factors in
determining what happens and who gets ahead in America. The election
of Barack Obama ushered in this silly term and now that he’s begun
running for re-election, I’m here to brusquely escort it out of the party
called American English because it’s a con man of a term, selling you a
concept that doesn’t exist… “Post-racial” is a mythical idea that should be
as painful to the mind’s ear as fingernails on the chalkboard are to the
outer ear. It’s an intellectual Loch Ness Monster. It is indeed a monster
because it’s dangerous.”
- Toure (2011)
“In a way, Toure is right. There are still many racists in America; they
vary in skin hue. However, there is no longer organized, institutionalized
racism that can keep groups from opportunity. Yes, there are individual
racists, and individual people are discriminated against. However, those
discriminated against can go down the block to where there is no racist.”
- Commentator response to Toure (2011), The New York Times
comments section
Although anecdotes evidencing the success of Barack Obama, Oprah and other

Black Americans may continue to spur a debate over whether the U.S. has fulfilled its
post-racial promise, statistical evidence of racial prejudice and discrimination puts the
post-racial narrative on shakier ground. Indeed, skeptics of the post-racial narrative can
point not only to anecdotal evidence, but also to studies measuring explicit and implicit
racism, as well as studies measuring discriminatory outcomes in a variety of areas of
Americans’ day-to-day lives.
While the post-racial narrative uses Barack Obama’s election as proof that racism
no longer pervades the American way of thinking, let alone American behavior,
Americans’ explicit anti-black attitudes seem to have gotten worse in the four years since
the president’s historic election, not better—in 2008, 48% of white Americans expressed
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anti-black attitudes, compared to 51% white Americans in 2012 (Associated Press 2012).
Reactions trying to distract from the Associated Press study included questioning how
pervasive anti-white attitudes are amongst the Black community, and pointing out that
the pervasiveness of anti-black attitudes is barely a majority of America and hardly a sign
of racism running rampant. However, neither reaction succeeds in explaining away the
pervasiveness of prejudice in a supposedly post-racial society-- in the former, the
presence of anti-white sentiment (albeit problematic) would not, or does not, balance out
the presence of anti-black attitudes; in the latter, arguing that only 51% of white
Americans outwardly express anti-black sentiments hardly seems like cause for
optimism, let alone cause for accepting the post-racial narrative.
When statistics start speaking to the outcomes faced by Black Americans, in
contrast with those outcomes received by their white counterparts, the post-racial
narrative is called even further into question. Discrimination against the Black
community has been observed in studies regarding the workforce, the education system,
the health care system, housing and lending practices, and the criminal justice system.
And when discrimination hasn’t been traced as the direct cause of a specific area of racial
disparities, it often is rooted, by way of spill-over effects, in other areas where
discrimination is a major factor.
Discrimination in the workforce has been documented in a variety ways that can
be more generally categorized as pertaining to either the hiring process or to wages and
employment levels. Studies show racial discrimination persisting in the hiring process,
revealing that job applicants with “white sounding names” are about fifty percent more
likely to be called back for an interview than applicants with “Black sounding names,”
12

even when their qualifications are indistinguishable (Bertrand & Mullainathan 2004;
Wise 2010, 88). Even white men who claim to have a felony record have been shown to
receive call-backs at slightly higher rates than Black applicants without a criminal record.
And even when researchers sent out more qualified Black applicants, their white
applicants still received interviews twice as often (Pager & Western 2005; Wise 2010,
89). In terms of employment rates, Blacks with bachelor’s degrees have been
documented as being twice as likely to be unemployed as non-Hispanic whites (Brown,
Carnoy, Currie, Duster, Oppenheimer, Shultz & Wellman 2003, 35; Wise 2010, 66), and
in terms of wages, the earnings gap between college-educated Blacks and whites has
actually grown in recent years (Associated Press 2009; Wise 2010, 66).
In the education system, discrimination exists in a variety of ways as well;
teachers and administrators have been observed treating minority students differently
than their white counterparts when subjectivity is allowed to enter into the decision
making process, and the opportunities that are present in predominantly minority schools
prevent even the best students at those schools from being competitive when pitted
against students from non-minority schools. To the former point, studies have shown that
Black students are disproportionally likely to be classified as learning disabled and placed
in special education programs, especially when the placement is based on more
subjective categories of disorders, like emotional disturbance, rather than for medically
diagnosable disorders (Shavers & Shavers 2006; Wise 2010, 104), and that (independent
of neighborhood factors and school quality) teachers with the most experience, highest
levels of certification and best track records in terms of boosting achievement, choose to
leave schools when the number of Black students enrolled begins to increase (Jackson
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2009; Wise 2010, 102). To the latter point, studies have documented that predominantly
minority schools are less likely to offer honors and AP courses which prevents students
from being able to successfully compete against students at other schools (their GPA
can’t be as high, due to weighting, and they can’t prove they’ve done as well in
challenging courses) (Orfield & Eaton 1996; Asian Law Caucus 2003; Grant-Thomas
2010; Wise 2010, 106-107). Studies also show that students at those schools have less
than a fifty-percent chance of having math or science teachers with a degree in their field,
and that new teachers in all fields at those schools are five times as likely to be
unlicensed in what they are teaching (Darling-Hammond 1998; Wise 2010, 103).
Studies have also documented racial discrepancies in the health care system, and
while these discrepancies are usually dismissed as products of differences in wealth and
insurance (both of which link to discrepancies in areas like employment and education),
to dismiss racial discrimination as playing a key role would be to turn a blind eye to a
major factor. For example, Black households with annual incomes of $35,000 or more
have higher rates of infant mortality than white households with annual incomes of less
than $10,000. Similarly, Black women who have attained at least a bachelor’s degree
have a higher rate of infant mortality than white women who dropped out before even
entering high school, and when only comparing Black and white women with college
degrees, the infant mortality rate for children born to Black women is nearly three times
higher (Wise 2010, 114-115). And infant mortality isn’t the only health area affected by
these discrepancies. Amongst Black and white individuals with similar incomes,
education and employment, for example, the racial gap in the outcome of hypertension
cases is wider amongst those who would be considered middle-to-upper-class than
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amongst those who are poorer (Graves 2004, 133; Wise 2010, 114). And when
comparing similarly situated Black and white individuals (for example, controlling for
things like age, gender, income, geography, health, etc.) researchers have found that
Black women are twenty-five percent less likely to receive mammography screening and
that Black patients are sixty percent less likely to be referred for, and to receive coronary
angioplasty or bypass surgery (Brown et al. 2003, 15 & 46; Wise 2010, 122).
Part of the explanation for the persisting racial disparities can be traced to studies
documenting (likely subconscious) forms of discrimination by those within the medical
field, especially doctors. In one study doctors perceived Black patients (who the doctors
believed were real, although they were not) to be less intelligent, less likely to fully
participate in treatment and more likely to miss scheduled appointments; they also
believed that the Black patients were less likely than the white patients to benefit from
various invasive procedures despite both being presented with identical symptoms for the
Black and white patients (Brown et al. 2003, 48; Wise 2010, 123). In another study
doctors were more apt to recommend life-saving drugs to hypothetical patients who were
white than hypothetical patients who were Black (Cohen 2009; Wise 2010, 122), perhaps
because of the beliefs about Black patients demonstrated in the aforementioned study.
Thus, it perhaps shouldn’t be surprising that an aggregate study of racial disparities in the
quality of cardiovascular care found that nearly all of the eighty-one studies indicated that
Black patients received inferior treatment (Wise 2010, 122). It is also possible that
disparities in health are attributable, in part, to housing conditions, which is another area
that has seen persistent discrimination.
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Although racial discrimination in terms of housing has decreased over the
decades, racial discrimination in housing still occurs and generally comes in the form of
“steering” wherein agents guide minorities into minority neighborhoods, even if the
purchasers prefer to see a wider swatch of residential options. Studies estimate that
between two million and three-point-seven million instances of race-based housing
discrimination against minorities occurs each year in the United States (Massey &
Denton 1993, 200; McCoy & Vincent 2008, 128; Wise 2010, 98). For example, a 2012
report released by the Department of Housing and Urban Development that sent pairs of
testers (one white, one minority) into twenty-eight metropolitan areas, found that
regardless of age, gender and qualifications to rent/buy, the minority testers were told
about and shown fewer units/homes by realtors than the white testers (Gamboa 2013;
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2012).
Once the decision to buy has been made, minorities also face discrimination in
lending practices. Racial discrimination in terms of loans often comes in the form of
“subprime mortgages” or other loans with less than desirable interest rates. Studies have
revealed that even high-income Black borrowers are more likely than low-income whites
to wind up with a high-cost loan (Applied Research Center 2009; Wise 2010, 98) and that
Black households with annual incomes of at least $68,000 are still five times more likely
to have a subprime mortgage than white households with similar or even less income
(Powell & Roberts 2009; Wise 2010, 99). Studies have also shown that even when Black
families have better credit, higher incomes, more savings, and less debt than white
families, they are treated worse by lenders sixty percent of the time. They were more
likely to be actively discouraged by the lender and told they would not be able to afford
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homes, and were given less information about loans or home availability. On average,
Black testers were also quoted interest rates a quarter-point higher than the less qualified
white testers (Spatter 2009; Wise 2010, 101). Some of these disparities may arise from
subconscious prejudices, but affidavits from former Wells Fargo (bank) employees
revealed overt racism in play as well; according to those employees, loan officers at the
bank regularly referred to Black customers as “mud people” to whom they sold “ghetto
loans,” and those loan officers were rewarded by the bank with financial bonuses for
pushing subprime loans in minority neighborhoods (Powell 2009; Wise 2010, 99-100).
Finally, racial discrimination has been documented along many stops within the
criminal justice system, including interactions with the police, the attitudes of jurors, and
punishments that derive from state prosecutors and/or judges. Much of the disparities
occur in the context of the U.S. War on Drugs. For example, in a Seattle case study,
officers focused their efforts in a particular downtown drug market where the frequency
of drug transactions was much lower than in predominantly white areas of the city;
additionally, in racially mixed open-air markets Black dealers were far more likely to be
arrested than white dealers who were equally present and visible to police (Beckett,
Nyrop, Pfingst & Bowen 2005; Beckett, Nyrop & Pfingst 2006; Alexander 2010, 124).
In case studies in New Jersey and Maryland, officers pulled Black drivers over at a
severely disproportionate rate even though they violated traffic laws at the same rate as
white drivers; what’s more, when they were pulled over, white drivers were actually
almost twice as likely to have illegal drugs or contraband in their car than were the Black
drivers who were pulled over at a higher rate (Harris 2003, 80; Alexander 2010, 131).
Again, some degree of racial prejudice is a likely explanatory factor, especially when
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considering a study involving officers in a “shoot or hold fire” simulation; in the
simulations, officers were quicker to shoot unarmed Black subjects than they were to
shoot at armed white subjects (Correll, Park, Judd & Wittenbrink 2002; Payne 2001;
Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie & Davies 2004; Alexander 2010, 104; Wise 2010, 84).
Jurors have also been observed to hold prejudicial attitudes; whether it was due to
subconscious or overt prejudice, participants in hypothetical scenarios were more apt to
misremember aggressive conduct by Black subjects than to correctly remember
aggressive conduct by white subjects (Levinson 2007; Wise 2010, 85). Similarly,
participants were more apt to misremember that the unspecified perpetrator in a news
segment was Black (Gilliam & Iyengar 2000; Steinhorn & Diggs-Brown 1999, 155;
Peffley, Shields & Williams 1996; Wise 2010, 85). Such attitudes might help explain
why Black individuals would be hesitant to take a trial to court even if they knew they
were not guilty; such a line of thinking not only leads Black individuals to take plea deals
when they have not committed a crime, but it leads state prosecutors to offer plea deals to
Black individuals when they know the prosecution would not otherwise win the case
(Davis 2007, 31-33; Alexander 2010, 85-88). Studies have documented that “at virtually
every stage of pretrial negotiation, whites are more successful than nonwhites” (Schmitt
1991; Alexander 2010, 115) and that a major reason for the discrepancy is that
prosecutors’ subjective discretion is racially biased; the criminal motivations of Black
offenders are more apt to be attributed to personality flaws such as disrespect than white
offenders whose motivations are more often attributed to external conditions such as
conflict inside the home and/or family (Bridges & Steen 1998; Alexander 2010, 115).
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And if they do go to trial, Black defendants are judged more harshly than white
defendants and receive steeper sentences. For example, studies have revealed that
prosecutors are more than three and a half times more likely to seek the death penalty in
cases involving a Black defendant and white victims than they are to seek the death
penalty in cases involving a white defendant and Black victims and that even after
accounting for thirty-five nonracial variables, defendants accused of killing white victims
were more than four times as likely to receive the death sentence when that was the
sentence prosecutors sought (Alexander 2010, 107). Additionally, the sentencing
disparities between consumers of crack cocaine (a form of the drug more often associated
with poorer, Black drug users) and consumers of powder cocaine (a form of the drug
more often associated with middle-upper class white drug users) persists (Alexander
2010, 109-110) even though Congress’ 2010 Fair Sentencing Act reduced the disparity
from a 100:1 ratio to an 18:1 ratio, and eliminated the mandatory five-year minimum
sentence that used to accompany crack cocaine convictions. Other studies have
documented racial disparities in the likelihood that Black and white juveniles are tried in
an adult court and that they are confined to secure residential facilities, and reveal that
Black juveniles who have never been sentenced to prison before are still six times as
likely to be sentenced to do time as their white counterparts who engaged in identical
crimes (Pope, Lovell & Hsia 2002; Hinton Hoytt, Schiraldi, Smith & Ziedenbert 2002;
Poe-Yamagata & Jones 2000; Alexander 2010, 115). And, adding an extra layer of
difficulty for Black defendants, prosecutors are often able to eliminate minority members
from the jury by way of peremptory strikes (Alexander 2010, 116-120).

19

The racial disparities in the criminal justice system cannot simply be dismissed as
a product of disparate rates of drug use or drug dealing among Black individuals in
comparison to white individuals, although such an explanation is often offered anyway.
Instead, studies show that Black individuals are arrested and incarcerated at higher rates
than whites for drug offenses despite similar rates of usage between the two groups. In
fact, studies—although they may be tainted with social desirability factors—actually
show that drug usage is higher among white students, especially “hard” drugs like
cocaine and heroin, and that white teenagers were three times more likely to have sold
drugs than Black teenagers (Snyder & Sickman 2006; Johnston, O’Malley, Bachman &
Schulenberg 2007; Johnston, O’Malley & Bachman 2003; Western 2006, 47; Human
Rights Watch 2000; Alexander 2010, 96-98). Nonetheless, the drug problem in the
United States remains a “Black problem” in the minds of many Americans; when asked
to imagine a hypothetical drug user 95% of respondents admitted to picturing a Black
drug user, and similarly high results were indicated when respondents were asked to
imagine a hypothetical drug trafficker (Watson Burston, Jones & Robertson-Saunders
1995; Alexander 2010, 103). Thus, while the War on Drugs, and criminal justice
policies as a whole, are not thought to be policies that are directly related to race, the
connection between the two are undeniable.
III.

Moving beyond the debate over the emergence of a post-racial America:
Questioning whether the post-racial narrative is relevant to documented
racial discrimination
There are, then, ample and abundant examples of racial discrimination occurring

in a variety of areas of Black Americans’ day to day lives that are worth considering
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when discussing the supposed arrival of a post-racial United States. However, the
preceding discussion of whether or not we have yet witnessed the emergence of a
sustained post-racial society fails to address a very important follow up question: it fails
to address whether the divisiveness in perceptions of the prevalence of racial prejudice
negatively impacts the quality of solutions to the racial discrimination catalogued in the
previous section. As has already been stated, it is rare for individuals in the United States
to openly embrace racism; the prejudice that occurs in our society and our politics is
overwhelmingly viewed as being problematic when it does occur. This is true of those
individuals who show subtle and/or subconscious forms of prejudice themselves, but it is
even true of those individuals who openly wear their prejudice (and at times hostility)
toward Black Americans on their sleeve. Again, the discussion in the U.S. rarely
concerns whether or not racism is bad, but whether or not it exists, and if it does exist, to
what extent.
But the discussion over whether or not racial prejudice remains a problem in a
post-Obama, twenty-first century American is normally accompanied by lamentations
from skeptics of the post-racial narrative as well. The fear is that if people are unaware
of the persistence of racial prejudice in the United States, that they will see little reason to
support policy measures aimed at correcting racial injustices, such as those forms of
discrimination cited previously herein. Even amongst those Americans who believe
discrimination to be a problem, the motivation to address it might be lacking if they
perceive prejudice to be largely a relic of America’s dirty past. If individuals buy into the
post-racial hype, it is thought, any further progress is stalled.
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It is this thought process, these lamentations, which have inspired this broader
project, however, because they have not been tested. The assumption that Americans
who perceive higher levels of racial prejudice persisting in our current society will be
more apt to support policies aimed at correcting discrimination (all other variables held
constant) may seem like a reasonable one, but the social sciences are fraught with
examples of reasonable, common sense assumptions failing to hold when looked at
empirically. Thus, they are worth putting to the test. It may very well be the case (as will
later be hypothesized) that those who perceive higher levels of the prevalence of racial
prejudice will be more apt to support policies designed to combat prejudice’s effects—
and alternatively that those who perceive lower levels of the prevalence of racial
prejudice will be more apt to oppose those policies since they would not seem to be
necessary—but it might also be the case that skeptics of the post-racial narrative are
worrying themselves over consequences that are unlikely to be related to individuals’
perceptions of the current state of the U.S. race relations.
IV.

Moving forward: An outline of what follows
Having spent time explaining the state of America’s post-racial debate, the

context in which the debate currently resides, and the motivating factors in exploring
whether differences in perceptions of the prevalence of racial prejudice in the U.S. even
matter, the remainder of this dissertation project will move forward on investigating
whether there are any effects of post-racial thinking (or the rejection of post-racial
thinking) on racial policy preferences. In order to do so, the trajectory of the dissertation
will be divided into five subsequent chapters.
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Chapter Two introduces the concept of meta-stereotyping as a way of measuring
perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice. Meta-stereotypes are more easily understood
as stereotypes about stereotypes; in this case, they assess how pervasive an individual
believes any given stereotype is in relation to certain racial and ethnic groups. The idea
that meta-stereotypes impact opinion and behavior is well documented in other areas of
the social sciences, yet they have not been introduced in a way that tests their effects on
political inclinations, such as the likelihood that policies impacted by race (whether
purposefully or incidentally) will be supported or opposed. Motivated by the research on
meta-stereotyping’s impact in other fields, this dissertation draws on (a) the theoretical
concept of “double-consciousness” articulated by W.E.B. DuBois, wherein Black
individuals are always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, (b) the political
socialization literature, and (c) the theories of common and linked fate, wherein
individuals interpret whether their own experiences and self-interests may be shaped by
the experiences and interests of other people who are “like them.” Chapter Two also
introduces this dissertation’s hypotheses regarding the effects of perceived prejudice on
individuals’ racial policy preferences.
Chapter Three introduces the methodological justifications for conducting an
original experimental survey; in doing so, the overall strengths and weaknesses of
experimental studies are discussed, as are the specific strengths and weaknesses of this
dissertation’s specific experimental survey design and instrument. The chapter
introduces readers to the project’s subjects, to the treatment groups (including vignettes)
to which those subjects were randomly assigned, and to the specific questions that are
most pertinent to the study—i.e. those measuring meta-stereotypes (and, by extension, a
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composite score indicating overall perceptions of the prevalence of racial prejudice),
those measuring perceptions of the prevalence of discriminatory outcomes (an alternative
to meta-stereotyping’s potential effects) and those which measure subjects’ policy
preferences.
Chapter Four will use the data from this project’s respondents to better understand
meta-stereotyping in the United States from a descriptive standpoint. The chapter will
investigate whether or not the meta-stereotypes held by the Black and white community
are accurate—that is, do they reflect the actual rate of stereotyping against Black
Americans—and will compare meta-stereotypes regarding white perceptions of Blacks
against meta-stereotypes pertaining to white perceptions of other racial and ethnic
minority groups. Additionally, the chapter will investigate whether there are certain
demographic traits that are more likely to lead to higher meta-stereotypes, such as race,
partisanship, ideology, age, education, gender and region. Lastly, the chapter will
compare subjects’ levels of meta-stereotyping when using different types of questions to
measure the concept—first, the chapter will compare subjects’ meta-stereotypes when
using a dichotomous measure versus an interval 101-point scale; second, the chapter will
compare subjects’ meta-stereotypes when using more abstract concepts (such as the two
previously mentioned measures) versus a more concrete, real-world application of the
concept via assessments of likely prejudice and discrimination in hypothetical scenarios.
Chapter Five will move beyond a descriptive account of the data and assess the
validity of the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2 in an analytical fashion. Making use of
the experimental design described in Chapter 3, this chapter begins by conducting
ANOVA analyses with the data. Failing to locate meta-stereotyping as a causal
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mechanism driving racial policy preferences in such analyses, however, this chapter then
moves to investigating meta-stereotypes as a factor that could be significantly related to
higher levels of support for policies aimed at alleviating racial injustice while using OLS
regression analyses.
Chapter Six concludes this dissertation project by attempting to make sense of the
mixed results in Chapter 5, while considering how the information provided by this study
can best serve academics and racial justice advocates alike. The chapter also considers
possible flaws in the research design that should be addressed in future studies of metastereotyping, and potential theoretical considerations that may need to be built into any
future research projects on the topic of meta-stereotyping’s effects on racial policy
preferences. The chapter concludes by asserting that, regardless of the null findings
regarding meta-stereotyping’s effects in this project, academics should continue to
investigate the reasons for which Americans—overwhelmingly in favor of such broad
concepts as equality, fairness, justice, etc.—are nonetheless reluctant to support policies
that are designed to achieve those very principles that continue to allude the Black
community in twenty-first century America.

25

CHAPTER 2:
THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR STUDYING META-STEREOTYPES’
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON RACIAL POLICY PREFERENCES
This project looks at the effects that meta-level perceptions have upon racial
policy preferences and is an area that, to this point, has not been explored in terms of
their effects on political decision making. Meta-level analyses move beyond the potential
effects of individuals’ own, outward beliefs and attitudes, and instead explore the
potential effects of individuals’ beliefs and attitudes about others’ beliefs and attitudes.
This project is specifically interested in the potential effects of meta-stereotypes. That is,
this project explores the potential effects of stereotypes about stereotypes.
This project is keenly interested in the varying perceptions Americans within, and
across, the Black and white communities now hold regarding the state of U.S. race
relations. Perceptions on this topic may range from believing that we have achieved a
truly post-racial society wherein race is not only surmountable, but is unlikely to be
considered a potential detriment in the first place—highlighted by the emergence of
powerful Black individuals like Barack Obama and Oprah Winfrey—to believing that the
U.S. has seen little progress in race relations because the nation is still a remarkably racist
society, both at the individual and institutional levels. Many individuals’ opinions,
however, fall somewhere between these two extremes, and because there is no unified
perception of U.S. race relations, this paper expects to find differences in the way these
perceptions impact support for, or opposition to, policies aimed at correcting racial
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injustice; specifically, this project looks at the policies of affirmative action, criminal
justice reforms, and racial profiling. After all, if citizens are framing issues in two
completely different perceived realities, it is no wonder that these debates are still
brewing with little inclination of being resolved any time soon.
Meta-level analyses of perception are present in the sociological and
psychological literature, however, and so this chapter will clarify a host of necessary
background concepts that served as the building blocks for current meta-level research.
Likewise, this chapter will highlight how these concepts contribute to the theoretical
foundations upon which analyses of meta-level perceptions’ non-political effects have
been formed.
The perceptions experienced by individuals or collective groups can be discussed
on a number of different fronts, but most pertinent to this project are those perceptions
projected upon another group (stereotypes) and those perceptions that are internalized in
response to expectations about one group perceives another group (meta-stereotypes).
The literature on stereotyping is plentiful and can be found within many social science
disciplines due to the importance they have been shown to have upon the psyche, social
interactions, and political discourse and decision making; however, the literature on
meta-stereotyping is less plentiful, especially as it pertains to public opinion or political
behavior.
I.

Stereotypes
Stereotypes are broadly defined as “cognitive structures that contain the

perceiver’s knowledge, beliefs and expectations about human groups” (Hamilton and
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Trolier 1986), and have been more simply described as “pictures in the head” (Lippman
1922), “exaggerated beliefs” (Allport 1954), and “character profiles” (Brown 1986).
Stereotypes are part of the categorization process (Tajfel 1969) and act as cognitive
constructs in order to help people explain phenomena related to their understanding of
groups (McGarty, Yzerbyt & Spears 2002). As such, stereotypes form when a group has
been “otherized” (Pickering 2001). Stereotypes extend to groups on account of gender,
sexuality, religion, age, race and ethnicity, to name only a few. They ultimately heighten
differences between groups (Judd & Park 1988, 1995; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff & Ruderman
1978) and tell a story about the relationship between groups1 (Wilder 1984), both of
which fosters an “us vs. them” mentality which, in turn, creates stronger group
attachments and inflates the individual’s tendency to identify with their social group
(Tajfel & Turner 1986). This process then further perpetuates the stereotypes that divide
the two groups in the first place (Greene 1999) and creates additional intergroup conflict
(Tajfel 1981; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell 1987).
The study of stereotyping within the political science literature has taken two
trajectories: the effects of stereotyping and the prevalence of stereotyping. Researchers
have long been interested in the effects of stereotypes, especially negative stereotypes, on
those individuals who hold the stereotypes about an out-group and on those individuals
who are on the receiving end of a stereotype or set of stereotypes. As the effects of
stereotyping relate specifically to political science, researchers have found overwhelming
support for the expectation that those who stereotype a group, and are overall more

1

For example, taking a cue from specific negative stereotypes, a member of an otherized
group could infer their relationship with the dominant group in a more general way—
“they feel superior to us” or “they despise us”.
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prejudiced against a group, allow those feelings to infiltrate their political decision
making model when racial policies are addressed (Bobo & Kluegel 1993; Schuman,
Steeh, Bobo & Krysan 1997; Krysan 2000). Stereotypes, by nature, give way to the
“ultimate attribution error” (Pettigrew 1979) and contribute to the development of
ideologies that justify discriminatory behavior (Jackman & Senter 1983; Stroebe & Insko
1989; Bar-Tal, Grauman, Kruglanski & Stroebe 1989); thus, it is not surprising that
stereotypes color political discourse and political information processes. Among the
issues affected by racial stereotyping and overarching racial prejudice are welfare (Gilens
1996, 1999, 2004; Peffley, Hurwitz & Sniderman 1997), criminal justice (Alexander
2010; Gilliam, Valentino & Beckmann 2002; Peffley et al. 1997), school integration
(Smith 1990), neighborhood integration (Bobo & Zubrinsky 1996; Farley, Steeh, Krysan,
Jackson & Reeves 1994), healthcare (Haynes & Smedley 1999; Smedley & Syme 2000;
Smelser, Wilson & Mitchell 2001; Smedley, Stith & Nelson 2002), housing and lending
practices (Pager & Shepherd 2008; Turner, Ross, Gaister & Yinger 2002), employment
practices (Bertrand & Mullainathan 2004; Pager & Shepherd 2008), equal opportunity
programs and multiculturalism (Link & Oldendick 1996).
Given the widespread effects stereotyping has on policy preferences, of which the
stereotyped racial minority is often the target, the hope would be that stereotyping would
be the practice of the few rather than the many. However, research seems to suggest
otherwise. A number of studies in the early part of the twentieth-century confirmed the
expectation that negative stereotyping of racial and ethnic minorities was prevalent in the
United States (Katz & Braly 1933; Gilbert 1951; Karlins, Coffman & Walters 1969).
Given the tumultuous climate of race relations during that era, the confirmation of racial
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and ethnic stereotyping is not surprising. However, the continued confirmation of racial
and ethnic stereotyping pervading American society throughout the latter half of the
twentieth-century, and into the twenty-first, is likely to surprise many individuals who
buy into the post-racial narrative. Despite the fact that overt expressions of racial
stereotyping and prejudice have declined (Jaynes and Williams 1989), studies
consistently find a notable portion of the white American population that not only holds
on to negative stereotypes of racial and ethnic groups, but also are willing to admit to as
much when asked by researchers (Smith 1990; Peffley & Hurwitz 1993).2 Other research
suggests that even if respondents aren’t willing to admit to racist inclinations, the notions
that white opposition to racially targeted policies is due to non-racial factors, and that
those who are motivated by race are limited in number and indicative of uneducated
xenophobes, are but a ruse (Sears, van Laar, Carrillo & Kosterman 1997). These latter
findings may result from an authentic naivety, wherein respondents are truly unaware of
their own prejudice. It may also be the case, however, that respondents have learned how
to talk about race in a way that allows them to simultaneously deny racial prejudice,
while using coded language and explanations to convey a racialized message to likeminded individuals (Burton 2013).
II.

Perceptions of the U.S. racial climate in the mid-to-late 20th century
What is interesting about the prevalence of racial stereotyping, and the ensuing

rise it gives to racial prejudice, is the disparity between white Americans’ assessments of

2

For further discussion, see: Bobo, Lawrence. 2001. “Racial Attitudes and Relations at
the Close of the Twentieth-Century”. In Neil Smelser, William J. Wilson and Faith N.
Mitchell (Eds.), America Becoming: Racial Trends and their Implications, vol. 1.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
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racial tensions versus those of Black Americans. Research routinely suggests that Black
Americans hold a more pessimistic view of race relations than their white counterparts.
A 1994 Sigelman & Welch study found that one in four Blacks agreed that more than half
of white Americans “personally share the attitudes of groups like the Ku Klux Klan
toward Blacks” and only ten percent say that “only a few” whites share such views, while
at the same time only one in twenty white respondents agreed that “over half” of their
white in-group members held such views and a third of them said “only a few” held such
beliefs. Other studies have found that Blacks exaggerate the conservatism of whites,
while whites exaggerate the liberalism of Blacks (Hagen & Glaser 1993) and that Black
Americans perceive “most whites” to hold a wide variety of negative stereotypes of their
racial in-group (Sigelman & Tuch 1997).
The disparities between the documented levels of perceived prejudice in the Black
and white communities leads to a better understanding of studies documenting disparities
in the perception of the overall racial climate in the country as well. For example, in
1962 and 1963, between two-thirds and nearly ninety percent of Gallup Poll respondents
nonetheless reported that they believed blacks were treated equally with regard to jobs,
schools and housing (The Gallup Organization 2001). This, despite the lingering effects
of segregation and the continuation of rampant, legal inequalities, neither of which would
be addressed by the national government until later in the decade (the 1964 Civil Rights
Bill banning segregation in the workplace and public accommodations, and the 1969
Civil Rights Bill banning housing discrimination). Given the differences in perceptions
about the state of race relations in the U.S., it is not surprising that Americans who failed
to acknowledge inequality would also think that the civil rights movement was
31

overstepping its bounds. Indeed, in 1963, seventy-five percent of white respondents
explained that the civil rights movement was asking for “too much” (Steinhorn & DiggsBrown 1999). Such attitudes might seem misguided in hindsight, even a bit shocking
but, when taken in concert with the findings of the aforementioned surveys, it becomes
easier to imagine that those respondents might have disapproved of the civil rights
movement for asking for more than they thought was necessary given that their perceived
reality was framed around a society that exhibited low levels of racial prejudice in the
first place and thus had little to correct in terms of U.S. race relations.
III.

Meta-stereotypes
Unlike the effects of stereotypes, which have been well-documented within the

political science literature, the effects of individuals’ perceptions of others’ stereotypes is
an avenue for exploration. This project aims to fill this gap and does so by reintroducing,
and extending, the idea of meta-level perceptions into the political science literature. The
primary meta-level perceptions studied thus far are meta-stereotypes, and these will also
be the primary interest of the present study. While stereotypes evaluate groups in terms
of that groups’ own characteristics, meta-stereotypes evaluate groups in terms of what
individuals believe regarding the way other groups—in this case, white Americans—
stereotype members of the group in question. A meta-stereotype has been defined as “a
person’s beliefs regarding the stereotype that out-group members hold about his or her
own group” (Vorauer, Main & O’Connell 1998). In simpler terms, and with the scope of
this project in mind, a meta-stereotype is measured by asking the following individuals:
“What do I (a Black American) think that they (white Americans) think about us (Black
Americans in general)?” or, when approaching meta-stereotypes from the vantage point
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of the majority in-group whose beliefs are being perceived, “What do I (a white
American) think that we (white Americans) think about them (Black Americans in
general)?” Additionally, and though this project is mainly interested in meta-stereotypes
concerning the Black community, meta-stereotypes can measure perceptions of
stereotyping against other minority groups. For example, Black respondents may be
asked “What do I (a Black American), think that they (white Americans), think about
them (Hispanic/Arab/Asian Americans)?” and white respondents may be asked “What do
I (a white American), think that we (white Americans), think about them
(Hispanic/Arab/Asian Americans).
IV.

Meta-stereotypes as a way of capturing “double-consciousness”
Research on meta-stereotypes speak to the “double-consciousness” articulated by

W.E.B. Du Bois (1903) wherein Blacks view themselves through their own lens, as well
as through the lens of white society:
“After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and the Roman, the Teuton and
the Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and
gifted with second-sight in this American world, -- a world which yields
him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the
revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this doubleconsciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes
of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in
amused contempt or pity. One ever feels his two-ness, -- an American, a
Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring
ideas in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being
torn asunder.” (12).
The internalization of this double-consciousness, according to Du Bois, effects
not only Black thoughts, but Black actions as well; the double-consciousness
forces Black individuals to make decisions about their outward appearance and
personality, and may compel some to take action (133).
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Indeed, Du Bois’ theory of double-consciousness seems to ring true a century
later. Predicated upon the salience of white racial attitudes and beliefs, this doubleconsciousness is well-documented and points toward this project’s assertion that metastereotypes should be, and likely are, politically relevant. In a study on social awareness,
Sheldon & Johnson (1993) found that thinking about the way an individual believes
he/she is viewed by another person ranked third among eight types of awareness, only
behind thinking about their own feelings and their own thoughts about others, and ranked
second out of the four self-targeted types of awareness. With this in mind, Black
individuals’ tendency to consider whites’ stereotypes and prejudice against their minority
in-group is not only made possible, but may also probable. Thus, when Torres & Charles
(2004) documented Black college students’ proclivity to correctly identify the negative
perceptions of their in-group held by white students, and to then take those metastereotypes into consideration when engaging in inter-group behavior and when thinking
about the university’s race-based policies, they extended the work on meta-level
perceptions documented earlier by Sigelman and colleagues.
Sigelman & Tuch (1997) documented the accuracy3 of Blacks’ meta-stereotyping
on many different content-factors using data from a 1991 Time/CNN poll. The study
revealed high rates of meta-stereotyping; that is, a substantial portion of the poll’s Black
sample reported thinking that “most whites” endorsed the stereotypes that Blacks are

3

It should be noted here that accuracy does not whether or not Blacks are lazy, violent,
etc., or even whether or not an individual him/herself thinks their own in-group is lazy,
violent, etc. Instead, the accuracy of a meta-stereotype refers to whether an individual
properly identified whether or not another group (in this case whites) held stereotypes
against his/her in-group—that is, whether their perception of another group’s perceptions
of their own group accurately reflect the perceptions of their own group held by the outgroup in question.
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“violence-prone” (82%), “lazy” (69%), “unintelligent” (76%), and that they “prefer to
live off welfare” (75%). In fact, the only stereotype that less than a majority of the Black
sample perceived to be held by “most whites” was the “unpatriotic” label, though a still
sizeable percentage of those sampled (44%) asserted that “most whites” endorsed that
stereotype as well.
If conceptualizing “most” to mean a majority, as do Sigelman & Tuch, the Black
sample’s meta-stereotypes were accurate regarding the “prefer to live off welfare” and
“violence-prone” content-factors; indeed, more than fifty percent of the whites asked
about these stereotypes admitted to accepting those images of the Black community in
general. Nearly a majority (47%) accepted the image of Blacks being “lazy”, but the
Black sample largely overestimated the perception whites have of Blacks being
“unintelligent” (31%) and “unpatriotic” (18%). Still, while the accuracy (or inaccuracy,
in some cases) of these meta-stereotypes is intriguing in and of itself, this project is more
interested in the rates at which individuals perceive the prevalence of such stereotyping,
whether those meta-stereotypes accurately reflect society or not.
The trend of overestimating, or exaggerating, another groups’ perceptions of an
individual’s in-group was borne out in the aforementioned research performed by
Sigelman & Welch (1994) concerning Blacks’ perceptions of whites’ inclination to adopt
attitudes and beliefs similar to that of the Ku Klux Klan, and the trend continued when
Krueger (1996) explored Black-white perceptions of negative valence.
Omitted from the current literature on meta-stereotyping is the way white
individuals perceive their own in-group as it relates to the stereotyping of minority out-
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groups. Sheldon & Johnson did not include this type of perception in their study of eight
types of awareness, nor are white meta-stereotypes included in the Sigelman &
colleagues’ studies. Thus, there is less data to draw on, and less theory to build on, when
formulating hypotheses about the effects of meta-stereotypes on white individual’s racial
policy preferences.
V.

Acquiring meta-stereotypes as a result of socialization
Meta-stereotypes may be formed through a variety of avenues, but most notable

are their formation through experience with out-group members and through the
socialization process. The process of racial socialization speaks to personal and group
identity, interracial relationships, and social position related to race (Thornton, Chatter,
Taylor & Allen 1990). Meta-stereotypes may be formed when individuals observe
others’ behaviors toward “people like them”, but they may also be formed by relying on
stereotypes which are partially learned via the socialization process (Mendoza 2008).
Many Black individuals continue to feel the residual effects of the blatant prejudice in the
past, now masked by more subtle and covert forms or prejudice (Banks-Wallace 1998;
Cose 1993; Essed 1991). Additionally, Black individuals are socialized to understand
how others perceive “people like them” and how they may expect to be treated as a result
(Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu 2002; Massey, Charles, Lundy & Fisher 2003; Operario &
Fiske 2001). In doing so, the socialization process emphasizes the discrimination that
Blacks Americans have faced throughout history, the belief that discrimination has
negatively affected Blacks’ advancement in society, and a belief that they should,
therefore, fight against discrimination and avoid stereotypical behaviors (Nunnally 2012).
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This last part fuels the expectation that Black Americans are not only aware of
what those stereotypical behaviors are, but that they actively affect their beliefs and
behaviors. The existing research backs the assertion that not only are they aware of
stereotypes (Torres & Charles 2004), but that the prospect of being stereotyped is not just
possible, but perceived to be probable, and that these meta-stereotypes therefore becomes
salient in their day-to-day interactions (Wout, Shih, Jackson & Sellers 2009; Torres &
Charles 2004).4 Thus, despite progressive strides in U.S. race relations, and the resulting
opportunities which have opened to Black Americans, a legacy of distrust, frustration and
anger persists (White & Cones 1999). Overall, judging by the accuracy with which
Blacks’ form meta-stereotypes on many content-factors, and their tendency to overexaggerate (rather than under-exaggerate) when the meta-stereotype is inaccurate,
Blacks’ racial socialization of white beliefs and attitudes about “people like them” seems
both highly attuned to their social and political surroundings, and also very strong.
Another consequence of the strong socialization process in the Black community
is a heightened sense of racial identity; in fact, race generally trumps, or intersects with,
all other social identities, such as gender, sexuality, or class (Simien 2006; Cohen 1999;
Hochschild 1995; Dawson 1994). The socialization process of the Black community
often begins at a young age, but the aspects of this socialization process described above
are continuously reinforced and intensified as children get older by parents (Hughes &

4

These findings suggest that Voraeuer & Ross’ (1993) indication that meta-stereotypes
are less salient than an individual’s own stereotypes—because meta-stereotypes are less
usual and available, and entail more psychological risks—may be overstated; instead, it
appears that even if meta-stereotypes are less available than an individual’s own
stereotypes, he/she still has easy access to meta-stereotypes and uses them quite
frequently when engaging in individuals from another group, or members of another
group en masse.
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Chen 1997), and by other family members, friends and the broader community (Demo &
Hughes 1990). The media, schools and churches also serve as important sources for
learning about being Black in America (Nunnally 2012; Martin and McAdoo 2007;
Dawson 1994). In line with Du Bois’ theory of “double-consciousness,” many Black
parents believe that they are not simply raising an American child, but are also raising a
Black child who will face situations and experiences unique to members of their own
racial group by virtue of being Black (Peters 1985). Studies routinely show a majority of
the Black children and parents engaging in “race talk,” and the percentage raises when
other non-parental actors are considered as socializing agents. Interviews in the early
1990s (Sanders Thompson 1994) revealed that 79% of the study’s Black participants had
discussions of race with their parents, and that 85% of them had discussions concerning
race with other family members. These rates were higher than those documented in
studies during the 1980s (Bowman & Howard 1985; Thornton et al. 1990). Some of
these discussions may have been subtle, but others may have been quite blunt. Recently,
for example, this topic made news in the wake of the death of Trayvon Martin. In an
interview with CNN, Black actor and activist recounted teaching his son what to do if he
was pulled over for speeding by a police officer:
“I taught this to my own son, who is now thirty-three, as part of my duty
as a father to ensure he knows the kind of world in which he’s growing up.
When I get stopped by the police, I take my hat off, I take my sunglasses
off, I roll down my window, take my hands, stick them outside the
window and on the door of the driver side because I want that officer to be
as relaxed as he can be when he approaches my vehicle. And I do that
because I live in America” (Burton 2013).
Burton’s experience points to one possible reason for high levels of racial socialization
and “race talk” in the Black community—the perceived need to adapt their responses to,
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or their behaviors in the face of, social, economic and political barriers (Harrison,
Wilson, Pine, Chan & Buriel 1990).
Alternatively, the socialization process regarding race relations in the U.S. is
typically very different in the white community because white families don’t typically
have the “race talk” as do members of the Black community. Instead, the socialization of
white Americans is geared toward “an orientation that tries hard to ignore racial
differences and to think of themselves as individuals without a racial position” (Carlson
& Chamberlain 2004). An ethnographic study of eighth grade girls in a white suburban
community (Kenny 2000) details the way white parents socialize their children. The
study found that the idea of “color-blindness” in this community meant circumventing the
topic of race altogether; that “tolerance” meant pretending that the construct of race does
not exist, rather than acknowledging it as an obstacle faced by many of their fellow
citizens. And Kenny determined that this supposed “color-blindness” failed to mask the
fact that this white community was very much aware of race; their actions and words
routinely betrayed their aspiration of remaining “color-blind” by highlighting a deep
racial consciousness that was all too obvious. Being able to avoid the issue of race
altogether is a benefit of white privilege, as are the lessons derived from such a “culture
of avoidance” (Baumgartner 1988; Lipsitz 1995) which manifest in ways that stress the
merits of liberal democracy wherein success and failure are individualized and not
institutionalized (Kenny 2000); however, neither the culture of avoidance or the view of
meritocracy are thought to be benefits of a racial privilege when racial privilege is not
acknowledged. In fact, in stark contrast with the Black community, the difficulties
inherent in Kenny’s attempts to “talk race” with white students (receiving pushback from
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the Principal, teachers and parents when the topic of race—even the concept of their own
“whiteness”—was mentioned) suggests that the difference in socialization is not merely
the racial content, but the receptiveness to discussions of race in the first place. A likely
explanation is that in many white communities “to be caught in the act of seeing race [is]
to be caught being ‘prejudiced’” (Frankenberg 1993). This culture of avoidance was,
similarly, documented amongst white college students, although their Black counterparts
at the college were quite interested in talking about racial group issues and the Blackwhite divide (Sheldon 2000).
The concept of white privilege, whether one admits to possessing it or not, also
affects the way the white community engages in “race talk” once it decides to enter the
fray. In this sense, white individuals are socialized to view the issue—or the perceived
non-issue—of race from their own vantage point, and as a consequence often leave the
vantage point of Black Americans out of the discussion (unless the vantage point of the
Black community is being assumed by white discussants based on their preconceived
notions about what it means to be and feel Black).

This aspect of white socialization is

noted by Warren (2000) who explains that for many white individuals, their barometer of
the racial climate is “based not on whether power was racialized nor the degree of
antiblack racism, but rather on [their] comfort level as a white person with ‘dark-skinned’
people” (143). Thus, when white individuals do not feel threatened, intimidated, or bad
around Black individuals, it is difficult for them to think of society as anything but a
racial democracy (Warren 2000). This avoidance and denial of racism, of course, flies in
the face of both anecdote and evidence, but remains as the result of “selective hearing,”
“creative interpretation,” and “complicitous forgetting” (Simpson 1996). This approach
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to forming perceptions about American race relations is also problematic when taken in
concert with statements like those made by Burton (above). If a white individual feels
comfortable around a Black individual, it may not be that the white individual is free
from prejudice; it may be that the Black individual is aware of potential unease and
modifies behavior in a way that manipulates—in a positive way—the pre-conceived
notions of a white individual and their ensuing reactions during their brief interaction.
Even if the white individual in question is unprejudiced, the fact that Black individuals
feel the need to modify their behavior to appease prejudiced whites suggests a potential
racial problem nonetheless. Essentially, the white socialization process regarding race
relations in the U.S. not only suppresses “race talk” in general, but transforms “race talk”
into “white talk” when the topic does come up.
These socialization processes also impact the way Black and white Americans
regard the narrative of the “American Dream.” The American Dream (Adams 1931)
purports that opportunities for success are afforded to all individuals, regardless of the
circumstances of their birth, or their current station in life, and that those opportunities
will be capitalized upon so long as the ability and desire to achieve are there. It is
“characterized by the beliefs that any individual can improve their position in society
(i.e., individual mobility) through hard work (i.e., the Protestant work ethic)” (Wiley,
Deaux & Hagelskamp 2012). This conceptualization of the American Dream is
predicated upon the belief in meritocracy (Hothschild 1995), which itself is predicated
upon (and then reinforces) the belief in fairness and equality (Son Hing, Bobocel, Zanna,
Garcia, Gee & Orazietti 2011). As a result, individuals who believe in a meritocratic
society also perceive that there are few systematic barriers to success, whereas
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individuals who reject the belief that society is meritocratic instead perceive substantial
systematic barriers to success, including factors like racial group membership (Major,
Kaiser, O’Brien & McCoy 2007). The belief in the American Dream, therefore,
contributes to the belief that inequality is acceptable because, under the fair and equal
system of meritocracy, an individuals’ station in life—including those who are stuck in a
low to middling socio-economic class—is attributed to their own lack of effort or ability
(Jost & Hunyady 2002; Major, Gramzow, McCoy, Levin, Schmader & Sidanius 2002;
Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz & Federico 1998; Sidanius & Pratto 1999). Perhaps
unsurprisingly, those who find themselves in better socio-economic situations are more
apt to believe in a system of meritocracy—that is, that their success is due to their own
efforts and abilities, and was not aided by a system designed to “work” for “people like
them” in the first place—whereas those who perceive that their racial group has a lower
socio-economic status stemming, at least in part, to a general sense of disrespect for their
racial group, are more apt to reject the notion of American meritocracy (Levin et al.
1998; Major et al. 2002).
Therefore, differences in the socialization of white and Black Americans, with
regard to the racial climate of the U.S., are likely, therefore, to impact both the strength of
white and Black meta-stereotypes and racial policy preferences. After all, being
socialized to either see prejudice in discrimination is likely to yield meta-stereotypes that
indicate the belief that more white Americans hold negative stereotypes of the Black
community, than would a socialization process that pretends prejudice and race is a nonfactor in American life. Likewise, the differences in these socialization processes are
likely to impact public policy preferences since those who are socialized to believe in a
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system of American meritocracy, for example, might be expected to see policies like
affirmative action as asking for special treatment as opposed to asking for equal
treatment. On the flip side, those who have been socialized to see prejudice and
discrimination in day-to-day life are likely more apt to support policies aimed at
correcting such injustice.
Of course, not all Black Americans will have been socialized in the way described
above, and even those who were socialized in that sense might not ascribe to such beliefs
about the prevalence of racial prejudice and discrimination. While the Black
socialization process might generally entail discussions of bias and distrust (Hughes &
Chen 1997) or “racial barriers,” many Black families or communities might instead focus
on a broader sense of “racial identity,” “self-development” or “egalitarianism” (Bowman
& Howard 1995). Likewise, not all white Americans will have been socialized to avoid
“race talk.” Instead, some white Americans may have been socialized to be highly
attuned to racial differences—either unapologetically reinforcing negative stereotypes,
and displaying a more overt kind of prejudice and racism than do most Americans in the
twenty-first century, or apologetically highlighting disparities between the way white and
Black Americans experience opportunity and outcomes in America today. These
differences in socialization, however, are expected to affect meta-stereotypes between
racial groups, and even within racial groups, and thus are expected to affect support or
opposition to racial policies too.
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VI.

From socialization to a fateful collective identity

Taken as a whole, “historical narratives about this racial discrimination are transmitted as
a form of collective memory about blacks’ collective experiences with race and racism…
This information is transferred from generation to generation in a way that conveys the
historical and contemporary group status of African Americans” (Nunnally 2012, 68-69).
In addition to socialization about Black group status, which Nunnally documented as
being the most emphatic of the content-areas she examined, Black socialization also
places heavy emphasis on Black pride and/or Black contributions to society, and on the
necessity to cooperate as a unified racial group across Black ethnicities. Thus, the Black
socialization process ultimately serves to create a group consciousness and group
closeness, which fosters a collective identity around their “Blackness.” This awareness
of one’s Blackness, and the importance given to that particular social identity, stems in
part from a “double-consciousness” that is aware of the awareness and importance white
Americans give to their Blackness as well.
The heightened sense of discrimination as a result of their “Blackness” helps
explain the relatively low sense of control Black Americans reported having concerning
their own fate in the late 1970s compared to their white counterparts (Cummings 1977).
This idea that fate is determined by something other than a system of meritocracy
continues into the twenty-first century, and individual fate has instead been
conceptualized as being dependent upon the fate of the Black racial group as a whole.
The theories of common fate (Gurin, Hatchett & Jackson 1989) or linked fate (Dawson
1994) speak to this conceptualization; the theories measure whether individuals feel that
what generally happens to Black people in the U.S. has something to do with what
44

happens in their own lives, and suggests that this process is representative of a “black
utility heuristic” (Dawson 1994). Again, not all Black Americans share a sense of
common or linked fate, but high degrees of common or linked fate have been shown to
affect levels of activism and the acceptance of Black political ideologies (Dawson 2001),
unified voting behaviors and policy preferences (Tate 1993; Dawson 1994), and an
overall inclination to support more liberal policies and the radical egalitarian agenda
(Dawson 2001). This is because a belief in common or linked fate flies in the face of
meritocratic system; thus, “people who perceive that individual mobility is illegitimately
blocked… will be more likely to identify with their group and pursue collective strategies
to improve their status, such as collective action” (Wiley, Deaux & Hagelskamp 2012;
citing Ellemers 1993; Mummendey, Kessler, Klink & Mielke 1999; Verkuyten &
Reijerse 2008).
In contrast, white Americans do not generally exhibit a sense of common or
linked fate because their socialization process does not emphasize their “whiteness” as an
important self identity, nor does it emphasize “whiteness” having an effect on life’s
opportunities and outcomes, even though in many cases it does have a bearing. Coupled
with an emphasis that is instead placed on meritocracy, and the ensuing belief in
individual mobility (Wiley et al. 2012), there are fewer motivating factors in play that
would cause white individuals to similarly favor liberal policies and the racial egalitarian
agenda. However, those white Americans who do identify with Black Americans may be
more apt to support such policy measures.
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VII.

Effects of meta-stereotyping in the psychological and sociological
literature

Armed with the knowledge that negative stereotyping has adverse effects on those
being stereotyped and that Blacks in the U.S. are aware of these negative stereotypes (and
at times even exaggerate them), sociology and psychology researchers set out to
determine whether meta-stereotypes, too, have adverse effects on those perceiving
stereotypes against their in-group. Within those studies, researchers have concluded that
the effects of meta-stereotypes are plentiful and wide-ranging, and that individuals who
perceive meta-stereotypes often adapt their behavior in a way to cope with the perceived
“stereotype threat” (Steele 1997; Steele & Aronson 1995; Steele, Spencer & Aronson
2002). Psychologically, common reactions to negative meta-stereotypes are anxiety
(Stephan & Stephan 1985; Steele, Spencer & Aronson 2002) and “stigmatization”
(Crocker & Major 1989; Crocker 1999; Major & O’Brien 2005), and in response
common sociological modifications to behavior have been demonstrated by way of
aversion (Vorauer, Main & O’Connell 1998), avoidance (Brewer & Brown 1998; Fein &
Spencer 1997; Wills 1981), self-fulfilling prophecy (Merton 1948) and assimilation.
Additionally, when an individual disagrees with a meta-stereotype they may also perceive
a sense of general unfairness (Gomez 2002), which may shed some light on why Blacks
in America are generally more suspicious of whites, perceiving them to be less
trustworthy, less honest and more demanding (Nunnally 2009).
Thus, researchers have concluded that metastereotypes are salient because “a
Black individual’s behavior is not shaped so much by White stereotypes themselves, as
by the person’s perceptions of White stereotypes about Blacks” (Torres & Charles 2004,
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116). As a result, researchers have lamented that the lack of research on metastereotypes
is “unfortunate because metastereotypes, like stereotypes themselves, can decisively
shape the behavior of members of each group” (Sigelman & Tuch 1997, 89). And while
research on the effects of meta-stereotyping is pervasive in other social science
disciplines, these effects have not been tested within the political science literature. The
closest research has come to introducing the concept of meta-stereotypes in a politically
relevant way is the Torres & Charles (2004) piece that shows Black Ivy League students
indicating that they believe white students dislike affirmative action policies due to their
overarching stereotypes and prejudice, and that they feel as though people may assume
that the only reason they are at an Ivy League school is because of the policy rather than
their own accomplishments. Their research stops short, however, at trying to gauge how
these meta-stereotypes might influence their support or opposition to the policy of
affirmative action, and does not introduce any other relevant political matters within their
interviews and subsequent discussion. Thus, while Torres & Charles (2004) strive to
extend the work of Sigelman & Tuch (1997) in a variety of ways, their contributions are
mainly methodological and the contributions to the content only extend our prior
understanding of the prevalence of stereotyping and the accuracy of meta-stereotypes.
What their research does not do is extend our understanding of meta-stereotypes to
politically relevant behavior, despite highlighting a racially charged policy that might be
affected by such perceptions. Thus, while the research up to this point stops short on
testing the effects of meta-stereotypes on racial policy preferences, this research tests
exactly that and, given the known importance of meta-stereotyping on psychological and
sociological processes, this project hypothesizes that meta-stereotypes will affect an

47

individual’s policy preference formation as well. As such, this project’s main hypotheses
follow below.
VIII. Hypotheses
This project’s main concern is investigating whether an individual’s metastereotypes have an effect on their racial policy preferences. Given the theoretical bases
covered in the aforementioned sections of this chapter, the overarching hypothesis being
tested herein is:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Individuals who perceive a higher level of the prevalence of racial
stereotyping (meta-stereotyping) will be more likely to support policies designed to
correct racial injustice than those who perceive a lower level of the prevalence of racial
stereotyping.
In order to evaluate this hypothesis, however, two additional hypotheses must be
investigated. The first of these sub-hypotheses focuses on the different effects that may
be expected given the two racial sub-groups in the study. The second focuses on the
specifics of these potential effects given the experimental nature of this study’s design.
Analyses regarding these two hypotheses will then allow for a fuller assessment of the
main hypothesis (H1) described above.
As noted in the above discussion, Black individuals in America are aware of the
stereotypes against them, often convert that to an overarching sense of prejudice, and are
capable of linking these attitudes and beliefs to white support for or opposition to various
policy preferences. Because the policy preferences measured within this project’s survey
instrument are of a broader scope, rather than being individual incidents within a larger
policy debate, respondents will not have the aid of individuating information (about a
specific situation at hand) which has been identified as one way of overriding meta48

stereotypes’ effects (Fiske, Neuberg, Beattie & Milberg 1987; Kunda & Thagard 1996;
Locksley Borgida, Brekke & Hepburn 1980; Nisbett, Zukier & Lemley 1981). Instead,
respondents will be asked to address—by indicating their levels of support for or
opposition to— relevant racial policies that are expansive, rather than contained to one’s
own social setting, and in doing so will not have the benefit of knowing the people and
players involved in any given situation since those people and players are multiple and
ever-changing.5 Based on these meta-stereotypes, respondents who believe that it is
probable that their in-group would be stereotyped when in the presence of out-group
members (especially dominant out-group members; in this case White Americans) are
expected to perceive it as possible—if not probable—that they (or people they know)
would be discriminated against if the political circumstances did not include injusticecorrecting measures such as affirmative action and criminal justice reform.
Although research shows that stereotyping and prejudice are still alive and well in
America, the prevalence of such feelings is nowhere close to being unanimous. In fact,
as was alluded to earlier, the rates at which people admit to holding prejudiced beliefs has
declined since the early half of the twentieth-century. When prejudice is exhibited it is
generally done subtly; the open, almost braggadocios, displays of prejudice have all but
vanished in favor of a new, cultural or symbolic racism (Sears 1988; Kinder & Sears
5

For this study, the issues of affirmative action and criminal justice procedures will be
investigated. The maintenance of affirmative action, and the reform of many criminal
justice procedures, have been argued due to the perceived injustice that occurs within
hiring/admissions and arrests/sentencing that result from a reliance upon individuals
tasked with being race-neutral when many are not. Because they cannot narrow either
issue down to just one or a few individual cases, respondents must contend with the fact
that they do not have individuating information. As such, this project expects that
respondents will fall back on meta-stereotypes when forming their opinions on these
matters.
49

1981; Henry & Sears 2002; Sears & Henry 2003)—sometimes called “racial
resentment”— that is more muted and which can be shrugged off as not being racist at all
(Wise 2010).6 Thus, there is likely to be a wide range of variance in the perception that
their own dominant in-group is still prejudiced against Blacks. Some white respondents
will recognize the pervasiveness of stereotyping and prejudice that still occurs, despite
living in a “post-racial” America, while others are unlikely to recognize or acknowledge
such things.
If the limited research on such matters is any indication, those white individuals
who are low-prejudiced (as measured by their responses to the stereotype questions) and
suspect that they will be judged for their in-group’s prejudiced ways (therefore perceiving
that others perceive people like them to be prejudiced) will feel a similar sense of anxiety
that minority group members experience by way of stereotype threat and may avoid
behaviors that could be misunderstood as prejudicial by out-group members (Devine,
Evett & Vasquez-Suson 1996). The aforementioned hypothesis (H1) makes use of this
research when expecting that one type of behavior that would be affected by such
perceptions is the policy preferences they are willing to go on the record supporting or
opposing.
The emphasis this project’s survey instrument places on whites’ beliefs and
attitudes (as a focus for the meta-stereotype, as opposed to other out-groups or the
American population as a whole) is suitable for the purposes of this project as well
6

For example, arguments that Blacks are naturally inferior have given way to arguments
that Blacks suffer from a “culture of poverty” wherein they simply don’t have the
necessary cultural or social tools at their disposal to properly assimilate into the
American way of life—things like lower economic status, single-family households, poor
educational opportunities, etc. (see Moynihan 1965)
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because most of the power in the United States still is reserved within the white echelon
of society, and because those minority members who do wield power may
subconsciously hold stereotypes against their own in-group as a result of the overall
socialization effects of white American politics and culture.7 Thus, the decision to
emphasize whites’ stereotypes (and Black meta-stereotypes regarding white stereotypes)
is a practical one. The practical purpose does not detract from the theoretical or
methodological soundness of this project, however, because studies suggest that Black
Americans may have certain groups in mind—notably the dominant group, in this case
white Americans—when asked about peoples’ beliefs and attitudes more generally
(Nunnally 2009).
It is possible that the expected results could be diminished or non-existent if
Black individuals rationalize negative stereotypes, even when they do not agree with the
stereotype or even when they dislike the stereotype (Torres & Charles 2004); however it
is still expected that the negative appraisal of those meta-stereotypes, and the recognition
that they have real-world consequences leading to discriminatory practices, will outweigh
such attempts to rationalize such behavior and will, instead, seek to institute policies that
will alleviate the opportunity for offenders to rationalize their stereotypes and prejudice.
With these theoretical considerations in mind, as well as the theoretical considerations
developed due to the different socialization patterns of Black and white individuals (see
Section V) regarding race relations and racial discrimination, the second hypothesis (H2)
reads as follows:
7

This is not to say that minorities in power will be susceptible to racial stereotypes
against their in-group, only that it is possible. This assertion is bolstered by studies that
show many Black individuals, in general, who have subconscious—or implicit—racial
stereotypes held against their own in-group (Wise 2010).
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): The effects of H1 will be stronger for Black individuals than for
white individuals.
This project not only looks for relationships between the strength of metastereotypes and racial policy preferences; it also uses an experimental design to try and
highlight meta-stereotype’s causal effects. In order to achieve this, some respondents
will be primed to consider their meta-stereotypes before answering any questions about
their racial policy preferences, other respondents will have the potential effects of metastereotypes framed within a real-world hypothetical scenario before answering questions
about their racial policy preferences, and a third group of respondents will serve as a
control group wherein they answer questions about racial policy preferences before
answering question about their meta-stereotypes. It is, therefore, hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Subjects in the primed group will show more support for racial
policies aimed at correcting injustice than subjects in the control group. Subjects in the
framing group will show more support for racial policies aimed at correcting injustice
than subjects in the primed group.
The analysis regarding this final hypothesis (H3) is what will ultimately drive the
analysis of this project’s main hypothesis (H1); however, should the analysis of H3
provide null results, the hypothesis (H1) will also be evaluated for a non-causal effect (as
opposed to H3’s causal effect) via OLS regression analyses.
IX.

Controls
In addition to meta-stereotypes, individual attributes such as political ideology,

age, gender and education may also impact levels of support for, or opposition to, the
policies being measured in this study. It is also expected that Black individuals who feel
more closely connected to their racial in-group will be more supportive of injusticecorrecting policies. Additionally, it is possible that individuals will not only take meta52

stereotypes into consideration, but will then dismiss them if they view the larger
consequences of such policies to be detrimental to an overall goal of negating those
negative stereotypes once and for all.
Among the literature on the more introspective types of perception is the research
that has been conducted via group attachment theory (Campbell, Converse, Miller &
Stokes 1960) and, by extension, via social identity theory (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel & Turner
1979, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell 1987). In social identity theory
and group attachment theory, the individual in question might assess what he/she thinks
about other people, and that information is then used to link how closely the individual
feels toward that group or identifying characteristic. At the same time, an individual
might also assess what he/she thinks other people think about him/her or his/her group
(meta-level perceptions). Under such circumstances, individuals orient themselves in
terms of their self-categorized group membership rather than as unique individuals (Frey
& Tropp 2006), and research suggests that the strength of perceived stereotypes (metastereotypes) can strengthen individuals’ connection to their in-group.
An individual’s social identity is closely linked, then, to their closeness—or
attachment—to the group which they are basing their social identity in. This sense of
closeness might come from shared experiences (Allen, Dawson & Brown 1989; Dawson
1994; Demo & Hughes 1990; Tate 1993) or having been socialized to recognize a shared
fate. As such, this project’s survey instrument asks respondents to indicate their level of

53

closeness to a variety of racial/ethnic groups, including their own, by asking: “How close
do you feel in your ideas, interests and feelings to _______________?”8
It is expected that those who feel strongly tied to their racial in-group by way of
their social identity will be more apt to recognize the need for injustice-correcting
measures than those who do not feel closely attached to their racial in-group and will,
therefore, be more apt to support such policies.
However, it is possible that low-identifiers will still acknowledge that they are
members of a group and that other members of society, especially dominant out-group
members, may not differentiate between themselves and high-identifiers and that as a
result they will still consider their group membership when interacting with out-group
members and expect those out-group members to treat them as they would highidentifiers (Mendoza 2008). Such an assertion is borne out in the interviews with Black
Ivy League students conducted by Torres & Charles (2004), wherein some Blacks
describe themselves as “not like those other Blacks”9 but still acknowledge that their
fellow students and neighbors treat them as though they are the embodiment of the
typical Black stereotype. If low-identifying respondents nonetheless feel as though
society judges them as a member of their in-group, the expected effects of H1 may be
diminished or may not come to fruition at all.

8

This question wording is borrowed from the 2004 National Politics Study.
For some interviewed students, comments like this one could suggest a manifestation of
dominant-group driven stereotypes (termed “self-stereotypes”); for others comments like
this one could suggest that they were thinking of demographic variables (and not personal
characteristics/stereotypes), such as being college educated, coming from a higher
income family, coming from all-white neighborhoods, etc.
9
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If we assume that individuals disapprove and dislike the stereotypes they perceive
to be levied upon their racial in-group, then there is also some reason to believe that
individuals will not support policies designed to counter discrimination if they believe the
over-arching effect will be strengthening the stereotype even more. The recognition of
such policies’ potential to have detrimental consequences with regard to stereotyping,
while at the same time serving to combat discrimination in a specific arena, was
documented within the interviews of Black Ivy League students conducted by Torres &
Charles (2004). Within those interviews some students indicated that they believed that
students of color are discriminated against in the institutional setting of universities, but
that they also thought the proposed solution (in this case, affirmative action) was causing
people—white people, those who are perceived to already hold negative stereotypes—to
question or doubt whether they were actually qualified to be there or were there merely to
fill a quota, therein reinforcing stereotypes that Blacks would rather be given things than
earn them, and that Blacks are not intelligent enough to be accepted on their own merits.
While Torres & Charles did not follow up these comments with questions regarding their
levels of support or opposition to the practice of affirmative action, this project aims to
determine whether such thoughts have any effect on policy preferences, and is especially
interested to see whether they diminish the expected effects of meta-stereotyping on those
same policy preferences.
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CHAPTER 3:
DESIGNING AN EXPERIMENTAL SURVEY
I.

Experimental studies: Then and now
In a 1909 presidential address to the American Political Science Association, A.

Lawrence Lowell warned of the limitations faced by social scientists, and cautioned
against the temptation to model political science research after the natural sciences,
stating that “we are limited by the impossibility of experiment. Politics is an
observational, not an experimental science…” (Lowell 1910, 7). In 1971, an only
slightly more optimistic Arend Lipjhart wrote that “the experimental method is the most
nearly ideal method for scientific explanation, but unfortunately it can only rarely be used
in political science because of practical and ethical impediments” (Lijphart 1971, 684).
Still, in the years immediately preceding Lipjhart’s resignation to such impediments,
other researchers were signaling a shift in attitudes concerning the potential promises of
experimental research: “the major advantage of laboratory experiments is in its ability to
provide us with unambiguous evidence about causation” (Aronson and Carlsmith 1968,
10). Given the untapped potential of experiments, the reception of experimental studies
in the field of political science grew warmer.
In the century since Lowell admitted defeat, and in the forty plus years since
Lijphart maintained the lamentations of these limitations, the political science literature
making use of experiments has skyrocketed, thanks to the rise of behavoralism,
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improvements in technology, statistical innovations and sharpened creativity (Druckman,
Green, Kuklinski & Lupia 2006). As is noted in the Cambridge Handbook of
Experimental Political Science (2011, 3), “more than half of the 71 experimental articles
that appeared in the APSR during its first 103 years were published after 1992.” The
increased interest in experiments can likely be explained by two overarching factors:
first and foremost, “the growing interest in experimentation reflects the increasing value
that the discipline places on causal inference and empirically guided theoretical
refinement” (Druckman, Green, Kukliniski & Lupia 2011, 1); additionally, improvements
in experimental methodology allow researchers to ask different types of questions.
Experimental studies are well-equipped to meet three expectations of the
scientific process: first, “experiments facilitate causal inference through the transparency
and content of their procedures, most notably the random assignment of observations to
treatment and control groups,” second, they “also guide theoretical development by
providing a means for pinpointing the effects of institutional rules, preference
configurations, and other contextual factors that might be difficult to assess using other
forms of inference,” and third, they “guide theory by providing stubborn facts—that is,
reliable information about cause and effect that inspires and constrains theory”
(Druckman et al. 2011, 1).
The chief advantage of adopting an experimental framework, however, is the
ability of well-designed and well-executed experiments to “resolve the direction of a
causal relationship that has been difficult to entangle” (Mutz 2011, 15). The insufficient
use of experiments in the political science literature for much of the discipline’s history,
and even in its current state, given the potential experiments possess for practitioners who
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seek a more definitive form of causal inquiry, has been heralded by Rose McDermott
(2002) as an oversight that must be remedied. Additionally, because political science, like
any science, is a process undertaken to improve our understanding of phenomena, the
ability of experiments to isolate and examine specific intermediating factors that may be
lost in other types of research designs allows for us to better understand how many
moving parts fit together in a larger series of complex problems.
Thus, the addition of experimental studies to political science’s methodological
tool belt allows researchers to attempt to disentangle elusive causal inferences and to
explore complex relationships within a broader phenomenon of interest by breaking
down various components of a problem into smaller, isolated and more manageable
pieces of the puzzle (McDermott 2002), and they may do so because of the unparalleled
control exerted by experimental researchers over the testing environment and also over
the design and implementation of measurements, thus “eliminating extraneous factors
that might contaminate a study by inducing spurious results” (McDermott 2002, 339).
Given the strengths of experimental studies, optimism can be found in the
increased prevalence of such studies in the major political science journals, and their
increased citation rates. A 2006 study conducted by Druckman, Green, Kuklinski &
Lupia estimated that “in any given year, experimental articles have an expected citation
rate that is approximately 47% higher than their nonexperimental counterparts. The
effect is somewhat stronger when we compare experimental articles to their
contemporaneous counterparts, implying a 74% edge… With fixed effects for each of the
57 matched comparisons, experimental articles maintain a 26% advantage” (633). Thus,
while political science was once a skeptical, if not reluctant, discipline at the prospect of
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adopting experimental methods, experiments finally seem to have earned a positive
reputation, and have asserted themselves as the primary means for solving riddles of
causal inference.
II.

Population-based survey experiments: A combination of strengths
Much work in the political science discipline, much of which is also very good on

their own merits, relies on survey methods as the primary means of data collection.
However, as Mutz (2011, 8) notes, there are “often substantial obstacles to drawing
strong causal inferences from conventional survey data. Over the years, many have
hoped that advances in statistical methods would allow scholars to use survey data to
control for all plausible rival interpretations of a potentially causal relationship. But
despite massive and impressive advances in statistical methods over the years, few people
are as optimistic today that statistics can solve all of our causal inference problems.”
Thus, the primary advantage of experiments of any sort over observational data is the
ability to infer causal effects and, potentially, causal mechanisms and, therefore,
experiments offer a major advantage over survey research which can ascertain important
relationships between variables, but which cannot deduce causal inferences. Noting that
“as much as we would love it if it were true, there simply are no statistical techniques for
observational data that provide the power and elegance of an experimental design,” Mutz
(2011, 14) asserts that “for many research questions, experiments are simply the most
effective means of evaluating competing causal hypotheses.” Still, the use of
representative samples, in real world contexts, gathered using more conventional means
than laboratory experiments, allows survey research to maintain a high level of
importance because survey research offers a significant degree of external validity.
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While experiments’ external validity may not be as strong as observational
research’s external validity, due to the latter’s occurrence in a natural state of reality, the
increased power of experiments’ internal validity, in comparison to observational
research’s internal validity, is quite attractive when attempting to measure causality.
Because observational research lacks the ability to control the circumstances under which
comparisons across groups are being formed, observational research is more highly
subject to confounding effects than experiments are, thus weakening its internal validity.
In an attempt to regain some degree of internal validity, observational research often
relies on making comparisons across groups that are similar in other theoretically relevant
ways; the problem with this process is two-fold however: first, it requires the researcher
to narrow the target group which can limit the research’s external validity; second,
researchers may still, despite researchers’ best efforts, fail to eliminate comparability
problems if they fail to identify unmeasured aspects of the individuals that are different
and also theoretically important. As Druckman et al. (2011) note, the ability to properly
measure all theoretically relevant aspects of individuals before comparing across groups
is particularly difficult when subjects self-select into their groups, which is the case—at
least in part—during observational research.
Experimental research combats some of observational research’s internal validity
problems because researchers in these settings are able to exert much more control over
the circumstances of their study, and because subjects no longer self-select into groups,
but are assigned randomly to a control or treatment group instead. Because random
assignment requires each subject to have an equal chance of being placed in each of the
studied groups, random assignment is able to overcome the fundamental problem of
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causal inference by estimating the average treatment effects across groups. Random
assignment presumes that the expected behaviors of all subjects are the same prior to any
intervention, and allows researchers to justify the assumption that the behavior of the
treatment groups would mirror that of the control group had the they not received the
treatment, and that the behavior of the control group would mirror that of the treatment
group had they been the group to receive the treatment instead. Using appropriate
statistical analyses, such as analysis of variance (ANOVA), researchers are then able to
deduce whether average treatment effects occurred by chance or, as hypothesized, due to
the interventions.
However, laboratory experiments, while being high in internal validity,
experience their own limitations as a methodological tool. One such limitation is the
skepticism that surrounds laboratory experiments regarding the generalizability of
findings, and thus a study’s external validity. This skepticism largely stems from the
highly artificial setting of laboratory experiments which may replicate a scenario with
great mundane reality, but which fails to embody much of the “noise” that pervades
American political discourse in the real world, and which, in turn, may fail to embody the
long-term effects of treatment conditions as well. A second limitation is that “under
ordinary circumstances in laboratory settings, sampling subpopulations is either
massively inefficient (because large numbers of ineligible participants will need to be
screened out and turned away) and/or it makes subjects too aware of exactly why they
were selected, which threatens the integrity of the results” (Mutz 2011, 13).
Fortunately our options as researchers are not limited to either survey research or
laboratory experiments; instead, a combination of the two methods can help bridge the
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gap, capturing the benefits of each method, while avoiding some of their limitations.
Mutz (2011, 3) asserts that “when scholars want to be certain that a given relationship
involves cause and effect, and that their theory may be generalized beyond a narrow pool
of subjects, then this is precisely the context in which population-based survey
experiments can make their biggest contribution.” Therefore population-based survey
experiments challenge the false dichotomy presented by researchers who suggest that
there must be a trade-off between internal and external validity: “by combining
representative population samples with rigorous experimental designs, they demonstrate
that internal validity can be had without sacrificing the generalizaility of the study’s
sample participants. In addition, people need not be extracted from their everyday
settings in order to participate in an experiment. These challenges to the orthodoxy are
noteworthy” (Mutz 2011, 132). This evaluation of population-based survey experiments’
importance echoes that of Howard Lavine (2002, 242) who proclaimed that “survey
experiments that integrate representative samples with the experimental control of
questions represent the most valuable tool for gaining access to the processes that
underlie opinion formation.”
Thus, it may be possible for practitioners of population-based survey experiments
to, metaphorically, have their cake and eat it too. By combining the strengths of each
individual method, population-based survey experiments preserve and promote the
benefits of each individual method as well: the internal validity provides a process
through which “results and insights that might not have been obvious to a less systematic
or larger scale analysis become prominent” (McDermott 2002, 340) and may produce
results that provide “a blueprint of what variables might be worth exploring in future
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studies” (Druckman et al. 2006, 633); the external validity provides a way to investigate
causal effects, and may then use those results to impact real world politics. As noted by
Druckman et al. (2006, 634), “political science experiments can transform—have
transformed—thinking on a topic when carried out in relevant contexts—and to be
relevant, the situation need not be isomorphic with a naturally occurring (i.e. “real
world”) referent.”
A political scientist’s investigation of causal inference might appropriately be
compared to the quest for the Holy Grail—the difficult and elusive nature of causal
inferences fail to deter researchers because the theoretical payoffs loom large, especially
now that statistical and technological innovations have advanced to a point that
population-based survey experiments can adequately address a number of questions
concerning causal effects. In the real world, wherein actions have consequences and
those consequences can be interpreted as being positive or negative in nature, human
nature commands a heightened curiosity about the process of cause and effect. To better
understand the “holy trinity” of causality, Mutz (2011, 9) provides three conditions that
generally must be met in order to affirm that one variable “causes” another: “(1) the two
must co-vary, whether over time or across units of analysis, (2) the cause must precede
the effect in time, and (3) the relationship between the cause and effect must not be
explainable through some other third variable, which would render the association
spurious” and notes that “the “third variable problem” is the key reason experiments are
known as the gold standard for inferring causality.”
In addition to understanding the cause and effect relationships that occur within
our political decision making processes, most political scientists also want to know that
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their research and actionable—that is, the results might not only be consumed by parties
of interest (whether the citizenry, elected officials, activists, etc.) but might also be
applied to intended real world contexts, and may be adopted when formulating political
decisions in the real world. Druckman et al. (2011) note that while experimental methods
may appeal to the scientist inside each researcher because of their “potential to generate
stark and powerful empirical claims,” they also may appeal to the citizen inside each
researcher because of their potential to “serve the public” by giving “citizens and policy
makers a better understanding of their shared environs… [which] can enlighten, inform
and transform critical aspects of societal organization”.
Thus, experimental methods not only facilitate improved communication between
researchers, they also facilitate improved communications between researchers and
policy makers. Because experiments are designed with external validity in mind, the
results of those studies can often serve as a starting point in debate, if not a full-on guide
to behavior, when policy makers are interested in understanding the causal effects that are
in play. Mutz (2011, 52) points out that “policy makers and those outside of academe
find it easier to justify a change that has been tested on the same population that it is
affected by,” and because population-based survey experiments are not constrained to the
artificial settings of laboratory experiments “this gives population-based experiments an
automatic leg up on other approaches when it comes to policy-relevant research that will
ultimately be implemented.” Alvin Roth (1995) referred to the normative implications of
experiments as “whispering in the ears of princes,” though the normative implications
might, with a bit more effort, extend to the paupers as well, and Donald Campbell (1969)
highlighted the “experimental ethos” encapsulated by experimental research, arguing that
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experimental investigation should be an integral part of policy innovation, so that society
can draw reliable lessons about the consequences of social, political, or economic change
(Druckman et al. 2006, 634).
III.

Evaluating population-based survey experiments: Internal and external
validity
Research questions that try to draw out causal inferences start out facing a

fundamental problem: it is an inconvenient, yet unavoidable, law of reality that we
cannot simultaneously observe a person or entity in both its treated and untreated states
(Holland 1986). However, if successfully employed, researchers can use experiments to
try and artificially create nearly-identical treated and untreated states, and, using random
assignment, compare the averages of the means across groups in order to determine
whether the intervention (the treatment) is likely to act as a causal effect and/or
mechanism if played out in reality. When designing and implementing population-based
survey experiments, researchers must be aware of the threats to internal and external
validity, and attempt to mitigate those threats when possible.
For population-based survey experiments, with the emphasis firmly targeted on
causal inference, a preoccupation with internal validity—first and foremost—is actually
the mark of a healthy and sophisticated design. This is not to say that external validity is
unimportant; rather, it is to highlight that “without internal validity, there can be no
external validity” (McDermott 2002, 334). After all, an experiment highly attuned to
mundane reality, but lacking the appropriate randomization and high degree of control
that is found in experimental designs, is apt to lead audiences to accept the results of
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deeply flawed experiments (McDermott 2002, 334). Additionally, a failure to maintain
internal validity threatens the theoretical and normative potential of an experiment as
well: “but of the two, internal validity is, of course, the more important, for if random or
systematic error makes it impossible for the experimenter to draw any conclusions from
the experiment, the question of the generality of these conclusions never arises”
(Carlsmith, Ellsworth & Aronson 1976, 85).
Internal validity, as described by McDermott (2002, 334), “refers to whether you
are studying what you think you are studying,” whereas external validity refers to
whether what you are studying can/will stand up to tests in other environments, whether
differing settings, samples, sub-populations, etc. To best achieve internally valid results,
an experiment must attempt to strike an appropriate balance between impact and control:
“on the one hand, the experimenter wants the experimental situation to be meaningful and
involving to the subject—in a word, the treatments should have impact. On the other
hand, a situation which the subject finds meaningful and involving is also likely to trigger
a wealth of memories and influences from the past which can affect the subject’s
interpretation of present circumstances. From the experimenter’s point of view, these
memories and influences constitute extraneous variability and jeopardize control over the
effects of the independent variable. The choice of an empirical realization of one’s
conceptual variable—and an appropriate stimulus situation in which to apply it—always
represents a compromise between impact and control, in which case a little of each is
sacrificed” (Aronson et al. 1995, 44-45).
There are a number of ways to attempt to maximize the impact of a populationbased survey experiment, while also attempting to maximize control (Mutz 2011, 87-91):
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first, the researcher should attempt to make the treatments interesting; for this project,
treatments include the priming of some subjects to consider their meta-stereotypes and
the framing of some subjects to consider specific real-world scenarios involving potential
discrimination, and since U.S. race relations are an ever-present issue of debate, and one
that people generally feel passionately about one way or another, the survey experiment’s
subject matter alone should have stimulated a decent degree of interest.
Second, treatments should be fairly short so that respondents are not forced to
store large amounts of material, which could prevent the actual treatment from getting
lost in the mix. Third, treatments should be clearly articulated; as a general rule, given
the range of respondents in a representative sample, treatments and questions should be
written at no higher than an eighth grade level. For this project, the priming treatment
consists of a battery of questions concerning meta-stereotypes, while the framing
treatment consists of a single pair of hypothetical scenarios that consists of two brief
“cases” (each only two or three sentences) to consider before answering two questions
about the hypothetical scenarios. The reading levels of the hypothetical scenarios were
actually a bit higher than the recommended reading level10; however, all but less than two
percent of the Black respondents had achieved at least a high school diploma in the
sample and over eighty percent of the Black sample had attended at least some college.
For the white respondents, less than two percent failed to graduate high school and
ninety-four percent attended at least some college. Thus, while the reading level of the
treatments might have been higher than the recommended level for a representative

10

According the Microsoft Word’s Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level tool, the three
hypothetical scenarios ranged from an 8.8 reading level to a 12.2 reading level.
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sample, the skewed educational attainment of the sample precludes the need to be overly
worrisome about this aspect of the survey design.
Fourth, researchers must determine an appropriate length of time between the
reception of the treatment and the reception of the dependent variable. In some instances,
researchers might want to space the treatment and the dependent variable out in order to
prevent respondents from figuring out the purpose of the survey which could limit the
validity of their responses. On the other hand, if too much time is present between the
treatment and the dependent variable, the treatment might wear off prior to measuring its
effect. This second consideration is especially true for experiments using priming and
framing effects, both of which may be relatively short-lived. To combat the potential
detriment of short-lived treatments, respondents in the priming and framing groups were
provided the treatments directly before being asked about their policy preferences
(treatments were, thus, provided one page ahead of the dependent variable). And in order
to combat the potential problem of respondents figuring out what was at stake, a fifth way
to maximize impact was utilized: deception. The purpose of deception is “simply to keep
the subjects from being aware of the actual focus of the study until after the experiment is
over” (McDermott 2002, 337). In this project, while some respondents have been primed
to consider the issue of racial prejudice in America, and some have also been primed to
consider the issue in the framework of real-world discrimination, thus requiring the idea
of U.S. race relations to be at the top of their heads, deception was used in two ways:
first, when asking questions concerning the depending variable on the page(s)
immediately following the treatments, the questions of actual interest (those concerning
criminal justice reforms and affirmative action) were buried between questions
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concerning issues that are not expected to be impacted by meta-stereotypes (such as soda
bans, global warming, drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, and medicinal
marijuana). Second, because respondents answered the survey experiment in the comfort
of their own home, and were randomly assigned to a group by a software program, many
respondents may not have been aware that other versions of the survey existed and,
therefore, may not have been aware that the survey was actually a survey experiment.
While a researcher determines an experimental design that achieves, to a degree,
the necessary impact of the treatments, they must do so while also considering how they
can maintain a maximum level of control. In a population-based survey experiment the
task of keeping every single aspect under control is an impossibility since the researcher
is not physically present to observe and/or guide respondents; instead, the randomization
process is the key condition to factoring in control of a population-based survey
experiment. This project’s randomization process, wherein respondents were broken into
sub-groups based on race (either Black or white respondents; no other races or ethnicities,
nor mixed-race/ethnicity respondents) and then randomly assigned by a computer
software system to one of five groups (control, priming, or one of three framing groups)
“creates the pretreatment similarity of manipulations, which take place within the
experiment itself, and not to preexisting differences within the subject pool” (McDermott
2002, 339). What’s more, as Mutz (2011, 138) points out, “the beauty of random
assignment is not that it guarantees equivalence between experimental and control groups
on all possible variables, but rather that the expected sum of any differences between
groups across all variables is zero. Thus, excessive handwringing about perfect similarity
across groups is unwarranted because the variables on which the groups may, in fact,
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differ are highly likely to be normally distributed with a mean of zero… the effects of
these known and unknown variables on the dependent variable should largely cancel one
another out, with no net effect to undermine the interpretation of the effects of the
experimental manipulation.” Thus, even if the five treatment groups are not completely
equal based on the software program’s random generation of groups, the fact that the
program used random generation at all should eliminate concerns related to betweengroup differences of other variables.
A population-based survey experiment’s external validity, on the other hand, is
generally aided by the use of a random probability sample. However, while random
probability samples are the highest quality obtainable in terms of representativeness, they
are nonetheless very difficult to obtain given limited budgets and also given the fact that
systematic differences exist in the ability to contact different kinds of people, as well as
different kinds of people’s willingness to participate if researchers are able to
successfully contact them (Mutz 2011, 113). For example, the use of an online survey
experiment includes a degree of systematic bias against lower-educated Americans which
may skew the sample toward a more affluent subset population (though it should be noted
that this project did not suffer from a systematic bias against lower-income Americans).
Still, an internet survey is able to offer a more representative take on most other
demographic variables than convenience samples (limited to localities, or the everpopular college sophomore sample), and is more efficient than other forms of sample
recruiting—online samples produce faster results for the researcher, involve less effort
than mailing or phone interviews for both the researcher and the respondents, and
because of those benefits they are more likely to produce higher completion rates as well.
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And because the respondents are distributed amongst groups randomly, as noted in the
preceding paragraph, the effects of the treatments against the control group can still be
ascertained with confidence.
The external validity of population-based survey experiments must also be
assessed via the generalizability of the results since, as described earlier, researchers and
political practitioners alike expect the findings of political science research to be
applicable to the real world. When evaluating an experiment’s generalizability, four
dimensions should be considered: setting, participants, measures, and treatments (Mutz
2011, 141). When considering the setting of this project, we actually cannot know
much—we do know that respondents used the internet; however, we do not know where
they accessed the internet to do so, thus we are unable to tell what kinds of distractions
may have occurred, what kind of attention was paid by the respondent, etc. as we would
in a laboratory setting. Still, this degree of sacrificed control is outmatched by the
previously described attention paid to maximizing other aspects of experimental control
and the maximization of impact. Thus, when compared to laboratory experiments, this
project may lack a degree of mundane realism, but it still embodies experimental realism
which is the more important aspect of reality of the two options (McDermott 2002, 333).
When compared to filed experiments, which occur within the specific context being
theorized, online population-based survey experiments, like this project, lack both
mundane and experimental realism; yet, Mutz (2011, 134) asks the not-so-obvious
question: “why should we be so quick to assume that results from one particular field
setting will easily generalize to another, completely different, real-world setting?” and
answers her own question by suggesting that “upon further examination, there is nothing
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particularly logical about such a claim.” Thus, the generalizability of population-based
survey experiments, when compared to other experimental settings, might not be in as
much peril as critics would lead us to believe.
The evaluation of population-based survey experiments due to their participants
was covered briefly above but, to reiterate, a more representative sample is more likely to
be generalizable. While online population-based survey experiments may not yield
totally representative samples, and may indeed by systematically biased in some regards,
they are nonetheless more representative than many other means. Additionally, if the
theory in question is directed toward specific subgroups, the lack of generalizability for
other groups may not be problematic at all, and in fact can lead to future avenues of
research. Before conducting a broader study—which would require either more funding
or fewer respondents in each group—it may make sense for research to develop theories
that are tested amongst the most likely subgroups to be affected, before seeing whether
they exist in other parts of the overall population. It is, of course, possible that failing to
have a certain demographic included in a sample will lead to missing the hypothesized
effects if those effects end up occurring only in the missing subgroup, but this is likely
only a problem of real concern if the missing subgroup was originally theorized to
respond differently than other subgroups.
The evaluation of an experiment’s generalizability regarding measurement
outcomes can occur on a few different fronts. First, this project models the dependent
variables after similar policy questions used by other survey researchers by providing
respondents with a five-point scale, ranging from being “very supportive” to “very
opposed” (including moderated “somewhat” responses, and a neutral response); this
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allows the results to be compared against other research and also provides respondents
with a range of options so that their answers are less likely to be a false artifact of poor
answer options. Second, this project does not simply ask about affirmative action or
criminal justice reform as single constructs. Instead, affirmative action is measured in the
specific context of employment and also in the specific context of education, since it is
possible that the distinction makes a difference in respondents’ opinions. Likewise,
criminal justice reforms are measured by asking about specific aspects of the reform
movement; questions were asked about the War on Drugs, the death penalty, “threestrikes” laws, and also about racial profiling which itself is broken down into three
different contexts (one focusing on racial profiling as it generally pertains to Arab
Americans, one that generally pertains to Hispanic Americans, and another than generally
pertains to Black Americans). A third aspect of this project’s generalizability in terms of
measurement can be evaluated via the types of injustice-correcting reforms I elected to
include in the survey experiment (affirmative action and criminal justice reforms). In this
regard the survey experiment may very well fail to generalize to other reform efforts,
both within the Black community and also amongst other minority groups, whether they
be racial, ethnic or some other minority group. The only true way to know how
generalizable the results of this study will be to issues of concern to other minority
groups is to test for them in subsequent studies. However, selecting these two issues was
strategic—first, the racial aspect inherent within discussions of affirmative action and
criminal justice reform is likely to be more salient to respondents than the racial aspects
of housing and lending practices, of medical treatment practices, and even of K-12 public
school practices; if meta-stereotypes’ fail to have an effect on affirmative action and
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criminal justice reform preferences than they are also unlikely to yield such effects on the
other aforementioned practices. Second, in order to keep the survey experiment to a
length that would keep the interest of the respondents, and also to maintain some
deception, both of which strengthened the impact of the survey experiment, additional
policy questions were inserted into the survey questionnaire which then required the
careful selection of racially discriminatory issues for inclusion at the expense of those
other potential issues.
The last measures on which to evaluate the generalizability of this project are the
survey experiment’s treatments. As with lab experiments, the treatments of populationbased survey experiments do not occur in the real world and therefore may not represent
the way respondents receive information, or the way they organize information when
formulating policy preferences. However, the treatments in this project do not aim to
provide new information so much as they serve to force respondents to consider
information that is already within them—i.e. their own beliefs about the ways racial
prejudice and discrimination pervade society in the United States. Thus, the priming and
framing effects in this paper ask respondents to recall their own perceptions of prejudice
rather than attempting to change their mind about the prevalence of prejudice. It is true
that individuals are not asked about meta-stereotypes in their day-to-day lives, at least,
not in the terms posed to them in this project’s survey experiment, but individuals are
confronted with the debate over whether we live in a post-racial society by way of the
news and entertainment (for example, via debates with friends and family over Henry
Louis Gates’ arrest, Paula Deen’s firing or the guilt of George Zimmerman). The
hypothetical scenarios chosen for the framing treatments may not mirror the examples
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most individuals discuss in their day-to-day lives, but they are scenarios that occur on a
daily basis and which, therefore, are in the minds of activists and politicians, and thus are
more likely to have a direct effect on policy preferences.
IV.

Experimental set-up: The specifics
In order to gauge the effects of meta-stereotypes on racial policy preferences, this

project makes use of an original survey experiment. The experiment uses a betweensubjects design wherein each subject is randomly assigned to a single group (each with a
different experimental condition) rather than a using a within-subjects design wherein a
single group of subjects is tested under each experimental condition. Between-subject
designs need not place as much concern over the fatigue, boredom and increased
skepticism that may accompany within-subject tests which require subjects to answer the
same questions repeatedly and which may signal to subjects that they are supposed to be
changing their minds or answering in a specific manner, thereby measuring beliefs,
attitudes, opinions, etc. that are not genuine. Thus, between-subject designs better
maximize the impact of the experimental treatments which is important for a project’s
internal validity. The experiment also uses a blocked design wherein subjects are first
divided into homogenous blocks before being randomly assigned to an experimental
condition (in this case they were divided by race and positioned in a group with other
Black or white subjects depending on their own racial identification). The process of
blocking is important because it shrinks error variance if the particular variable has an
impact on the dependent variable, as race is theorized to do in this project, and because it
strengthens the power of the experimental design by reducing unwanted noise (Mutz
2011, 95).
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Once subjects have been blocked into the two groups according to their selfreported racial identity (either Black or white; no other races or ethnicities, or mixedrace/ethnicity subjects), subjects were then placed into one of three groups in order to
measure their meta-stereotypes and policy preferences: (1) the control group will be
asked about their meta-stereotypes after having been asked the policy questions, while (2)
the priming group will be asked about their meta-stereotypes directly before they are
asked the policy question. Shifting the location of the meta-stereotype questions between
these two groups allows the experiment to locate meta-stereotypes as a causal
mechanism, rather than assuming that a correlative effect is akin to a causal effect. (3) A
third group—the framing group— will follow the trajectory of the priming group,
answering questions about their meta-stereotypes directly before answering questions
about their policy preferences; however, they will also receive a hypothetical pair of
nearly identical scenarios (the only difference being the race of the individuals involved)
and will be asked to judge the likelihood of certain outcomes based on the hypothetical
scenarios. Because these hypothetical scenarios allow respondents to consider the link
between racial prejudice (one possible outcome of the given scenarios) and the actions of
those holding power in the scenarios (another possible outcome of the given scenarios),
the framing effects will allow the experiment to see whether individuals’ need to have
meta-stereotypes activated by transforming the somewhat abstract notion of metastereotypes to one that has evident, real-world consequences. The flow of the
experimental design for each of the three groups is detailed in Appendix A; the full
experimental survey can be found in Appendix C.
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The framing group is divided into three sub-groups, each of which will receive
only one of the three possible hypothetical scenarios. These hypothetical scenarios have
been designed to frame some of the specific racial policies serving as dependent variables
in terms of one of the specific stereotypes being measured as an independent variable.
Hypothetical scenario 1 focuses on whether a jury is more likely to view a Black
defendant as being violent than a white defendant, and what the consequence of that is in
terms of casting a verdict. Hypothetical scenario 2 focuses on police perceptions of
laziness of Black loiterers and white loiterers, and what the consequence of that is in
terms of being searched for drugs. Hypothetical scenario 3 focuses on whether a hiring
representative is more likely to view a Black applicant as being less intelligent than a
white applicant, and what the consequence of that is in terms of being hired for a job.
These three scenarios directly address the stereotypes that Black individuals are more
violence-prone, are lazier, and are less intelligent than their white counterparts, each of
which having also been measured pertaining to a respondent’s self-reported stereotypes
held about various groups, and having been measured pertaining the respondent’s metastereotypes. In terms of the dependent variable, these three scenarios directly address the
racial policy issues of “three-strikes laws” and the death penalty, the “war on drugs,” and
affirmative action, respectively.
This project uses priming and framing effects in order to better observe the
potential effects of meta-stereotypes on policy preferences. Priming has been defined as
“the effects of prior context on the interpretation and retrieval of information” (Fiske &
Taylor 1984) and as “changes in the standards used by the public” to make evaluations
(Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Krosnick & Kinder 1990). Although it is possible that
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individuals do not need to be primed to consider their perceptions of the stereotypes held
by others, given research that suggests meta-stereotypes are likely readily accessible
(Sheldon & Johnson 1993) and that suggests that individuals who already find an issue
important are less likely to rely on the priming of an outside force (Converse 1964;
Krosnick 1990), setting up this project to embody a population-based survey experiment
still allows the project to try and pin down a causal relationship. Providing a priming
treatment is a logical aspect of the research design for two reasons: first, asking subjects
to provide self-assessed perceptions of racial prejudice is not akin to providing them with
information about the reality of racial prejudice in the U.S.; thus, priming allows them to
recall aspects of their own beliefs system, making those previously held beliefs more
salient for the portion of the survey geared towards measuring policy preferences (the
dependent variables). Second, the experimental research on priming effects thus far has
painted a fairly clear portrait; that is, priming has a significant impact on the way
individuals respond to candidates and policy issues (Hillygus & Shields 2008) because
they serve as a reinforcement or reminder of what an individual already knows or
believes (Medvic 2006) by making the knowledge or beliefs more accessible (Iyengar &
Kinder 1987; Valentino, Hutchings & White 2002).
Framing also serves as a way of amplifying previously held knowledge or beliefs,
but it is distinct from priming because framing selects “some aspects of perceived reality
and make them more salient… in such a way as to promote a particular problem
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation”
(Entman 1993, 53). Framing is also distinct from persuasion/belief change because
framing does not necessitate the cultivation of new information; instead of providing
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messages with positive or negative information about an attitude object that is not already
part of the recipients’ knowledge or belief structure, framing operates by activating
information already at the recipients’ disposal, stored in their long-term memory (Nelson,
Oxley & Clawson 1997). However, just because new information is provided to
individuals does not mean that framing effects lack the potential to change individuals’
opinions; rather than having their opinions changed by way of traditional persuasion,
individuals’ opinions are subtly swayed by framing effects that change how the
individuals in question weight the retrieved information (Nelson, Oxley & Clawson
1997). This project’s experimental conditions do not attempt to persuade subjects that
any of the outcomes in the hypothetical scenarios are more likely than others by
providing statistics or anecdotes about real-world institutional discrimination; instead, it
frames the policy issues of interest (the dependent variables) by asking subjects to draw
on their previously held beliefs concerning racial discrimination, but also by providing
subjects with the ample chance to situate those previously held beliefs in a specific realworld context that could potentially be remedied by the injustice-correcting policy
measures in question. Thus, the framing condition in this project’s survey experiment
aims to take the activated knowledge or beliefs in the priming condition and make the
potential consequences of such perceptions of racial prejudice less abstract by connecting
them to potential areas of racial discrimination.
V.

Advantages of online survey experiments
This project uses an online survey platform to recruit and administer the

population-based survey experiment. While the use of an online platform does pose
some problems for a study’s external validity, most of the problems are not unique to an
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online platform, and a number of practical considerations make online experiments an
attractive method despite their limitations. The main problem for a study’s external
validity is the potentially skewed attributes in an online survey experiment’s sample;
those who are most apt to have dependable and convenient access to the internet are
likely to differ systematically on some demographic variables such as income,
geography, age and education, which could then impact the representativeness of
behaviors and attitudes across the spectrum of possibilities since they are often impacted,
at least in part, to an individual’s life experiences as a member of each demographic
group. However, the gaps on such measures are constantly shrinking as internet access
becomes more widely available and at more affordable rates, and as older Americans are
incorporating internet use into their daily routine. Another potential disadvantage of
online experiments is the potential presence of bias due to samples of “volunteers”
because the researcher gives up a degree of control when subjects self-select into the
study; thus, it is possible that a study will over represent certain demographic traits at the
expense of others, or certain behaviors and attitudes at the expense of others, and it is
possible that those with more interest in the topic of the study will opt into it, further
skewing the results. Studies comparing the samples and validity of online surveys
against other tools of subject acquisition suggest that the problem of systematic bias,
however, is not unique to online samples; these studies find that while demographic bias
occurs in online samples, “the relationships among variables are similar across
recruitment methods and match those implied by substantive theory” (Alvarez, Sherman
& VanBeselaere 2003, 23), that “with inclusion of standard demographic controls, typical
relational models of interest to political scientists produce similar estimates and
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parameters across modes” (Berrens, Bohara, Jenkins-Smith, Silva & Weimer 2003, 1),
and that, despite the non-random demographic bias of online surveys, “what occurs in
survey experiments resembles what takes place in the real world” especially amongst
subgroups, as has been set up in this project’s design (Barabas & Jerit 2010, 239).
Other problems often associated with surveys of any kind include perceptions that
the survey is junk mail, which may then lead to low response rates, a sense of
impersonality, which may then lead to disinterest and high mortality rates (discontinuing
the survey once it has begun), and the inability of subjects who do participate to get
clarity on questions that they find confusing (Evans and Mathur 2005, 201-202).
However, this project avoids these problems better than other types of survey, and has a
number of other advantages as well. Mortality rates are combated by explaining up front
how long the study will take, and by rewarding subjects with incentives provided by the
survey company only when they complete a study. Because subjects were only
compensated for complete response rates, the mortality rates for this study is less
worrisome than the 20+% mortality rate of recent NES telephone studies, and the
morality rates of face-to-face surveys ranging from 30%-60+% (Berinksy 2008). This
project’s white subgroup experienced a mortality rate of 12% which is higher than
mortality rates of the mid-1950s, but which is still lower than other recruitment measures
and tools used today. Additionally, when looking at the number of respondents that
dropped out prior to any of the questions of actual concern (i.e. not the demographic
questions on the very first page), the mortality rate of the white subgroup was only 8%, a
mere two percentage points more than those obtained by the NES telephone studies in the
mid-twentieth century. What’s more, the mortality rate for the Black subgroup is
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incredibly low; the Black subgroup experienced only a 2% mortality rate overall, and
only a 1% mortality rate when looking at those respondents who made it past the
demographic questions. This suggests that the Black subjects were either more interested
in the subject matter, or less uncomfortable given the content about racial prejudice and
discrimination, and thus the theoretical reasons for creating subgroups in the first place
seems warranted. Lack of clarity also remains a potential issue; however, that is an issue
that would be faced in a mail survey as well. While a phone interview or face-to-face
interview might alleviate a lack of clarity, those kinds of experiments would introduce a
new problem: a social desirability factor. Social desirability factors can cause a subject
to answer questions in a way that they feel is most acceptable by the interviewer even if it
is not truly reflective of their beliefs, attitudes, opinions, etc.
In addition to combating social desirability problems due to interviewer effects,
online survey experiments also have the following advantages over other types of surveys
(Evans and Mathur 2005, 196-201): they can be distributed faster than other types of
surveys and require fewer administrative costs, technological innovations allow the
researcher more flexibility in designing question types and sequence logic and more
control over the way information is presented on the screen, the online format is often
more convenient for potential subjects because the survey can be started at any date and
time within the parameters set by the researcher, and provides an easier way of
conducting data analysis since coding can be set up in advance and downloaded into a
ready-to-use data set. Additionally, unlike paper surveys, online surveys can be designed
to require subjects to answer questions before moving on, thus preventing subjects from
changing their answers after seeing treatment conditions, or preventing subjects from
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skipping a question entirely; likewise, online surveys can create logic sequences that send
subjects to various questions depending on the answers provided earlier in the survey and
they do a more efficient job of randomly assigning subjects to groups and tracing
treatment effects faced by each subject.
VI.

Subjects
Because this project explores the beliefs and attitudes individuals possess

regarding the prevalence of racial prejudice in America today as a precursor to
understanding their preferences on racial policies designed to combat discrimination and
injustice, the project uses Black and white individuals, across the United States, as its
subjects. While the project clearly oversamples the Black community, the emphasis on
those subjects is by design; because the project is primarily concerned with explaining
the variance of support and opposition to racial policies within the Black community,
within the white community, and across those communities, it was important that subjects
be selected based on their racial identification. While the project makes use of this quotasampling technique, the selection of subjects does not fall prey to sampling bias in the
same way other quota-samples may because the survey starts out being available to
everybody and it is the subject’s answers to a battery of racial and ethnic demographic
questions that determines whether they are able to proceed with the survey or whether the
survey terminates based on their self-identified group memberships. Thus, on all other
demographic measures, subjects have an equal likelihood of being included in the survey
sample. Additionally, the selection of which group (treatment, priming or framing) a
subject is assigned to is completely random based on a computer generated algorithm
provided within the online survey software. The project has a sample size of 522
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subjects11; 267 of those subjects self-identified racially as white (non-Hispanic) while
255 of those subjects self-identified as Black; individuals who identified with multiple
racial and ethnic categorizations were terminated from the study before they began
answering non-demographic questions, as were individuals who identified themselves as
a single non-white or non-Black race or ethnicity. The sample size for each subgroup
allowed each treatment condition to net at least 50 responses for inclusion in the ANOVA
data analysis. The demographic breakdown of this project’s subjects can be found in
Appendix B.
Subjects for this study self-selected their participation; via the SocialSci12 online
survey platform, individuals who have voluntarily signed up to be research subjects are
able to self-select which projects they wish to participate in. Because of the self-selection
process, and also because of the online nature of this project, there is the potential for bias
to sneak into the sample. When individuals who were active in SocialSci’s participant
pool logged onto their account, they were given the option of starting this project; the
name and description of the project used to recruit individuals appears below:
11

The number of subjects included within the sample reflect only those respondents who
completed the survey to 100% completion; thus, not included in this sample are
respondents who quit the survey at any point, respondents who were not asked at least
one question due to glitches with the survey software, and respondents who passively
bypassed any of the meta-stereotype questions (i.e. they answered 0 for every
racial/ethnic group, for every stereotype). <The number of omissions for these reasons is
small and I’ll make sure to confirm these numbers after my consultation with the
statistics department in case they tell me I need to add some of those subjects back into
the sample>
12
From the SocialSci website: “SocialSci was designed from the ground up specifically
and only for academic research. We have created the most efficient data collection
platform online by combining cutting-edge computer technology with modern-day
participant recruitment practices. We provide the tools you need to power your research.
We also guarantee that every participant takes your study seriously and answers your
questions honestly—you no longer need to worry about fake responses or repeat surveytakers.” (http://www.socialsci.com)
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Title: Study of Social and Political Attitudes
Description: You are being asked to complete this survey because your
social and political attitudes will help us understand the attitudes held by
Americans as a whole. The following survey is being administered for use
in a political science dissertation. Therefore, it is important that you
answer each question as accurately as possible. All information provided
will remain anonymous, including all answers to the questions asked
within. It is important that you answer each question in the survey. If you
feel you need to further explain an answer you have provided, we
welcome you to provide open-ended explanations at the end of the survey.
While race is the real focus of subjects’ social and political attitudes, neither the title nor
the description of this project belies that focus. The absence of any mention of race is
intentional: first, the neglection of race prevents individuals who are turned off by
discussions of racism from opting out of the study, while also preventing individuals who
are most interested in the discussion of racism from opting into the study (they were still
able to participate, but did not elect to do so under the pretense that race was the focus);
second, the neglection of race prevents the survey from priming individuals to think
about race at the outset (they will be asked questions concerning their own racial
stereotypes early on in the survey, but the absence of race in the description still allows
subjects to think about the policy questions in more general terms). It is possible that
individuals with more interest in politics will self-select into this project, however the
inclusion of the term “social” in the description may appeal to individuals who are less
interested in politics. Furthermore, because SocialSci provides incentives to members of
the participant pool13, individuals who are not interested in sharing their social or political
attitudes may still be enticed to self-select into the project’s samples.

13

SocialSci rewards members of the participant pool for taking surveys; longer surveys
generally provide a greater reward. SocialSci does not pay individuals outright, but they
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Subjects were able to opt-out of the survey at any point after accepting the terms
of use and consenting to their participation. While it is possible that some individuals
decided to opt-out of the survey for non-random reasons, and that the somewhat
controversial nature of opinions regarding race in America will lead to a systematic dropoff of individuals who are uncomfortable with the content of the survey or who question
the motivation of the survey, it is expected that many individuals who terminated their
participation did so for more random reasons, such as the lengthy duration of the survey
(designed to take approximately 25 minutes) or due to technical difficulties. Moreover,
because subjects were incentivized to complete the survey (termination of participation
forfeits any “points” earned for taking the survey), the expected opt-out rate was minimal
and 93% of individuals who began the survey ended up completing it.
VII.

Measures

In order to measure subjects’ perceptions of the prevalence of racial prejudice, the
survey instrument includes a battery of questions aimed at gauging the subjects’
perceptions of the prevalence of four specific stereotypes. The four specific metastereotype questions were formatted in the following way:
What we would like for you to do next is GUESS the percentage of white
people who you think would say that the characteristics in each question
can be applied to the different groups.
Drag the cursor along the scale from 0-100 to register your guess.
Please GUESS: What percentage (0-100%) of white people do you think
would say that each group is “lazy”? i.e. that they answered 5, 6 or 7 on
the scale of “hard working” to “lazy”?
do offer “points” for completion of surveys that can be redeemed for gift certificates or
donations to charities. Individuals do not accrue any rewards if they fail to complete a
survey.
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While “lazy” versus “hard working” is used in the example above, the remaining
meta-stereotypes measured are the following pairs of adjectives: “violence
prone” versus “not violence prone”, “unintelligent” versus “intelligent”, and
“prefer to live off welfare” versus “prefer to be self-supporting”. Because
subjects could possibly interpret the question as asking what percentage of white
Americans would verbalize such thoughts, rather than the percentage that just
holds such thoughts, the question could potentially yield understated levels of
meta-stereotyping. This is something to keep in mind when analyzing the
descriptive accounts of white and Black subjects’ levels of meta-stereotyping in
chapter 4.
These meta-stereotypes can then be analyzed in relation to the dependent
variable (policy preference) individually, or they can be merged together to build
a composite score of an individual’s overall perception of the prevalence of
prejudice held against the group in question. Because of the nature of the
question, meta-stereotypes will be measured on a 100-point scale. When the
composite score of perceived prejudice is built, the answers to all four metastereotype questions will be therefore range from 0-400; this composite measure
will be used in select analyses in Chapters 4 and 5 and will be noted as such.
This project’s measurement of meta-stereotypes improves on the previous
measure used by Sigelman & Tuch (1997). Whereas Sigelman & Tuch used a
dummy variable by asking subjects whether they thought “most whites” held
various stereotypes, this project’s new measure provides more variance and thus
greater explanatory power. This project also asks subjects to respond to the same
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exact question wording used by Sigelman & Tuch in order to compare the degree
of variance lost by using a dummy variable, and in order to compare the degree of
ambiguity in the word “most” used by Sigelman & Tuch.
The four specific stereotypes used in this project were selected due to their
use in previous social science research, including a number of years of the
General Social Survey.14 Stereotypes of racial and ethnic minorities, especially
Black Americans, as being lazier, more violent, less intelligent and less selfsupportive than their white counterparts are not merely a relic of America’s past;
these stereotypes still persist in America today. Because of the pervasiveness of
these admitted stereotypes, and because these specific stereotypes pair nicely with
the racial policies serving as the dependent variable, those four stereotypes were
identified as being the most appropriate way to measure meta-stereotyping for the
purposes of this study.
In order to measure the effect of meta-stereotypes on racial policy preferences this
project highlights two specific policy debates as the dependent variables of interest:
affirmative action laws and criminal justice reforms. In order to conceal, to a degree, the
project’s goal of linking meta-stereotypes to racial policy preferences, subjects are also
questioned regarding their opinions on race-neutral policy issues as well.15 When pressed
to provide their opinions on the policies in question, subjects are provided the following
range of options: “I am very supportive”, “I am somewhat supportive”, “I do not have an
14

The GSS asked respondents about welfare stereotypes in 1990, violence stereotypes in
1990 and 2000, and laziness and unintelligence stereotypes every other year from 1990 to
2012.
15
The full range of policy issues presented within the survey instrument, and the
questions’ corresponding wording, can be found in the Appendix C.
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opinion”, “I am somewhat opposed”, and “I am very opposed”. This five-point scale is
representative of the typical scoring of public opinion data and, if the situation calls for it,
can later be collapsed into a three-point scale of overall support, overall opposition, or not
having a stance one way or the other on an issue.
Affirmative action laws were selected as one group of policy preferences to
examine based on the direct link between the issue and race. While affirmative action
programs are designed to combat other forms of discrimination—gender discrimination,
ethnic discrimination, and discrimination of the handicapped, for example—affirmative
action is, nonetheless, still chiefly considered a program aimed at helping the Black
community first and foremost. Because subjects might have diverging opinions on
affirmative action in the workplace, compared to affirmative action in universities, two
questions were asked concerning affirmative action policies:
What are your feelings about affirmative action programs that attempt to
increase diversity in the work place through hiring and promotion
practices?
What are your feelings about affirmative action programs that attempt to
increase diversity in university settings through admissions and
scholarship practices?
Criminal justice policies were selected as another group of policy preferences to
examine based on their link to race as well; however, the connection between the issues
falling under the criminal justice umbrella and the persistence of racial prejudice is not as
obvious as it is for affirmative action because criminal justice policies are designed to be
race-neutral. Despite the race-neutral promise of these policies, however, research
routinely shows that racial prejudice still exists at all stages of the criminal justice
process—from the police officer making arrests, to prosecutor assigning charges, to the
jury handing down a verdict, to the judge formulating a sentence, racism is still
89

institutionalized in the criminal justice system, even if the actors involved are unaware of
their racial biases. This project looks at four specific aspects of the criminal justice
system, and the questions designed to measure policy preferences of those four aspects
appear below:

What are your feelings about the federal government’s War on Drugs?
What are your feelings about the use of the death penalty in the U.S.
criminal justice system?
Some states have enacted “Three Strikes Laws” which require mandatory
life sentences for those who are convicted of serious criminal offenses on
three or more separate occasions. What are your feelings regarding the
adoption of Three Strikes Laws?
Racial profiling refers to the use of an individual’s race or ethnicity by law
enforcement personnel as a key factor in deciding whether to engage in
enforcement (such as making a traffic stop or an arrest). What are your
feelings regarding the use of racial profiling by law enforcement in the
following situations?
The last question mentioned—regarding racial profiling—differs from the first three
questions in the criminal justice battery because it is directly linked to race; in fact, it is
the only policy question that makes explicit reference to race.16 Although the survey
included questions about three different types of racial profiling, only the following
question is pertinent to the scope of the current project since it may easily be inferred that
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Questions measuring a subject’s perception of the consequences of affirmative action
policies—used as a control variable—also refer explicitly to race; however those
questions are asked after a subject responds to the questions measuring their policy
preferences.
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the profiling in question would directly impact the Black community, whereas the same
cannot be said of the other two profiling questions.17
Stopping suspicious individuals in their car to see whether they have drugs
in their vehicle?
Although random assignment to treatment groups should counter any sort of
systematic demographic and attitudinal bias in the distribution of subjects, the survey also
asks subjects to respond to a number of questions that may serve as control variables
using certain kinds of methodological analyses. For example, because the bulk of
literature on racial beliefs’ and attitudes’ effects on racial policy preferences has looked
at the role of individuals’ own stereotypes—as opposed to their meta-stereotypes—the
survey included questions designed to measure subjects’ own stereotypes (and, after
merging the stereotypes into a composite score, uses prejudice as well) as a control
variable18. In order to measure these control variables, the survey included questions
designed to capture individuals’ levels of stereotyping and overall prejudice of various
racial and ethnic groups: whites- non-Hispanic, Hispanics, African Americans, Asians
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The other two racial profiling questions ask about stopping suspicious individuals in
the airport to see whether they have weapons or explosives (a policy directed mainly
toward Arab or “Arab-looking” Americans) and stopping suspicious individuals in their
cars to see whether they are in the country legally (a policy directed mainly toward
Hispanic Americans).
18
Although the survey did include questions measuring subjects’ own stereotypes, these
variables were ultimately left out of the analyses in Chapter 5. Subjects’ admission of
stereotyping was not in line with the stereotypes reported within the data of other survey
research (see Chapter 4) which indicates that a social desirability factor may have been in
play. Because the stereotypes did not attain significance when they were included in the
models, and because the results of the other factors did not change with their inclusion,
this potential control variable was left out of the reported analyses. Additionally, the
survey included an Implicit Association Test (IAT) in order to combat the potential social
desirability factor; however, the IAT test was in “Beta mode” and a number of subjects
experienced problems with the test and so those results are not included in the analyses
either.
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and Arabs. Survey respondents were asked to indicate, on a seven-point scale, how
applicable certain stereotypes are to each specific group: being lazy, being violenceprone, being unintelligent, and preferring to live off welfare. These specific stereotypes
were chosen for two reasons: First, these stereotypes have been used in a litany of
previous research on racial and ethnic stereotyping; as such, the results from this project
will be able to be compared to those from previous works. In fact, the wording used for
this section of the survey mirrors that used in the General Social Surveys. Second, these
four specific stereotypes, when applied to the Black community, may conceivably be
linked to the policy preferences being measured later in the survey.
For example, when hiring or admitting applicants, employers and admissions
counselors look for hard-working, intelligent and self-supporting individuals; if Black
applicants are stereotyped to the point that the assumption is that they have failed to
attained those requirements to the same degree as white applicants, discriminatory hiring
and admissions practices are bound to crop up. Because a number of studies have shown
such discrimination to be precisely the case, the policy of affirmative action has been
offered up as a potential solution, aimed at evening out the playing field for members of
those groups on the receiving end of discrimination. While those groups may include
women, the disabled, and other racial and ethnic groups, when Americans think of the
policy, it is often linked inextricably to the Black community.
Likewise, individuals who are perceived as being lazy and violence-prone may
not fare as well in the criminal justice system, and indeed research backs up claims that
racial discrimination exists within all stops of the justice system—from the police officers
who perform searches and arrests, to the prosecutor who decides the charges and
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potential plea bargains, to the jury who hears a case and passes down a verdict, to the
judge who doles out a sentence, racial prejudice, no matter how subtle or subconscious,
pervades the justice process and unfairly burdens the Black community. Because of this,
a number of criminal justice reforms have been offered to counteract the discrimination
encountered in our supposedly color-blind justice system. Efforts to repeal “three-strikes
laws” and the death penalty often focus in on the way discrimination by each of the actors
in the criminal justice system negatively affect Black defendants, and efforts to end the
“war on drugs” also include some discussion of the disproportionate effect on the Black
community given the prevalence of drug use across all racial and ethnic groups,
especially the white community. The links between negative stereotyping and racial
profiling is likely more evident to Americans than the apparent links between
stereotyping and the other policies aforementioned; racial profiling, by definition, targets
individuals of certain racial and ethnic groups solely due to those demographic factors,
and due to the overarching acceptance that individuals of those races or ethnicities are
more “suspicious” for various reasons, usually backed up by wide-spread stereotypes
based on pop culture or a limited number of high-profile, real-world cases.
While this project is interested specifically in those stereotypes subjects held
against Black Americans, requiring the subjects to answer about a range of racial and
ethnic groups serves two purposes: first, it allows for comparison of racial attitudes held
across groups, and therefore even those individuals who do not rank as holding overt
stereotypes (i.e. answering toward the “most Blacks” end of the spectrum) may still be
uncovered as holding stronger stereotypes against that community than they do against
other racial or ethnic groups; second, it allows for subjects to positively stereotype other
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racial and ethnic groups which may make them more comfortable providing negative
stereotypes of other groups, as though positive counterbalances the negative. And
although there is a very strong risk of a social desirability factor coming into play as
respondents answer questions pertaining to their own stereotypes, past GSS research
indicates that many Americans are willing to admit to their own racial and ethnic
prejudice by way of these four stereotypes (Smith, Marsden, Hout & Kim 2013).
In addition to testing for a respondent’s level of racial stereotyping and prejudice,
questions were included in the survey in order to control for a respondent’s level of group
attachment. As was discussed in chapter two, past research indicates that those who
identify more strongly with a group will be more apt to support policies that benefit that
group; in this case, respondents were asked solely about their group attachment to the
five racial and ethnic groups that are included as groups within the study’s stereotype and
meta-stereotype questions: white, non-Hispanics, Hispanics, African Americans, Asians,
and Arabs. To gauge their degree of attachment to each group, respondents were asked
the following:
On a scale of 0-10, where 0 represents having no feeling of group
attachment and where 10 represents feeling extremely linked to the group
in question, please place where you fall on the scale for each group.
Respondents were also asked three questions concerning their perception of the
consequences of affirmative action policies, and those answers will also be built into a
composite score to be used as a control variable when looking at meta-stereotype’s effect
on the policy of affirmative action, specifically.19 Given economic theories of political
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The questions gauging respondents’ perceptions of the counterproductive
consequences of affirmative action appeared after the battery of policy preference
questions; thus, unlike the other control variables, these questions were found within the
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behavior, that emphasize weighing perceived costs against perceived benefits, these
questions are introduced because it is possible that individuals who perceive high levels
of stereotyping and prejudice, and who would then be expected to support a policy like
affirmative action, may nonetheless be hesitant to support such policies if they perceive
the negative fall-out of the program to outweigh the positive gains that the program
strives for. Thus, the three questions gauging perceived consequences are measured on a
five-point scale, ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”, and focus on the
following potential consequences:
Do you agree or disagree: Affirmative action programs cause white
Americans to think that minorities are incapable of making progress in
the work place and university setting without these policies in place?
Do you agree or disagree: Affirmative action programs cause white
Americans to think that anyone who is a minority and is hired, promoted,
accepted, etc. is a product of affirmative action policies rather than
because they earned it?
Do you agree or disagree: Affirmative action programs cause white
Americans to be resentful of minorities?
As is standard with most social science research, a number of demographic
variables are used as control variables as well. Many of these demographic variables
may prove to be of theoretical importance given the policies measured in the dependent
variables, and given the nature of a study that focuses on racial stereotyping. For
example, gender may end up not having an effect; however, it is possible that, due to the
past research on a gender-gap between women and men on criminal justice policies
(Applegate, Cullen & Fisher 2002; Cochran & Sanders 2009), gender may prove to have
some effect on the dependent variable. Political ideology and partisanship are measured

body of the survey as opposed to in the set-up prior to the treatments or at the conclusion
of the survey with the typical, wide-ranging demographic questions.
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because of the obvious link between those variables and policy preferences in general,
and specifically the divisions between the Democrat and Republican parties regarding the
specific policy preferences being measured in this project, both at the elite and mass
levels.20 Also included as potential demographic control variables are questions
indicating whether respondents currently live in the South and/or grew up in the South
since the southern region is known for enduring racial prejudices and for its conservative
roots, both of which may impact the dependent variable.21 Respondents’ current
employment status and their incomes (personal and household) are included since either
variable may account for perceptions of the job market and the work force, which may
then impact feelings toward affirmative action programs. Lastly, respondents’ level of
educational achievement and age are taken into consideration as well since past research
indicates a growing level of tolerance as individuals scale up the educational ladder and
as generational replacement occurs (Stouffer 1955; Nunn, Crocket & Williams 1978;
Bobo & Licari 1989; Golebiowska 1995).
VIII. Data analysis
In order to measure the effects of meta-stereotyping on individuals’ racial
policy preferences, and in order to measure the effects of meta-stereotypes on
white (majority in-group) individuals and Black (minority out-group) individuals,
this project uses an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to compare the average
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Both ideology and partisanship were measured using the typical seven-point scales.
Questions inquiring about connections to the American south were scored in the
following ways: respondents were asked to select up to three states that they had lived in
within the past 12 months, and also to select up to three states in which they grew up; for
each variable if the respondent selected a southern state (as determined by standard
political science conventions) than they were coded as either living and/or growing up in
the south.
21
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treatment effects. This data analysis procedure allows the researcher to compare
means of multiple groups in order to gauge whether or not a hypothesized effect
exists. ANOVA tests for between-subjects experiments, like this one, compare
the means for each treatment group, and in doing so can test to see whether the
causal mechanism attains significance using an F-score which is calculated by
comparing two estimates of variance: the first is the within-group variance,
which should be unaffected by the random assignment of treatment conditions;
the second is the between-group variance, which should, if hypotheses are correct,
vary and will differ in degree based on the strength of treatment effects. The Fscore, then, divides the between-group variance (the effect variance) by the
within-group variance (the error variance).
In order to determine whether statistical significance has been achieved
using this method, three assumptions must be taken into account: the
observations must be independent, the observations are normally distributed, and
the homogeneity of variances. Because this experiment is a between-subjects
design, and because it relies on the random assignment of treatment conditions,
the first assumption is met; no observation on the dependent and independent
variables of interest are impacted in any way by another observation in the data
set because questions are not repeated within the survey, and thus each subject
only contributes one score (data point) for the same self-reported variables (for
example, a pre-treatment score and a post-treatment score). The data will need to
be checked in accordance with the central limit theorem in order to confirm that
the second and third assumptions are met. Using the aforementioned hypotheses
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(see chapter two), a series of planned comparisons can follow-up the ANOVA
analyses by conducting a linear contrast analysis and trend analysis of the data as
well. Additionally, OLS regression analyses can be conducted in order to observe
any relationships between the hypothesized independent and dependent variables
in the occasion that no causal mechanism is found; a statistically significant
relationship could potentially occur where a causal mechanism is not identified,
especially if the priming and framing effects were not strong enough to affect the
independent variable at hand (meta-stereotypes or the composite score of
perceived prejudice).
IX.

Limitations of the research
While the use of an experimental survey better gauges meta-stereotypes’

causal effects on policy preferences, as opposed to mere correlations between the
independent and dependent variables that would result from a non-experimental
survey, there are still limitations to this method of analysis. Though experimental
studies can generally be more confident that their measured effects come from a
designed intervention, they still must make sure that their confidence is justified
by the experiment’s internal validity. Campbell and Stanley (1966) identify nine
threats to internal validity: selection, history, maturation, repeated testing,
instrumentation, regression towards the mean, mortality, experimenter bias, and
interaction effects. On the whole, most of these threats to internal validity are
avoided within this project: the short-term (thirty minute) nature of this study
likely avoids the problem of maturation, the single-test nature of this study avoids
the problem of testing, the reliance on objective, non-wavering survey measures
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(as opposed to subjective measures, or interviewer effects based on tone, wording,
etc.) avoids the problems of instrumentation and experimenter bias, the betweensubjects design combats regression to the mean which can occur when analyzing
repeated measures in a within-subjects design, the study has a fairly low mortality
rate, especially when compared to other current methods and other current
studies, and a careful statistical analysis should look for hidden explanations due
to interaction terms to attempt to avoid the problem of interaction effects.
A few of these threats to internal validity do remain potential problems,
though they are not expected to have large effects on the answers provided within
this project. Participants are asked to give the survey their full attention and they
must answer all the questions in one sitting; these two provisions, however,
cannot be forced on the subject because he/she is not in a controlled laboratory
setting. Thus, the researcher has given up a degree of control that would
otherwise combat the problems of history and contamination because subjects
may shift their attention around during the survey. If subjects lose focus after the
treatment has been provided, but before measuring the effects of that treatment,
some internal validity may become lost because they may no longer be thinking
about the treatment. Additionally, since the researcher loses control over what
else the subject is doing while taking the study, it is possible (though not likely)
that some subjects would feel moved to use the internet during the survey to
explore some of the issues being asked within the survey. Lastly, there may be
some sort of difference in the way the treatments are received and absorbed
during the survey depending on the time of day that the survey is taken, or the
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amount of distractions in the subjects’ environment, which might make it harder
for some subjects to focus than others.
Additionally, if subjects try too hard to figure out the purpose of an
experiment, internal validity may be threatened. In some cases individuals may
attempt to answer in a way that they believe the researcher expects them to
answer—not because of the normal pressures associated with social desirability
factors (though that, too, is a potential threat) but because they feel the need to be
“right” and prove the researchers’ argument for them. On the other hand, some
individuals may attempt to thwart the research agenda if they feel manipulated, or
if they are skeptical about the researchers’ motivations, and answer in ways that
are not in accordance to their “true” beliefs, attitudes, opinions, etc. Because this
project tackles controversial attitudes regarding race and ethnicity, the
motivations of this study may be questioned by some subjects and, if so, the latter
reaction could prove problematic for the study’s internal validity. In order to
gauge whether the latter has occurred, subjects will be able to provide open-ended
comments at the end of the survey; those who have a bone to pick with the
perceived research question and the motivation behind it might decide to make
those feelings known to the researcher.
The threats to this project’s external validity are more problematic than the
tempered threats to internal validity. While researchers always hope to combat
both types of threat, it is most important to thwart internal validity threats first
because “if random or systematic error makes it impossible for the experimenter
even to draw any conclusions from the experiment, the question of generality of
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the conclusions never arises” (Aronson, Ellsworth, Carlsmith & Gonzalez 1990).
A potential sampling bias, such as the one made up of volunteers within a
predetermined subject pool, may not accurately reflect the population as a whole,
which could then make the project less generalizable. Likewise, the restricted
subject population of this study—focusing only on meta-stereotypes’ effect on
Black and white individuals—is limited due to practical considerations (chiefly
the costs associated with recruiting and distributing the survey to enough
members of other racial or ethnic groups to make their inclusion statistically
sound); however, those limitations may make generalizing any findings regarding
the effects of meta-stereotypes on racial policy preferences more difficult when
we’re talking about the way they impact the Hispanic population in America, the
Arab population in the United States, etc. It is possible that a longer and deeper
history of discrimination against Black men and women in America, and a
stronger socialization process acknowledging that discrimination in the Black
community, would unearth effects in this study that would be larger than those
that might be found if other racial and ethnic minority groups were tested. The
perception that this survey is a mere “trivial” matter, and the artificial setting,
could also threaten external validity if subjects don’t take the survey questions
seriously, or if the way the treatment effects are presented within this study don’t
mirror the way those treatments exist in the real-world. Specifically, the latter
threat could be seen as a significant problem since the way meta-stereotypes exist
in the real-world is much different than they way they are primed and framed
within this study. In reality, people are not asked to consciously deliberate on and
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then recall their meta-stereotypes; instead, it is something they have likely
previously formulated and can easily access, but which is done subconsciously.
Thus, although this project tries to introduce the treatments as a way of facilitating
subjects’ consideration of meta-stereotypes, questions asking them to recall those
meta-stereotypes in a conscious manner may resemble the design of more
manipulative studies nonetheless.
The careful construction of this project’s survey instrument does,
however, attempt to alleviate the problem of mediating variables. Still the
internal validity of the survey can only do so much to assuage some of the
resulting threats to external validity and, as is the case for any experimental study,
the strength of a study’s external validity can really only be realized after careful
replication across diverse groups, under diverse circumstances (McDermott
2011). For the purposes of this study, an emphasis is placed on preserving
internal validity first and foremost, and the relatively high degree of control over
the way subjects are assigned to groups, and the way treatments are introduced in
an otherwise identical scenario to that of the other groups subjects are compared
against, allows for statistical analyses within the subject population that can later
be replicated within a more random sample, and while including in the study other
racial and ethnic groups.
A final limitation that applies not only to this project specifically, but to
experimental studies in general, is the criticism that although an experiment may
highlight a causal effect, the causal effect still leaves a number of questions to be
answered since causal effects are distinct from causal mechanisms (Imai, Keele,
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Tingley & Yamamoto 2011). However, scholars also must recognize the inherent
value of experimental studies, such as this one, that highlight causal effects while
failing to attempt to discover the precise mechanism that drives the effect.
Scholars note that finding a causal effect is nothing to shrug at (Green, Ha &
Bullock 2010); designing a study that can find a causal effect through
experimentation is, in and of itself, a difficult procedure, and the findings of such
experiments can further drive research on the topic. Green et al. (2010) point out
that “the practical progression of an experimental agenda makes it impractical to
examine mediators until a causal relationship is firmly established” (202). They
also point out that holding up experiments that derive causal mechanisms up as
those with the most value is inherently risky since it is extremely difficult to
control for every potential mediator (whether due to resources, complexity, or
even our own ability as researchers to think of all the potential confounding
mediators) and that if researchers fail to do so they may risk falsely attributing an
effect to a certain causal mechanism. Thus, Green et al. (2010) conclude that
“one can learn a great deal of theoretical and practical value simply by
manipulating variables and gauging their effects on outcomes, regardless of the
causal pathways by which these effects are transmitted” (207). This project
acknowledges the contributions of experiments focusing on causal effects at the
immediate expense of locating a causal mechanism, and is merely a starting point
for a broader discussion of the effects of meta-stereotypes on individuals’ policy
preferences.
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CHAPTER 4:
CURRENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE PREVALENCE OF PREJUDICE IN 21ST CENTURY
AMERICA: A DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF THE DATA
This chapter is broken into three distinct sections in order to better understand the
meta-stereotypes held by individuals in the United States’ Black and white communities.
Ultimately, the descriptive accounts of the data in this chapter should better put the
analysis of meta-stereotyping’s potential effects of racial policy preferences into context.
In doing so, this chapter will also paint a clearer picture of Americans’ proclivity to
accept the post-racial narrative on its face, or to remain skeptical concerning the
narrative’s claims that a post-racial mentality has materialized in twenty-first century
America.
The first section observes whether the meta-stereotypes regarding the Black
community are accurate; that is, that the proportion of white Americans assumed to hold
each stereotype actually accurately matches up with the proportion of white Americans
who admit to holding each stereotype. This section, therefore, looks at the perceptions of
racial prejudice in America and contrasts it with the data from this project’s survey to see
whether perception matches reality. It is worth noting that the “reality” measured in this
survey and others are susceptible to a social desirability factor; therefore, an alternative
way of looking at levels of prejudice using self-reported data is also included in this
section.

104

The second section reports levels of meta-stereotyping within the Black and white
subsamples by contrasting those perceived to be held against the Black community with
those perceived to be held against other minority communities, specifically the Hispanic,
Asian and Arab populations in the United States. Like the first section, this second
section also looks at how accurate meta-stereotypes are when they are measured
regarding these other groups; doing so allows this project to investigate whether the
potential inaccuracies regarding meta-stereotypes of Black Americans is unique or
whether Americans similarly overestimate the prevalence of prejudice against other
minority racial and/or ethnic groups.
The third section reports the mean meta-stereotypes regarding the Black
community within this project’s Black and white subsamples. It then breaks down each
subsample into further demographic groups—such as partisanship, ideology, age,
education and region— to see whether those aspects affect levels of meta-stereotyping.
The fourth section will use the answers provided by this project’s framing
treatment group to compare subjects’ meta-stereotypes—itself a relatively abstract
concept, especially as it is measured in this project’s survey using a 101-point scale—to
those same subjects’ answers regarding the prevalence of prejudice in more clear-cut
hypothetical real world scenarios. Additionally, this section will compare subjects’
answers to the 101-point meta-stereotype question to that of the dichotomous metastereotype question. Comparisons on both counts should put into context the complexity
of measuring individuals’ perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice.
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I.

How do Americans view the prevalence of racial prejudice today?
This section begins by reporting the meta-stereotypes regarding the Black

community and then proceeds to compare these meta-stereotypes to supplemental data in
two specific ways: first, this projects’ subjects’ meta-stereotypes are compared to the
actual self-reported stereotypes within this survey; second, these meta-stereotypes are
compared to the same respondents’ meta-stereotypes of the white (majority) community
and three distinct minority communities (Hispanics, Asians and Arabs). In doing so, this
section follows-up on Sigelman and Tuch’s 1997 investigation of how accurately Black
individuals perceive prejudice held against them; however, it also expands the scope of
their work by including white subjects and can, therefore, also investigate how accurately
white individuals perceive the prejudice their own in-group holds against their Black
compatriots.
In describing the accuracy of meta-stereotypes, this project is not interested in
whether or not the original stereotype (i.e. laziness, violence-prone, etc.) can actually be
attributed to members of a specified group. Instead, accuracy in this sense looks to
compare whether or not perceptions of the prevalence of stereotyping against specific
groups is in line with the actual amount of stereotyping being cast by members of the
white, majority community. Sigelman and Tuch documented a wide gap between Black
subjects’ metea-stereotypes and the actual stereotypes admittedly endorsed by white
subjects, and this project finds a similarly large gap between subjects’ meta-stereotypes
and the actual levels of stereotyping reported by the study’s participants. This study,
however, documents this gap not only in the perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice
held by Black subjects, but also by the white subjects in the study. Thus, while Sigelman
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and Tuch’s work left readers in the dark about whether Black Americans’ proclivity to
over-exaggerate the prejudice held against them was indicative of their unique station in
American society, or whether such over-exaggerations were held by members of the
white majority as well, this project begins to paint a clearer picture by putting the Black
community’s level of meta-stereotyping into context vis-à-vis the white community’s
level of meta-stereotyping.
This project measured meta-stereotypes in two different ways: the first measure
was modeled after the Time/CNN survey of Black Americans used by Sigelman and
Tuch; the second measure was designed specifically for this study and allowed subjects
to respond with a full range of options. Specifically, the first measure, a dichotomous
measure of meta-stereotyping, asked subjects to answer the following question: “Do you
think that most white Americans think that Black Americans are lazy?” (also, violenceprone, unintelligent, and prefer to live off welfare). The second measure, an interval
measure of meta-stereotyping, provided subjects with a 101-point scale and asked them
to answer the following question: “Please GUESS: What percentage (0-100%) of white
people do you think would say that each group is lazy?” (also, violence-prone,
unintelligent, and prefer to live off welfare).
The percentage of actual white subjects who endorsed a stereotype is reported
based on whether subjects answered the self-reported stereotype questions on the
affirmative side of the scale—i.e. when asked where, on a seven-point scale, they’d rank
Black Americans in terms of being lazy, violence-prone, unintelligent, and preferring to
live off welfare, those white subjects coded as endorsing a stereotype answered 5, 6 or 7
(where the question wording indicated that a 1 meant that they think all people in a given
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group exhibit the positive characteristic in the pair, that a 7 meant that they think all
people in a given group exhibit the negative characteristic in the pair, and that a 4 meant
that a given group was not toward one end of the scale or the other).
Table 4.1 reports the inaccuracies inherent in subjects’ ability to perceive the
prevalence of racial stereotyping using the first, dichotomous, measure. As the table
indicates, no single stereotype netted a self-reported endorsement rate (by white subjects)
that topped thirty-three percent. Despite the low self-rated admission of stereotype
endorsement, a majority of the same white subjects believed that “most whites” do
stereotype the Black community as violence-prone and preferring to live off welfare,
while over forty percent of those same white subjects believed that “most whites” do
stereotype the Black community as being lazy and unintelligent.
The rates of Black subjects reporting similarly exaggerated perceptions are also
documented in the table, though it is worth noting that Black overestimations were even
more exaggerated than the overestimations of white subjects. Specifically, at least 70
percent of Black respondents answered affirmatively when asked whether “most whites”
endorsed the specific negative stereotypes in all four questions. Like the white sample,
Black subjects perceived “most whites” to hold the stereotypes of Blacks as violenceprone and preferring to live off welfare at the highest rates. The overestimation of these
two specific stereotypes by both white subjects and Black subjects may be due to the
salience of those stereotypes since both negative stereotypes are staples of political
rhetoric, news coverage, and even entertainment.
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The last column in Table 4.1 reports the difference in the percentage of Black and
white subjects who answered affirmatively to the dichotomous, “most whites” questions
for each stereotype. Because white subjects overestimated the percentage of white
individuals who believe that Black Americans are violence-prone (75% answering
affirmatively vs. 33% who actually admitted to endorsing the stereotype), the gap
between Black and white subjects is the smallest regarding that specific negative
stereotype. Still, the gap between the two groups’ assessment is a full 10 points. The gap
between the two groups when assessing the other three stereotypes all top 20 points.
Thus, Black subjects appear to hold much higher meta-stereotypes than their white
counterparts, even while those white individuals are themselves holding onto moderate to
high stereotypes. Given what we know about the political socialization process of Black
and white Americans as it pertains to issues of racism, the discrepancy is not particularly
shocking, though it does indicate that many white Americans have not been socialized to
adopt a purely post-racial narrative.
Table 4.2 reports that similar inaccuracies abound when using the second,
interval, measure. Once again, both Black and white subjects overestimated the
prevalence of white stereotyping against the Black community. In doing so, Table 4.2
reports the average meta-stereotype score (0-100%) reported by this project’s white
subjects, as well as the size of the gap between subjects’ perception of the prevalence of
prejudice for each stereotype and the self-reported “reality” described previously (shaded
in light gray). The gap between average guesses offered by Black and white subjects is
reported in the last column, shaded in a darker gray.
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Like the dichotomous, “most whites” measure, answers to questions using the
interval, 101-point scale indicate that both white and Black subjects are overestimating
the rate at which white Americans hold each negative stereotype against Blacks (at least,
when those guesses are compared to the self-reported endorsements of each stereotype by
this project’s white participants). This measure allows for the direct comparison of the
actual percentage of white subjects who endorsed a stereotype to the percentage of white
Americans guessed, on average, by white and Black subjects, and therefore provides a
specific gap between perception and “reality;” these gaps are reported in the two columns
shaded in a lighter gray.
Although the violence-prone stereotype was the most overestimated stereotype of
the four when assessing white and Black subjects’ perceptions using the dichotomous,
“most whites” measure, it is surprisingly the stereotype garnering the lowest level of
overestimation when using the 101-point scale measure (although it is still the stereotype
with regards to which both groups guess the highest level of negative stereotyping, and
although it is still overestimated by both groups). The overestimations for the white
subjects still exists on all four counts of stereotype questions, and at a rate of between 19
percent and 36 percent depending on the question, yet like the dichotomous measure their
degree of overestimation is dwarfed by those held by this project’s Black subjects.
Worth noting, however, is that while Black subjects still overestimate the percentage of
white Americans holding negative stereotypes against Blacks, the gap between the two
groups’ assessments is much smaller when using this measure than when using the
dichotomous one. Indeed, while the gap between Blacks’ and whites’ perceptions of the
prevalence of stereotyping topped 20 percent for three of the four stereotypes when using
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the “most whites” question, when using the more nuanced measure, the gap between the
two groups’ perceptions shrinks considerably. The gap between the two remains steady
at 10 points higher for Black subjects than white subjects when looking at the violenceprone questions using both measures, the gap for the other three measures drops to below
a 10-point difference. Thus, the difference in perceptions seems less extreme when using
the 101-point scale to measure those perceptions in a more specific, more nuanced way.
Not only are the rates at which Black and white subjects perceive whites to hold
negative views against Blacks overestimated when looking at their mean metastereotypes, but even when looking at the lower-quartiles of the data (see Figure 4.1) both
Black and white individuals overestimate the prevalence of negative stereotyping.
Indeed, for both the Black and white subjects in this study, over 75% reported holding
meta-stereotypes that approached or topped forty percent in many instances despite the
“reality” (using self-reported endorsements) which fell far short of those expectations.
Of course, there is likely a large disconnect between objective reality and the
“reality” measured using self-reported endorsements of stereotyping; after all, social
desirability factors, while mitigated to a degree through the use of non-face-to-face
survey mechanisms, may very well be in play here. But measuring prejudice against
Black Americans solely by looking at which side of the seven-point stereotype scales a
white subject indicated their beliefs lie is itself limiting the way we might understand
prejudice. It is possible that subjects who rate low on the seven-point scale may,
nonetheless, demonstrate some degree of prejudice against Black Americans, and the
degree to which such stereotyping occurs can be uncovered by comparing their placement
along the seven-point stereotyping scales when rating Black Americans to the placement
111

of white Americans along the same scale. Thus, a subject might indicate that they do not
believe Black Americans to be toward one end of the scale or the other (rated as a 4)
when asked about a specific stereotype pair (and would, therefore, not be coded as
holding that specific stereotype), but the same subject might also rate white Americans as
a 3 on that same scale which would indicate that they are, to a small degree, prejudiced
against Black Americans. While investigating endorsements of prejudicial stereotypes
this way does not eradicate social desirability factors, the data from this project’s survey
indicates that it does diminish the social desirability factor to a degree and that many
subjects admit to more positive stereotypes of white Americans than Black Americans,
while at the same time refraining from labeling Black Americans with a negative
stereotype.
Table 4.3 reports the difference in the percentage of white subjects who admitted
holding a negative stereotype of Black Americans (by ranking them a 5, 6 or 7 on the
stereotype scales) and the percentage of those same white subjects who seem to endorse
some degree of stereotyping by ranking Black Americans more negatively than their
white counterparts. The second, alternative, measure is then reported alongside subjects’
meta-stereotypes regarding white prejudice held toward the Black community (0-100%),
and includes the difference gap between perception and this measure of “reality.”
When using this alternative measure of stereotype endorsement, white subjects
appear to be slightly more prejudiced than they are when measuring prejudice as a
product of assigning negative attributes outright to the Black community. The difference
between admission of stereotyping shouldn’t be very surprising given the hovering threat
of social desirability factors, and also because individuals can hold positive stereotypes
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more assertively for one group than another, as is implied by the use of a seven-point
scale measuring stereotypes in the first place. Thus, some white individuals may rate
Blacks as mostly positive and appear unprejudiced, but they may rate them as being
slightly less apt to display the positive trait as a group on the whole than they rate the
white community on the same stereotype question. Likewise, some white individuals
might rank both whites and Blacks as being mostly negatively maligned with a
stereotype, but they might believe Blacks are more likely to embody the negative trait on
the whole than whites are. Any individuals who fall into the latter group are captured in
the original measure of stereotype endorsement, however, since they self-report an
admitted negative stereotype in the first place. Thus, the difference between the two
measures (reported in the last column) are indicative only of the former group—those
who rate Blacks as a group mostly positively, but to a lesser degree than they do whites.
Using the alternative measure, at least a quarter of white subjects demonstrate
some degree of stereotyping on all four stereotype questions, although it is worth noting
that using this measure less white individuals appear prejudiced regarding the violenceprone stereotype than when using the original measure. This indicates that white subjects
see violence as being more of a widespread, and evenly spread, characteristic than the
other three stereotype traits. Because of this, the difference between the two measures is
actually in the negative direction for the violence-prone stereotype, but the gap between
the two measures holds at around a positive 10 points for the other three stereotypes.
Because the alternative measure of stereotype endorsement indicates higher levels
of prejudice than does the original measure, the differences between white and Black
subjects’ perceptions of the prevalence of each stereotype and the reality of the
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prevalence of stereotyping now appear to be smaller (see Table 4.4). However, white
subjects still overestimate the percentage of white Americans who likely possess each
stereotype (by almost twenty points on the closest guess, and by twenty-six points on the
furthest guess), as do Black subjects (by twenty-eight points on the closest guess, and by
thirty-four points on the furthest guesses).
Ultimately, then, it seems that despite the emergence of the post-racial narrative,
many—if not most—Americans actually overestimate the prevalence of racial prejudice.
These findings are similar to those documented by Sigelman and Tuch in the late 1990s;
while their study only looked at Black meta-stereotypes and only by using the
dichotomous, “most whites” measure, the meta-stereotypes documented in their study
nearly 25 years ago indicates exceedingly high rates of meta-stereotyping, just as this
projects’ Black sample did. These similarities are documented in Table 4.5. The last
column indicates that meta-stereotypes held by Black individuals today—when
measuring using the dichotomous, “most whites” variable—are remarkably similar to
those held by Black individuals in the early nineties (as measured by the 1991 Time/CNN
survey). In fact, while fewer Black subjects in this project indicated that they thought
“most whites” believe Blacks to be unintelligent than those who answered the question in
1991, the Black subjects in this project indicated a higher rate of meta-stereotyping on
the three other stereotype questions. Still, the difference between the two scores is very
small, ranging from a three point difference to a six point difference, depending on the
stereotype in question.
While it is not surprising that Black subjects continue to hold high metastereotypes, it is somewhat surprising that the rate at which they believe white Americans
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hold each stereotype against the Black community has remained so steady—that the
Black meta-stereotypes have remained as high as they have. After all, Table 4.6
documents that the percentage of white subjects who endorse the stereotypes in question
has decreased for each one over the past twenty years. The data reported in the first two
data-filled columns is from the 1990 and 2010 General Social Surveys (GSS).
Unfortunately, the GSS stopped asking about the violence-prone and preferring to live off
welfare stereotypes prior to the new millennium; however, the trend between the two data
points is one that indicates decline. This trend could represent improved race relations
over the span of the past two and a half decades; however, it could also represent white
Americans’ shift to more subtle or implicit forms of prejudice. Additionally, the GSS
survey is vulnerable to the same social desirability factor that this project’s survey likely
was, which would seem to alleviate—to a degree—the level of exaggeration the metastereotypes displayed by this projects’ white and Black subjects.
It is also worth noting that the self-reported endorsement of negative stereotyping
is higher for the subjects in the GSS 2010 survey and those subjects in this project; again,
this alleviates—to a degree—the level of exaggeration the meta-stereotypes displayed by
this projects’ white and Black subjects.
This section’s findings also indicate that such overestimations are not unique to the
Black community, as even members of the white majority over-exaggerate the rates at
which their fellow white citizens stereotype Black Americans.
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II.

Examining levels of meta-stereotyping regarding Black Americans and
other minority racial and/or ethnic groups
This section takes a similarly investigative approach to the question of subjects’

meta-stereotype accuracy as did the first section; however, this section looks at the rates
of accuracy when subjects are asked about white prejudice against other minority racial
and/or ethnic groups—specifically, this section looks at the previously unveiled levels of
white self-reported endorsements of stereotypes against the Black community in relation
to white self-reported endorsements of stereotypes against the Hispanic, Asian and Arab
population in the United States, as well as against white stereotyping against their own
in-group.
Table 4.7 reports the level at which this project’s white subjects positively and
negatively stereotyped each group in question. Subjects were coded as endorsing
positive22 stereotypes (columns are not shaded) if they answered on the end of the sevenpoint scale indicating that most members of a group were hard working, are not violenceprone, are intelligent, and do not prefer to live off welfare (1, 2 or 3 on the scale). As in
previous sections, a subject was coded as holding a negative stereotype (columns are
shaded in a light gray) if they answered on the end of the seven-point scale indicating that
most members of a group were lazy, violence-prone, unintelligent, or that they prefer to
live off welfare (5, 6 or 7 on the scale). Neutral responses (4 on the scale) to each
stereotype-pairing are not reported in this table..

22

The usage of the term “positive” here is not meant as a normative statement; applying
this terminology is not meant to suggest that stereotyping groups to hold seemingly
positive attributes is unproblematic, it is merely used as a way of indicating that subjects
apply those positive attributes to the groups in question.
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Results indicate that white individuals assign positive characteristics to Blacks at
the lowest rate of all five racial and/or ethnic groups measured, on all four stereotype
questions (they have been inserted in bold font, and are in the unshaded Black column).
Likewise, white individuals assigned negative characteristics to Blacks at the highest rate
of all five racial and/or ethnic groups measured, again on all four stereotype questions
(they have been inserted in bold font, and are in the lightly shaded Black column).
Because there was a neutral option along the seven-point scale which was used to code
negative and positive stereotyping, these two findings did not have to exist
simultaneously; however, on all four stereotype counts that is exactly how things played
out.
Specifically, when it came to rating Blacks as hardworking, the gap between
whites’ positive stereotype for Blacks and whites’ positive stereotype for the next closest
group—whites—was 14 points. For the not violence-prone stereotype, the gap between
whites’ positive stereotypes and the next closest group—this time Arabs—was only 2
points, though there was a bit more distance between whites’ positive stereotypes in this
instance and the next two closest groups (7 points compared to Hispanics, 9 points
compared to whites). For the intelligent stereotype, a similar story played out—positive
stereotypes were held to a similar degree for Blacks and Hispanics (38% to 41%), but
remained a bit further in comparison to Arabs (46%-- an 8 point difference) and much
further in comparison to whites and Asians (56% and 62%-- 10 point and 12 point
differences, respectively). Finally, whites’ were far less likely to positively stereotype
Blacks as preferring to be self-sufficient when compared to the next closest group—in
this case Arabs; the difference between the two groups was a full 15 points.
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When looking at negative stereotypes held by white subjects toward each group,
similar trends persist. Not only do whites rate Blacks more negatively on all four
stereotype questions than any of the other racial and/or ethnic groups, but they do so to a
fairly large degree on some of the measures. Fifteen percent of white subjects rated
Blacks as lazy, while the next closest group—whites, Arabs and Hispanics, tied—were
only rated as lazy by five percent of those subjects. Thirty-three percent of Black
subjects were rated as violence-prone by white subjects, while Arabs—the next closest
group—were rated as being violence-prone by “only” twenty-five percent of white
subjects (a difference of 8 points). On the unintelligent stereotype question, white
subjects negatively stereotyped Blacks at a rate of fifteen percent, while the next closest
group—Hispanics—were negatively stereotyped by ten percent (a 5 point difference; the
smallest gap between Blacks and the next closest group on any of the four negative
stereotype questions); when compared against the other groups, the gap on the negative
side of the intelligence-unintelligence scale become more pronounced (9 point difference
between Blacks and Arabs, and a 12 point difference between Blacks and both Asians
and whites). Finally, there was a thirteen point difference between the rate at which
white subjects’ negatively stereotyped Blacks as preferring to live off welfare and the
next closest group (Hispanics), and a whopping difference of between 17 and 21 points
between Blacks and the other three racial and/or ethnic groups.
While Figure 4.2 indicates that Black subjects correctly predict the general trends
regarding white stereotypes held against the five racial and/or ethnic groups on most
counts. Black subjects’ meta-stereotypes are higher as they pertain to white stereotyping
of the Black community than are their meta-stereotypes for any other group; this parallels
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the reality expressed in Table 4.7, wherein white individuals do hold negative stereotypes
against Blacks to a higher degree than the other four groups. Likewise, Black metastereotypes regarding white stereotypes against the Hispanic community are ranked
higher than the Arab, Asian and white groups, except in the case of being violence-prone
which is the sole case of Black subjects having a higher meta-stereotype for a group
(other than Blacks) than Hispanics. Again, both of these aspects of Figure 4.2 mirror the
realities expressed in Table 4.7. Additionally, while Black subjects overestimate the rate
at which white Americans negatively stereotype their own in-group, they also
overestimate the rate at which those negative stereotypes are applied by whites to all
other groups. Yet, despite that exaggeration, the gist of the pecking order in the hierarchy
of white stereotyping is preserved in their meta-stereotype assessments.
Not to be outdone, on most counts, white subjects also correctly aligned their
meta-stereotypes with the patterns grounded in the reality of Table 4.7—even if, like
Black subjects, these meta-stereotypes were overestimations (see Figure 4.3). White
subjects did exhibit meta-stereotypes suggesting that they believe whites stereotype
Arabs as violence-prone to roughly the same degree as Blacks, instead of a little less
likely (as was the case for this project’s sample), but again, the general pattern of Blacks
being on the receiving end of white stereotypes the most, followed by Hispanics and
Arabs, and finally whites and Asians, stays true to the form outlined in Table 4.7.
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III.

Looking at levels of meta-stereotyping across various demographic
groups
The previous two sections indicate that Black and white Americans tend to

overestimate the pervasiveness of prejudice against all racial and ethnic groups tested for
in this project’s survey, but that meta-stereotypes were higher regarding white
perceptions of Blacks than they were for any other group. The first section also indicated
that the accuracy gap between Blacks’ and whites’ perceptions of the prevalence of
prejudice (meta-stereotypes) and the self-reported reality of racial stereotyping against
Blacks was larger for this projects’ Black subsample than for the white subsample. This
section, builds on the previous sections by examining whether the difference between the
Black and white subjects is statistically significant, and also explores whether levels of
meta-stereotyping differ across other demographic groups at statistically significant rates.
i.

Race

While sections 1 and 2 indicated that Black subjects held higher meta-stereotypes
with regard to the rates at which Blacks are negatively stereotyped by whites, the
question of whether the differences between the two groups’ perceptions is significant
lingered. Using a t-test to conduct a difference in means test, Table 4.8 reveals that the
difference between Black and white meta-stereotypes are, indeed, significant at the 95
percent confidence level. Table 4.8 reports the difference in means results based on the
meta-stereotype composite score (built of meta-stereotype responses to all four individual
stereotype questions) and also for the four individual stereotype questions; the results
suggest that we can be confident that there is between a seven and nine point difference
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between Black and white meta-stereotypes depending on which specific stereotype is the
stereotype of interest.
ii.

Gender

Table 4.9 indicates that there does not appear to be a significant relationship
between subjects’ gender and the level at which they perceive white Americans to hold
negative stereotypes against Blacks for the white subsample. However, the relationship
between gender and level of meta-stereotyping does appear significant at the 95 percent
confidence level for the black subsample. The results of these t-tests are presented in
Table 4.9, and are indicative of higher rates of meta-stereotyping by Black women than
by Black men. These results are driven by the violence-prone and unintelligent metastereotypes, both of which achieve statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence
level; significance was not attained for differences in Black women and men’s metastereotypes regarding being lazy and preferring to live off welfare.
iii.

Region

Although t-tests were conducted to detect potential impacts of all four regions on
subjects’ levels of meta-stereotyping, the main region of interest is the south due to the
history and enduring legacy of overt racial prejudice and discrimination in that region. In
order to look at this relationship, subjects were asked to name up to three states wherein
they grew up, and the three most recent states that they have lived in. However,
regionalism had no impact on levels of meta-stereotyping for the white subsample, and
only attained significance (95 percent confidence) when looking at whether subjects in
the Black subsample grew up in the south (see Table 4.10).
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Substantively, the t-test indicates that Black subjects who did not grow up in the
south have higher levels of meta-stereotyping. This is interesting because one might
expect that Black subjects who grew up in a more overtly racially hostile part of the
country would hold higher meta-stereotypes. This does not appear to be the case,
however, and although it is unclear why those who grew up outside the south would
perceive higher levels of white stereotyping against Blacks, it could be speculated that
either those who did grow up in the south learned to adopt racial prejudice as the norm
and, therefore, did not notice it as much, compared to those who were on the receiving
end of more “subtle”—yet still noticeable—forms of prejudice in regions that were
supposedly less prone to such negative racial attitudes, or that the socialization of Black
individuals in the non-south take a different trajectory when it comes to U.S. race
relations than those who grew up in the southern states.
Difference in means tests were also conducted for Black and white subjects who
lived and/or grew up in the deep south; however, that demographic breakdown did not
achieve significance for either racial group.
iv.

Ideology

When comparing the difference in means between multiple groups (more than
two), such as subjects’ political ideology, an ANOVA was used instead of a t-test. The
results of the ANOVA comparing ideology of white subjects across three groups—
liberals, conservatives and independents—are reported in Table 4.11, and indicate that
there is a significant difference in means (at the 95 percent confidence level) between at
least two groups. The dependent variable in this ANOVA analysis was the composite
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meta-stereotype score (built as the sum of each of the four individual meta-stereotypes in
question—lazy, violence-prone, unintelligent, and preferring to live off welfare).
In order to determine which of the groups’ means are significantly different, a
Bonferroni test was conducted and those results are reported in Table 4.12. While the
difference in means between the liberal and independent groups do not attain
significance, nor do the difference in means between the conservative and independent
groups, the difference in means between the liberal and conservative groups do reach
significance with 95 percent confidence.
While the difference in means occurring between two distinct and opposing
ideological groups is not that surprising, what is surprising is that substantively the mean
of the conservative group was forty points higher than the liberal group. This is
surprising because conservatives are often cited in popular politics and/or culture as
stubbornly rejecting the reality that racism is still a problem in the 21st century. What
these results indicate is that we may hear the loudest, angriest voices denying racial
prejudice coming from conservatives, but that they are not representative of conservatives
as a whole. It may also indicate that liberals—who on the whole are more apt to value
multi-culturalism, yet are socialized to avoid real race-talk (see Chapter 2)—find
themselves buying into the notion that racial prejudice is on the decline thanks to their
efforts and/or avoidance of the topic all together.
It is also possible that the results are skewed due to the disparities in raw numbers
of subjects in this project that identified as liberal versus conservative (for white subjects
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it was a 205 to 34 split, liberals to conservatives, with an additional 33 independents in
the mix).
The results of an ANOVA comparing the difference in means between the three
ideological groups within the black subsample are found in Table 4.13. While the
difference in means are not significant at the traditional 95 percent confidence level, they
did attain significance at the 90 percent confidence level and are, therefore, worth
exploring.
Although the ANOVA indicated a significant difference between at least two
groups at the 90 percent confidence level, the Bonferroni Test indicates that no such
difference panned out (see Table 4.14). Thus, the level at which Black individuals
perceive that whites negatively stereotype their in-group (Blacks) does not appear to be
impacted by their ideology.
v.

Partisanship

Much like the ANOVA investigating whether white subjects’ ideology had a
significant impact on their meta-stereotype levels, the ANOVA in Table 4.15 indicates
that there is a significant relationship worth exploring more when it comes to the link
between partisanship and meta-stereotypes (only the partisanship ANOVA only attained
significance at the 90 percent confidence level). Again, the dependent variable in this
ANOVA was the composite meta-stereotype score built of the four individual metastereotype questions (lazy, violence-prone, unintelligent, and preferring to live off
welfare).
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Again, like the ideology ANOVA, it appears that Republicans’ meta-stereotypes
are higher than their Democratic counterparts (and that the difference in means between
any other partisan group pairing failed to achieve significance; see Table 4.16). While
such a result is still somewhat surprising (see discussion in ‘subsection c’), these results
make sense given the similar relationship between conservativism and meta-stereotypes
in this projects’ white subsample.
It is worth noting that the number of subjects who identified as Republican was
very small in this project’s white subsample, however; much like the conservative group
which only had 34 subjects, the Republican group only had 25 subjects (compared to 146
Democrats and 101 Independents).
An ANOVA investigating a partisan relationship for Black subjects failed to
attain significant results. Once again, it seems as though there is no relationship between
Black individuals’ partisanship and the rates at which they perceive whites to negatively
stereotype Blacks (see Table 4.17). This makes sense given the strong correlation
between ideology and partisanship, and the lack of significance pertaining to Black
subjects’ ideology and meta-stereotype levels in ‘subsection c’.
vi.

Age, education and employment

Although ANOVAs were conducted to detect whether the difference in means
between these types of demographic groups were significant, none of them attained
significant results. Therefore, it does not appear that individuals’ meta-stereotypes—
whether white or Black—are impacted by their age, level of educational attainment, or
employment status.
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IV.

Comparing measures of meta-stereotypes
In addition to this project’s main focus on extending our understanding of meta-

stereotyping’s potential effects on individuals’ racial policy preferences, the survey
design also sought to extend our understanding of meta-stereotypes by introducing a 101point interval variable to augment—or perhaps replace—the dichotomous measure
analyzed by Sigelman and Tuch in 1997. Additionally, the survey was designed to
include hypothetical scenarios which not only serve as a framing treatment, but which
also allows for the comparison of subjects’ answers to meta-stereotype questions when
asked in a more abstract way against questions that put meta-stereotypes in a real world
context.
i.

Dichotomous vs. interval

The term “most”—which is used as the operative condition in agreeing or
disagreeing with the dichotomous question posed by the Time/CNN poll—is a subjective
term; as such, it is impossible to know what, exactly, subjects thought about the
prevalence of stereotyping using the dichotomous measure. This question asked subjects
whether they thought “most white Americans hold the following perceptions of Black
Americans or not.” Common definitions of the term “most” include “greatest in amount,
extent or degree,” “in the greatest number of instances,” “a great majority of; nearly all,”
and “the superlative of many or much.” Still, even these definitions are subjective; after
all, even if all subjects agreed that “most” means “a great majority of; nearly all,” for
example, the terms “great” and “nearly” leave room for interpretation.
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A closer look at this project’s data indicates that this subjectivity persists when
subjects consider the question of “most” white Americans’ prejudices. Because
definitions like “a great majority of; nearly all” remain subjective in and of themselves, a
comparison using a more simplistic conceptualization of “most” is charted in Table 4.18.
Table 4.18 compares the percentage of subjects who answered affirmatively to
this survey’s question “do you think most white American think that Black Americans
are lazy?” (also, violence-prone, unintelligent, and preferring to live off welfare) with the
percentage of subjects who indicated a meta-stereotype above 50%. Thus, the second
column for each stereotype represents a simple majority and casts out subjective parts of
the definition, like “great” and “nearly all.” Table 4.18 indicates that subjects’
conceptualization of the term “most” is not always synonymous with even a simple
majority, let alone the more subjective dictionary definitions like “a great majority of;
nearly all” or “in the greatest number of instances.”
More specifically, Table 4.19 breaks down the percentage of subjects who
answered consistently versus those who did not, and includes a breakdown of which
direction the inconsistency was in—subjects who said “most” white Americans do hold a
specific stereotype, but who also hold meta-stereotypes under fifty percent (less than a
simple majority), and subjects who said “most” white Americans do not hold a specific
stereotype, but who also hold meta-stereotypes over fifty percent (at least a simple
majority).
Although there were a number of subjects who said “most whites” did not hold
specific stereotypes, but who nonetheless guessed that over fifty percent of white
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Americans held that stereotype in the follow-up 101-point meta-stereotype question, it
was more often the case that subjects answered affirmatively to the “most whites”
question yet guessed that less than fifty percent of white Americans held that same
stereotype. Thus, for many subjects, when conceptualizing “most” they are not thinking
in terms of a simple majority, let alone a super majority. The percentage of Black
subjects showing inconsistency in this manner was particularly pronounced and steady,
hovering around one-fifth of all Black subjects.
Thus, this study indicates that there may be important limitations to consider
when using a dichotomous measure of meta-stereotyping. When treating subjects whose
answers simultaneously affirmed and rejected the notion that “most” white Americans
held specific stereotypes as though their perceptions are equally comparable to all other
subjects who responded in a corresponding fashion (affirming or rejecting “most” in both
measures), researchers risk losing not only the nuance of this project’s interval measure,
but risk interpreting those subjects’ attitudes and beliefs incorrectly.
The assumption that everyone who believes that “most” white Americans hold a
stereotype also believe that the degree of stereotyping is the same is unwarranted; and, in
fact, such an assumption could potentially lead researchers to assume that subjects who
answer “yes” and “no” to the “most” questions hold opposing views when a more
thorough investigation of their meta-stereotypes could reveal just the opposite.
Therefore, scholars who rely solely on the dichotomous measure of variables may not
only interpret the meaning of their measure incorrectly, but their interpretation may also
confound our understanding of meta-stereotyping’s impact on whatever variables those
researchers study.
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ii.

Abstract vs. hypothetical

In addition to investigating whether meta-stereotypes affect racial policy
preferences, this project was designed to see whether the strength of potential effects is
stronger for subjects receiving framing treatments than those receiving priming
treatments or those placed in a control group without priming or framing treatments.
While the analytical aspects of this design will be interpreted in Chapter 5, this section
investigates whether meta-stereotypes in the abstract sense (as measured by the 101-point
scale and the dichotomous “most” question) match up with individuals’ assessments of
the likelihood that prejudice is a factor in real world hypothetical scenarios. Because the
previous subsection indicated that individuals do not always hold consistent metastereotypes depending on how they are measured, there is reason to investigate the
assumptions that subjects’ perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice are consistent
across abstract measurements of meta-stereotyping and assessments of prejudicial
thoughts and behaviors when applied to a less abstract, real world scenario.
Subjects who were randomly assigned to the framing treatment group were
further divided into three framing sub-groups. The three possible hypothetical scenarios
were designed to relate to both a specific stereotype measured in this project’s survey,
and also to a specific outcome that the racial policies in the survey aim to combat. The
three hypothetical scenarios read as follows:
Hypothetical Scenario 1
Related stereotype- violence-prone
Related racial policies- death penalty, three strikes laws
Case A: Imagine a court case wherein the defendant is a Black male. The
defendant has been charged with assault, but has pleaded ‘not guilty’ and
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the prosecution has failed to produce any solid evidence against the
defendant. The jury in this case consists of twelve white individuals.
Case B: Imagine that in a similar court case a white male has been
charged with assault. Like the other case, this defendant has pleaded ‘not
guilty’ and the prosecution has failed to produce any solid evidence
against the defendant. Again, the jury in this case consists of twelve white
individuals.
Question 1: Which defendant do you think is more likely to be viewed by
the all-white jury as violence prone?
Question 2: Which defendant do you think is more likely to be found
guilty by the all-white jury?
Hypothetical Scenario 2
Related stereotype- lazy; indirectly perhaps preferring to live off welfare
Related racial policies- drug war, three strikes laws, racial profiling
Case A: Imagine that on a suburban street corner, during typical work
hours, two Black males are loitering—hanging around, talking and
laughing—but generally minding their own business. A business owner
called the police complaining about loiterers. The police officers
patrolling that particular block are two white officers.
Case B: Imagine that on a similar suburban street a few blocks away, also
during typical work hours, two white males are also loitering—hanging
around, talking and laughing—but generally minding their own business.
Like the other case, a business owner has called the police complaining
about loiterers. Again, the police officers patrolling their particular block
are two white officers.
Question 1: Which pair of loiterers do you think is more likely to be
viewed as lazy by the police offers patrolling the area?
Question 2: Which pair of loiterers do you think is more likely to be
stopped by the police officers and searched for drugs?
Hypothetical Scenario 3
Related stereotype- Unintelligent
Related racial policies- Affirmative Action
Case A: Imagine that a company is hiring for an entry level position. The
interviewer is a white individual and the person applying for the job is a
Black male.
Case B: Imagine that a similar company is hiring for an entry level
position as well. Again, the interviewer is a white individual, but this time
the person applying for the job is a white male.
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Question 1: Which job applicant do you think is more likely to be viewed
as unintelligent by the interviewer?
Question 2: Which job applicant do you think is more likely to be hired
for the job?
When answering the stereotype questions paired with their framing treatment,
subjects were provided five possible answer choices; depending on the specific scenario
at hand, these answer choices were written to designate that (a) the Black individual in
question was much more likely to be stereotyped in a certain way, (b) the Black
individual in question was somewhat more likely to be stereotyped in a certain way, (c)
neither the Black nor the white individuals in question were likely to be stereotyped in a
certain way, (d) the white individual in question was somewhat more likely to be
stereotyped in a certain way, and (e) the white individual in question was much more
likely to be stereotyped in a certain way. A similar range of answers was provided when
asking questions about the potential consequences in the hypothetical scenarios for the
Black and white individuals in question. The range of options, therefore, allowed
respondents to indicate whether the Black or white individuals in question were much
more likely or somewhat more likely to be found guilty/be stopped and searched for
drugs/be hired for the job (depending on which framing treatment they received), or
whether neither the Black or white individual in question was likely to face any of those
consequences.
Table 4.20 documents the inconsistency between subjects’ answers to the
dichotomous, “most whites” question, and their answers to questions regarding the
likelihood of Blacks experiencing stereotyping in a hypothetical real-world scenario.
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For white subjects, the vast majority of those who answered negatively (“no”) to
the questions asking if “most whites” view Blacks as being lazy and violence-prone still
answered the hypothetical scenario’s question assessing the likelihood of stereotyping by
indicating that the Black individual in the scenario (loiterers or defendant, respectively)
were at least “somewhat more likely” to be stereotyped than the white individual in
question; a good portion (41% in the lazy frame, and 25% in the violence-prone frame)
even said that the Black individual was “much more likely” to be stereotyped. White
subjects were more consistent when they answered affirmatively to the “most whites”
question. White subjects who answered negatively to the “most whites” question fared
more successfully if they were assigned to the unintelligence frame, though alternatively
those white subjects in the unintelligence frame who had answered affirmatively to the
“most whites” question were largely unsuccessful. In comparison, Black subjects
reported answers that were more consistent than their white counterparts; however, they,
too, were susceptible to inconsistencies and those inconsistencies—though not as
pronounced as in the white subsample—trended in the same directions as did the white
subjects’ responses.
Thus, it appears that not only do people have a difficult time being consistent
between the two measures of stereotyping themselves, but that they also have a difficult
time being consistent when applying meta-stereotypes to real-world scenarios, with many
more individuals assessing a higher likelihood of stereotypes impacting Black Americans
when asked about specific, hypothetical real-world scenarios than when they are merely
asked about the notion of stereotyping in a more abstract way, without any sort of context
to guide their thought-process.
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Table 4.1: Meta-stereotypes based on dichotomous, “most” question
Actual % of
% of white
% of Black
white subjects
subjects saying subjects saying
who admitted
“most whites”
“most whites”
to endorsing the endorse
endorse
stereotype
stereotype
stereotype

Lazy
Violence-prone

15
33

45
75

73
85

Difference
between %
of Black and
white
subjects
saying “most
whites”
endorse
stereotype
+28
+10

Unintelligent
Prefer to live off
welfare

15
22

44
57

70
80

+26
+23

Table 4.2: Meta-stereotypes based on inverval, 101-point scale question
Actual %
Average Difference Average Difference
of white
guess of between
guess of between
subjects
white
white
Black
Black
who
subjects subjects’
subjects subjects’
admitted
guesses
guesses
to
and %
and %
endorsing
actually
actually
the
endorsing
endorsing
stereotype
stereotype
stereotype
Lazy
15
51
+36
59
+44
Violence33
52
+19
62
+29
prone
Unintelligent
15
47
+32
54
+39
Prefer to live
22
50
+28
59
+37
off welfare
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Difference
between
guesses
for Black
and white
subjects

+8
+10
+7
+9

Table 4.3: Difference in % of self-reported white stereotypes using the negative side of
the scale vs. % who demonstrate some degree of negative stereotyping
% of white subjects % of white subjects Difference between
who admitted to
who demonstrated
% of white subjects
endorsing the
some degree of
demonstrating some
stereotype by rating stereotyping by
degree of
Blacks on the
ranking Blacks more stereotyping and
negative side of the negatively than
those who endorsed
scale
whites
stereotyping by
rating Blacks on the
negative side of the
scale
Lazy
15
25
+10
Violence-prone
33
28
-5
Unintelligent
15
25
+10
Prefer to live off
22
31
+9
welfare
Table 4.4: Meta-stereotypes based on interval, 101-point scale question compared
against percentage of white subjects demonstrating some degree of stereotyping
% of white
Average Difference Average Difference Difference
subjects who guess of between
guess of between
between
demonstrated white
white
Black
Black
guesses
some degree subjects subjects’
subjects subjects’
for Black
of
guesses
guesses
and white
stereotyping
and %
and %
subjects
by ranking
actually
actually
Blacks more
endorsing
endorsing
negatively
stereotype
stereotype
than whites
Lazy
25
51
+26
59
+34
+8
Violence28
52
+24
62
+34
+10
prone
Unintelligent
25
47
+22
54
+29
+7
Prefer to live
31
50
+19
59
+28
+9
off welfare
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Table 4.5: Comparing levels of Black meta-stereotyping between 1991 and today
% of Black subjects % of Black subjects Difference between
saying “most
saying “most
the % of Black
whites” endorse the whites” endorse the subjects saying
stereotype in 1991
stereotype in this
“most whites”
project
endorse the
stereotype in 1991
vs. today
Lazy
69
73
-4
Violence-prone
82
85
-3
Unintelligent
76
70
+6
Prefer to live off
75
80
-5
welfare
Table 4.6: Comparing levels of white stereotype endorsements between 1990, 2010 and
today
% of white subjects % of white subjects % of white subjects
who endorsed the
who endorsed the
who endorsed the
stereotype in 1990
stereotype in 2010
stereotype in this
project
Lazy
47
33
15
Violence-prone
54
-33
Unintelligent
31
15
25
Prefer to live off
59
-22
welfare
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Table 4.7: Self-reported white positive and negative stereotypes across racial and/or
ethnic groups
Ar + Ar - As + As - B +
BH+
HW+
Hardworking
60
5
75
<1
68
5
61
47
15
(+) - Lazy (-)
Not
34
25
55
7
39
20
41
32
33
violenceprone (+) Violenceprone (-)
Intelligent
46
6
61
3
41
10
56
38
15
(+) Unintelligent
(-)
Prefer to be
65
5
75
1
64
9
71
50
22
selfsufficient (+)
- Prefer to
live off
welfare (-)
W = White
H = Hispanic
B = Black
As = Asian
Ar = Arab

W5
18

3

2

Table 4.8: Difference in means for Black and white subjects
Black
White
Difference in means
Composite meta233.37
200.07
33.30*
stereotype score
[221.10-245.65]
[189.57-210.57]
[17.25-49.35]
(255)
(272)
Lazy
58.49
50.74
7.75*
[55.14-61.84]
[48.10-53.38]
[3.53-11.98]
(255)
(272)
Violence-prone
61.53
52.44
9.09*
[58.13-64.92]
[49.72-55.16]
[4.77-13.39]
(255)
(272)
Unintelligent
54.19
46.67
7.52*
[50.73-57.66]
[43.84-49.50]
[3.08-11.96]
(255)
(272)
Prefer to live off
59.16
50.22
8.94*
welfare
[55.63-62.69]
[47.26-53.18]
[4.37-13.51]
(255)
(272)
*Indicates 95% confidence that the means are significantly different
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Table 4.9: Difference in means for male and female subjects
Male
Female
Difference in means
White subjects’
201.33
199.03
2.30
Composite meta[185.60-217.05]
[184.77-213.30]
[-23.42-18.84]
stereotype score
(123)
(149)
Black subjects’
217.46
244.16
-26.70*
Composite meta[198.93-235.98]
[227.89-260.43]
[1.85-51.55]
stereotype score
(103)
(103)
*Indicates 95% confidence that the means are significantly different
Table 4.10: Difference in means for Southern and non-Southern subjects
Has not lived in the Has lived in the
Difference in means
south
south
White subjects’
196.13
208.31
-12.18
Composite meta[183.75-208.51]
[188.48-228.13]
[-34.61-10.26]
stereotype score
(184)
(88)
Black subjects’
238.44
228.60
9.84
Composite meta[222.69-254.20]
[209.44-247.75]
[-14.85-34.54]
stereotype score
(126)
(127)
Did not grow up in
Grew up in the
Difference in means
the south
south
White subjects’
196.03
209.28
-13.25
Composite meta[183.70-208.35]
[189.11-229.45]
[-36.04-9.54]
stereotype score
(189)
(83)
Black subjects’
247.75
219.33
28.42*
Composite meta[232.37-263.13]
[200.38-238.28]
[4.06-52.76]
stereotype score
(126)
(129)
*Indicates 95% confidence that the means are significantly different
Table 4.11: ANOVA between ideological groups—liberals, conservatives and
independents
White subjects
Sum of
Degrees of
Mean square F
Significance
squares
freedom
Prob > F
Between
48270.92
2
24135.46
3.17
0.0436*
groups
Within
2048036.75
269
7613.52
groups
Total
2096307.67
271
7735.45
Chi2(2)=1.3717
Prob>chi2=0.5040
*Indicates 95% confidence that means are significantly different between at least two
groups
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Table 4.12: Bonferroni Test comparing means between ideological groups—liberals,
conservatives and independents
White subjects
Liberals
Independents
Independents
10.26
1.0000
Conservatives
40.44
30.18
0.0390*
0.4740
*Indicates 95% confidence that means are significantly different between specified two
groups
Table 4.13: ANOVA between ideological groups—liberals, conservatives and
independents
Black subjects
Sum of
Degrees of
Mean square F
Significance
squares
freedom
Prob > F
Between
46560.77
2
23280.38
2.37
0.0951†
groups
Within
2470522.84
252
9803.66
groups
Total
2517083.61
254
9909.78
Chi2(2)= 0.6461
Prob>chi2= 0.7240
†Indicates 95% confidence that means are significantly different between at least two
groups
Table 4.14: Bonferroni Test comparing means between ideological groups—liberals,
conservatives and independents
Black subjects
Liberals
Independents
Independents
-20.63
0.4680
Conservatives
-33.72
-13.09
0.1440
1.0000
*Indicates 95% confidence that means are significantly different between specified two
groups
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Table 4.15: ANOVA between partisan groups—Democrats, Republicans and
Independents
White subjects
Sum of
Degrees of
Mean square F
Significance
squares
freedom
Prob > F
Between
42139.24
2
21069.62
2.76
0.0651†
groups
Within
2054168.43
269
7636.31
groups
Total
2096307.67
271
7735.45
Chi2(2)=1.1703
Prob>chi2=0.5570
†Indicates 90% confidence that means are significantly different between at least two
groups
Table 4.16: Bonferroni Test comparing means between partisan groups—Democrats,
Republicans and Independents
White subjects
Democrats
Independents
Independents
-1.10
1.0000
Republicans
42.60
43.69
0.0750†
0.0780†
†Indicates 90% confidence that means are significantly different between specified two
groups
Table 4.17: ANOVA between partisan groups—Democrats, Republicans and
Independents
Black subjects
Sum of
Degrees of
Mean square F
Significance
squares
freedom
Prob > F
Between
9764.19
2
4882.10
0.49
0.6128
groups
Within
2507319.41
252
9949.68
groups
Total
2517083.61
254
9909.78
Chi2(2)=0.0251
Prob>chi2=0.9880
*Indicates 95% confidence that means are significantly different between at least two
groups
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Table 4.18: Comparing rates at which subjects believe “most” white Americans hold
each stereotype and those believing that a simple majority of white Americans hold each
stereotype
% answering affirmatively to the % who guessed that over 50%
“most” questions about each
held each stereotype
stereotype
White subjects Black subjects
White subjects Black subjects
Lazy
44
73
49
60
Violence-prone
75
85
51
65
Unintelligent
44
70
38
53
Prefer to live off
57
80
46
60
welfare
Table 4.19: Consistency between subjects’ answers to questions asking if “most” white
Americans hold specific stereotypes and asking them to guess the percentage who hold
the stereotypes
White subjects (n=272)
% of subjects who
% of subjects who
% of subjects who
said “most” white
answered in a
said “most” white
Americans hold
consistent fashion
Americans do not
stereotype, but who between the “most” hold stereotype, but
also guessed that
and metawho also guessed
<50% hold that
stereotype, guessing that >50% hold that
stereotype
questions
stereotype
Lazy
22
217
33
(8%)
(80%)
(12%)
Violence-prone
74
190
8
(27%)
(70%)
(3%)
Unintelligent
52
185
35
(19%)
(68%)
(13%)
Prefer to live off
49
204
19
welfare
(18%)
(75%)
(7%)
Black subjects (n=255)
Lazy
53
181
21
(21%)
(71%)
(8%)
Violence-prone
60
184
11
(24%)
(72%)
(4%)
Unintelligent
63
174
18
(25%)
(68%)
(7%)
Prefer to live off
63
181
11
welfare
(25%)
(71%)
(4%)
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Table 4.20: Consistency between subjects’ answers to questions asking if “most” white
Americans hold each stereotype and their answers to questions asking whether Black
individuals in hypothetical scenarios are more/less likely to be stereotyped than their
white counterpart
Answer to
# of subjects
# of subjects
# of subjects
question asking who provided
who indicated
who indicated
if “most” white the neutral or
that the Black
that the Black
Americans
“less likely”
individual was
individual was
hold the
answers to the
“somewhat
“much more
stereotype
hypothetical
more likely” to likely” to be
question
be stereotyped
stereotyped in
concerning
in the
the hypothetical
stereotyping
hypothetical
scenario
scenario
White subjects
Lazy (n=53)
Yes (n=32)
6
13
13
(19%)
(41%)
(41%)
No (n=21)
0
7
14
(0%)
(33%)
(67%)
Violence-prone Yes (n=16)
6
6
4
(n=56)
(38%)
(38%)
(25%)
No (n=40)
3
23
14
(8%)
(58%)
(35%)
Unintelligent
Yes (n=28)
20
7
1
(n=53)
(71%)
(25%)
(4%)
No (n=25)
9
14
2
(36%)
(56%)
(8%)
Black subjects
Lazy (n=52)
Yes (n=40)
5
9
26
(13%)
(22%)
(65%)
No (n=12)
5
4
3
(42%)
(33%)
(25%)
Violence-prone Yes (n=41)
4
8
29
(n=52)
(10%)
(20%)
(71%)
No (n=11)
6
3
2
(55%)
(27%)
(18%)
Unintelligent
Yes (n=32)
13
4
15
(n=49)
(41%)
(12%)
(47%)
No (n=17)
8
4
5
(47%)
(24%)
(29%)
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Figure 4.1: Comparing Black & white meta-stereotypes (white stereotypes against
Blacks)

Figure 4.2: Black meta-stereotypes-- average guesses concerning prevalence of white
stereotypes
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Figure 4.3: White meta-stereotypes-- average guesses concerning prevalence of white
stereotypes
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CHAPTER 5:
INVESTIGATING WHETHER PERCEPTIONS OF THE PREVALENCE OF PREJUDICE
ST
IN 21 CENTURY AMERICA IMPACT RACIAL POLICY PREFERENCES:
ANALYZING THE EXPERIMENTAL DATA
This chapter tests the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2. Specifically, this chapter
will investigate the sub-hypotheses (H2 & H3) regarding the different effects metastereotyping may have on Black respondents compared to white respondents, and
regarding the effectiveness of the experimental treatment groups, in order to assess the
validity of the main hypothesis of interest (H1) which expects that individuals who
demonstrate a higher level of meta-stereotyping will also be more apt to support racial
policies designed to combat the consequences of racial prejudice and discrimination.
As described in Chapter 3, and as dictated by this project’s experimental design,
this chapter’s analyses will begin by conducting ANOVAs for each of the two racial subsamples (H2), using the five treatment groups (control, priming, and three framing
groups) as the factor variable (H3) while investigating respondents’ level of support for,
or opposition to, the various racial policies aimed at correcting injustice (specifically,
affirmative action and an assortment of criminal justice policies). Should these ANOVA
analyses reveal significant differences between the treatment groups in a way that
corresponds to H3, there will also be reason to accept the main hypothesis (H1) regarding
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the relationship between meta-stereotyping and racial policy preferences as being valid.
However, should the ANOVA analyses provide null results, the main hypothesis (H1)
can be further tested using regression analysis; doing so would not be able to lead to any
findings of causation, but could point toward a potential non-causal relationship.
I.

Investigating the relationship between meta-stereotyping and racial
policy preferences using a causal approach
In order to determine whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis for this

project’s main hypothesis (H1), which states that individuals’ with higher metastereotypes will be more apt to support injustice-correcting policy measures, an
experimental study was conducted. The experimental components of the survey
randomly assigned subjects to one of five groups, either a control group, a priming group,
or one of three framing groups (each of which used a different real world hypothetical
scenario to transform the abstract concepts of meta-stereotyping into a more concrete
application of the concept of prejudice and discrimination). As discussed in greater
length in Chapter 3, the purpose of this experimental design was two-fold: first, by
attempting to prime some subjects (those in both the priming and the framing groups) to
consider their meta-stereotypes prior to answering questions about racial policy
preferences, the experiment tries to manipulate subjects’ thought-processes in such a way
that it isolates, and therefore highlights, meta-stereotyping as a causal mechanism;
second, by adding the framing treatments, the study can also investigate whether
perceptions of prejudice might have an effect when measured in a different way than the
abstract, often subconscious, process of meta-stereotyping.
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As this section investigates the treatment groups’ potential effects on racial policy
preferences, analyses will not only be broken down to look at one specific policy at a
time, but it will also separate these analyses as they pertain to the Black and white subsamples. Therefore, this section will be able to determine whether the effects of metastereotyping on racial policy preferences manifest at the same levels for the Black and
white communities, or whether these effects are stronger for Black individuals (H2).
To begin gauging whether an individual’s level of meta-stereotyping can be
accepted as a causal mechanism, an ANOVA was conducted between the three
overarching treatment groups (the framing groups were not separated for this initial
analysis) and measured for potential effects on the composite scores for the project’s two
racial policy areas: the criminal justice reforms policy area includes scores attained from
questions asked about the war on drugs, the death penalty, three strikes laws, and racial
profiling; the affirmative action policy area includes scores pertaining to college
admissions and workplace promotions. Table 5.1 reports the results of this initial
ANOVA for the white sub-sample and indicates that there were no treatment effects that
reached significance. Not reported in the table are the scores for the Bartlett’s test for
equal variance; however, in both instances, the ANOVA passed the assumption check—
i.e. we can assume the variance between the groups to be equal—and therefore the
ANOVA test remains an appropriate test to use. At this point, the initial results suggest
that we should be prepared to fail to reject the null hypothesis (H3) regarding treatment
effects for the white sub-sample, which also signals that the main hypothesis (H1)
regarding meta-stereotyping’s potential effects on racial policy preferences may not hold,
at least not as a causal mechanism for the white community.
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However, it was expected that the meta-stereotypes of the Black community may
have a more pronounced impact on their racial policy preferences, given their inclination
to aid their own in-group, than those hypothesized effects on the white community.
Thus, although the white sub-sample did not indicate the expected results vis-à-vis
treatment effects and policy preferences, H2 may hold in the sense that an ANOVA of the
Black sub-sample could indicate the expected causal relationship. Table 5.2 reports the
results of this initial ANOVA for the Black sub-sample; however, again, like the white
sub-sample, the treatment effects fail to produce a significant difference in the means of
the three groups. Thus, these initial results indicate that we should be prepared to fail to
reject the null hypothesis for H3 for the Black sub-sample as well, and also that we
should prepare to fail to reject the null hypothesis for H2 since neither sub-sample
indicates that treatment effects have a significant effect. Again, the initial results for the
Black sub-sample also casts doubt on the validity of the main hypothesis (H1) regarding
meta-stereotyping’s role as a causal mechanism pertaining to racial policy preferences.
Like the previous analysis, the score of Bartlett’s test of equal variance (while not
reported) indicates that the analysis passes the assumption check and that the use of an
ANOVA was appropriate. In fact, for all the analyses reported in this chapter, the
Bartlett’s test of equal variance indicates that ANOVA is an appropriate mode of
analysis.
However, because the framing component of the experimental design included
three different issue frames, it is possible that we may see significant treatment effects
when the treatment groups are separated into five groups. Thus, before we fail to reject
the null (H3) regarding treatment effects, ANOVAs were conducted in a way that
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matches the specific policies with specific framing groups (rather than using composite
scores for each policy area and factoring by a framing group that includes all three issue
frames at once). The results for both sub-samples (Black and white) are reported in
Tables 5.3-5.5 with each table representing a different combination of a specified framing
group and specified policies.
Table 5.3 specifically reports the results of ANOVAs that featured the control,
priming, and hiring framing groups as the factor variable when comparing the mean level
of support for affirmative action in universities and the workplace between the three
treatment groups. The hypothetical hiring issue frame makes sense to use in this set of
analyses because it directly relates to the issue of affirmative action. Individuals in this
framing group were given the following pair of hypothetical scenarios to consider, and
were then asked to rate how much more/less likely the Black applicant was to be viewed
as unintelligent when compared to the white applicant, and also how much more/less
likely the Black applicant was to be hired for the job when compared to the white
applicant:
Case A: Imagine that a company is hiring for an entry level position. The
interviewer is a white individual and the person applying for the job is a
Black male.
Case B: Imagine that a similar company is hiring for an entry level
position as well. Again, the interviewer is a white individual, but this time
the person applying for the job is a white male.
While the priming effects have not yet panned out, thus casting doubt over whether metastereotyping has a significant impact on racial policy preferences, these analyses allow us
to consider whether individuals need the idea of meta-stereotyping to be put into a more
concrete, less abstract context. Thus, instead of relying on the 101-point measure of
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meta-stereotyping, these analyses use individuals’ answers pertaining to hypothetical
real-world scenarios to measure the potential impact of perceived prejudice and
discrimination on those same racial policy preferences.
However, under these more specified conditions the effects of the treatment
conditions still fail to reach significance, and thus we must fail to reject the null as it
pertains to the potential causal effects of perceived prejudice on affirmative action
policies, and that the null remains for both the white and Black communities in this
specific instance.
Similarly insignificant trends are reported for both sub-samples in Tables 5.4 and
5.5 which look at the effects of the treatment conditions on individuals’ levels of support
for a variety of criminal justice reforms. Unlike the affirmative action example in Table
5.3, the criminal justice policies are less “racialized” (meaning that they are supposed to
be “colorblind” unlike affirmative action cases which purposely use race as a central
factor) and are also, therefore, less directly related to the hypothetical scenarios in
question. Still, research on the criminal justice system (see Chapter 1) indicates that
whether or not Americans notice the racial components of these policies, Black
Americans are nonetheless impacted at disparate rates due to prejudice and
discrimination within the system. Thus, even if the relationships between the two
hypothetical scenarios in these analyses and the criminal justice policies aren’t always
clear, they do exist.
Table 5.4 specifically reports the results of ANOVAs that featured the control,
priming, and loitering framing groups as the factor variable when comparing the mean
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level of support for the war on drugs, for racial profiling (specifically racial profiling
pertaining to searches & seizures after stopping “suspicious” motorized vehicles), and
three strikes laws. The hypothetical loitering issue frame makes sense to use in this set of
analyses given that being stopped and searched by police officers is the first stop in a
criminal justice system that has a disparate effect on Black Americans (see Chapter 1). If
individuals feel that Black individuals are more apt to be stopped and searched by the
police officers in the hypothetical scenario than one way of remedying that type of
prejudice and discrimination would be to oppose racial profiling, to oppose the war on
drugs, and to oppose the three strikes laws (both of which impact minorities
disproportionately due to racial profiling, whether that profiling is done consciously or
subconsciously, and due to other problems with the system; see Chapter 1). Individuals
in this framing group were given the following pair of hypothetical scenarios to consider,
and were then asked to rate how much more/less likely the Black loiterers were to be
viewed as lazy when compared to the white loiterers, and also how much more/less likely
the Black loiterers were to be stopped and searched for drugs by the police officers when
compared to the white loiterers:
Case A: Imagine that on a suburban street corner, during typical work
hours, two Black males are loitering—hanging around, talking and
laughing, but generally minding their own business. A business owner
called the police complaining about the loiterers. The police officers
patrolling the block are two white officers.
Case B: Imagine that on a similar suburban street a few blocks away, also
during typical work hours, two white males are also loitering—hanging
out, talking and laughing, but generally minding their own business. Like
the other case, a business owner has called the police complaining about
loiterers. Again, the police officers patrolling their particular block are
two white officers.
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Like the previous analyses regarding the hiring issue frame, this frame allows us to
investigate the impact of perceptions of prejudice and discrimination in a less abstract
way than the 101-point meta-stereotype scale.
Also like the previous analyses regarding the hiring issue frame, this loitering
issue frame fails to produce significant results. These results are reported in Table 5.4
and require us to fail to reject the null as it pertains to the potential causal effects of
perceived prejudice on various criminal justice reform policies, and that the null remains
for both the white and Black communities in this specific instance.
Table 5.5 specifically reports the results of ANOVAs that featured the control,
priming, and criminal defendant framing groups as the factor variable when comparing
the mean level of support for the death penalty and three strikes laws. The hypothetical
criminal defendant issue frame makes sense to use in this set of analyses given that the
determination of guilt by a jury of our peers is a crucial step in the criminal justice
procedure, and one that is not free from prejudice and discrimination (see Chapter 1). If
individuals feel that Black individuals are more apt to be found guilty of violent crimes in
the hypothetical scenario than one way of remedying that type of prejudice and
discrimination would be to oppose the death penalty and three strikes laws, since the
outcomes of jury deliberations have a direct impact on whether a defendant is impacted
by those two policies. Individuals in this framing group were given the following pair of
hypothetical scenarios to consider, and were then asked to rate how much more/less
likely the Black defendant was to be viewed as violent when compared to the white
defendant, and also how much more/less likely the Black defendant was to be found
guilty by the jury of all-white males:
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Case A: Imagine a court case wherein the defendant is a Black male. The
defendant has been charged with assault, but has pleaded ‘not guilty’ and
the prosecution has failed to produce any solid evidence against the
defendant. The jury in this case consists of twelve white individuals.
Case B: Imagine that in a similar court case a white male has been
charged with assault. Like the other case, this defendant has pleaded ‘not
guilty’ and the prosecution has failed to produce any solid evidence
against the defendant. Again, the jury in this case consists of twelve white
individuals.
Like the previous analyses regarding the hiring and loitering issue frames, this frame
allows us to investigate the impact of perceptions of prejudice and discrimination in a less
abstract way than the 101-point meta-stereotype scale.
Also like the previous analyses regarding the hiring and loitering issue frames,
this criminal defendants issue frame fails to produce significant results. These results are
reported in Table 5.5 and require us to fail to reject the null as it pertains to the potential
causal effects of perceived prejudice on various criminal justice reform policies, and that
the null remains for both the white and Black communities in this specific instance.
II.

Investigating whether there is a relationship between meta-stereotyping
and racial policy preferences using OLS regression analysis
While the results in the previous section mean that we must fail to reject the null

hypothesis for H3, and though these results should at least give pause to the hypothesized
relationship between levels of meta-stereotyping and support for policies designed to
correct racial injustice, it does not automatically follow that we must also fail to reject the
null hypothesis for H1. Although the experimental design of this study was not able to
locate meta-stereotyping as a causal mechanism, there may still be a relationship between
an individuals’ level of meta-stereotyping and their support for, or opposition to, various
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racial policies. Additionally, it should be kept in mind that treatment conditions—no
matter how carefully constructed— do not always materialize as expected; thus, the
priming effects may have simply been too subtle in this design, or the meta-stereotypes of
the control group may have been subconsciously driving answers even without the
priming treatment. Still, because the framing groups—which were less subtle—failed to
produce significant results, there remains a healthy dose of skepticism about whether a
more refined experimental design would capture different results.
In order to test whether there is a non-causal relationship between metastereotyping and racial policy preferences, this section uses OLS regression analyses.
OLS is used instead of a maximum likelihood technique because the dependent variable
has enough categories to sufficiently represent a continuous variable, and each category
is likely interpreted by subjects’ as being equally distanced apart; given these
justifications, and coupled with the fact that OLS techniques are generally preferable to
MLE methods when given the choice, the analyses herein reflect an OLS approach. The
analyses include the composite score of all four meta-stereotypes (lazy, violent,
unintelligent and prefer to live off welfare) as the independent variable of interest. The
standard battery of control variable is included in each regression as well (age, gender,
education, ideology, partisanship, and personal and household income). Additionally, a
score measuring the difference in an individual’s group attachment toward Blacks and
whites is included in each model as a control variable since group attachment is
associated with the theoretical concept of linked fate. For the analyses with support for,
or opposition to, affirmative action as the dependent variable, a score measuring
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individuals’ perceived negative—albeit unintended— consequences of affirmative action
is also included as a control variable.
Table 5.6 reports the results of regressions measuring meta-stereotyping’s
potential effect on individuals’ levels of support for, or opposition to, affirmative action
policies; the table includes analyses for both the Black and white sub-samples. Like the
results in the previous section, the results from these initial regression analyses indicate
that we must fail to reject the null (H1) and indicates that meta-stereotyping does not
have the hypothesized effect on policy preferences. Though these tables report the main
independent variable (meta-stereotyping) as a composite score, separate regressions were
run for each specific meta-stereotype as well. Similarly, none of the specific metastereotypes were shown to indicate an effect on the white sub-sample’s affirmative action
preferences, and only the meta-stereotype regarding violence achieved significance for
the Black sub-sample (though it only retained significance at the 90% confidence level,
which falls short of the more strident and typical 95% confidence level). Still, it is
interesting to note that perceptions of violence had an effect of any significance when
perceptions of other traits failed because characteristics like hard working and
intelligence seem more directly linked to hiring and admissions practices.
Instead, factors like ideology, partisanship and perceptions that affirmative action
has negative (even if unintended) consequences for Blacks are significant factors for the
white sub-sample. The direction of these factors is as expected; for example, as
individuals become more conservative they become less apt to support affirmative action.
Additionally, as individuals increasingly disagree with statements that reflect the opinion
that affirmative action is, despite its intention, actually bad for Blacks, they are also more
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likely to support the policy (or, stated differently, as individuals increasingly believe that
affirmative action actually does harm to Blacks, they are more opposed to the policy). In
terms of the difference in group attachment when comparing attachment towards Blacks
and whites, the regression indicates that as the gap between positive attachment towards
Blacks and positive attachment towards whites grows, the level of support for affirmative
action also grows. This is unsurprising given that the alternate way of viewing the same
factor would indicate that as individuals’ admit a greater attachment to whites than
Blacks, their level of opposition to affirmative action increases. For the Black subsample, ideology is a significant factor (as individuals become more conservative they
are less supportive of affirmative action policies) and as their level of education increases
so too does their level of support for affirmative action; this may be an indicator that
these individuals have either experienced first-hand the benefits of affirmative action, or
that they have seen the benefits of a college education even if they themselves didn’t
benefit from the policy.
Table 5.7 reveals the results of regressions measuring the relationshipo between
each independent factor and subjects’ levels of support for criminal justice reforms aimed
at correcting injustice. Again, a number of control variables impact levels of support for
these reforms, and for the most part the direction of each impact is as expected. Again, in
both sub-samples, as individuals become more conservative they become more
supportive of the “tough on crime,” status quo criminal justice measures which have been
found to disparately impact the Black community (oddly, however, as Black subjects
became more Republican they also became more opposed to the typical “tough on crime”
policies; this is highly unexpected, but could be the result of so few Black subjects—less
155

than 3%— actually identifying as Republicans in the first place). Similarly, as the gap
between positive group attachment for Blacks compared to whites increases, so too does
opposition to those “tough on crime” policies; this occurs in both the Black and white
sub-samples regarding criminal justice policies (whereas it only occurred at significant
levels for the white sub-sample regarding affirmative action). However, less clear are the
reasons why Southern Black individuals would be more supportive of the “tough on
crime” policies. There is literature to insinuate conflicted feelings toward “tough on
crime” policies within the Black community, so these effects may occur because Black
individuals who witness more crime or are in closer proximity to it may set the priority of
fixing the crime problem ahead of fixing the discrimination within the criminal justice
system. Still, there is plenty of crime in other parts of the country so it is still unclear
why Southern Blacks, in particular, would be more susceptible to this effect.
Finally, it was hugely unexpected that as levels of meta-stereotyping in the white
community increased that the level of opposition to the “tough on crime” policies would
occur; thus, not only can we fail to reject the null of H1, but the effect was the exact
opposite of what was hypothesized. The actual impact is quite small, as the coefficient is
a mere five-thousandths of a point, but the direction is still significant and unexpected. It
is possible that in answering the meta-stereotype questions, many white subjects were not
viewing the prevalence of prejudice as being problematic, which is an assumption made
when formulating this project’s hypotheses. Nonetheless, these unexpected findings are
not the result of one meta-stereotyping driving the policy preferences more than others, as
all four meta-stereotypes were found to be significant in the opposite direction of what
was hypothesized when they were separated out. The meta-stereotype scores (whether
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composite or separated out) had no significant impact one way or the other on the
criminal justice policy preferences for the Black sub-sample.
Although the individualized OLS reports are not reported here, when separated
out into four different criminal justice policies (rather than a composite criminal justice
score) it became apparent that the only policy driving the findings for the white subsample in Table 5.7 is support for three strikes laws, while racial profiling, the war on
drugs and the death penalty fail to reach significance (the death penalty actually does
attain significance at the 90% confidence level; however that is not the standard for
rejecting the null in general, so it won’t be held as the standard herein either). For the
Black sub-sample, none of the four policy areas reach significance on their own either
(opposition to racial profiling reaches the 90% confidence level but falls short of the
standard bearer). Whether looking at the significant effects on the white sub-sample’s
composite score or preferences regarding the three strikes law specifically the coefficient,
while in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized, is nonetheless very small and
thus is not as substantively important as a number of the control variables.
Slightly different patterns emerge when using the old dichotomous measure of
meta-stereotyping (in these analyses a composite score was built of the four “most
whites” questions). Whereas meta-stereotyping did not have a significant impact on
levels of support for, or opposition to, affirmative action when using this project’s 101point measure, it is significant when using the “most whites” question wording. What’s
more, unlike the significant effects regarding the impact of the white sub-sample’s metastereotypes on criminal justice reform preferences when using this project’s interval
measure, these effects of meta-stereotyping on affirmative action preferences are
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significant in the hypothesized direction. Thus, white subjects who affirmed that “most
whites” held the four stereotypes were more apt to support affirmative action policies.
The pattern between the interval measure and the dichotomous measure are the same
when comparing meta-stereotyping’s effects on criminal justice reform preferences—in
both cases results suggest that meta-stereotypes do have a significant effect, however
these results ran in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized. Thus, the results for
H1 are conflicting for the white sub-group—whereas they have the expected impact on
affirmative action policies when using the dichotomous measure, they do not have a
significant impact when using the interval measure; and when the results are examined
for the criminal justice policies the results using both measures are significant, but are
significant in a direction that runs counter to H1. The results for these regressions are
reported in Table 5.8.
The old dichotomous measure does not change the results for the Black subsample though; like the findings regarding the interval measure of meta-stereotyping,
affirmative Black responses to the “most whites” questions do not significantly impact
their level of support for, or opposition to, affirmative action policies or criminal justice
reform policies.
Somewhat different patterns emerge, however, when separating out the four
different criminal justice policy measures. Whereas the white sub-sample’s significant
results when using the interval measure were driven by the impact on preferences
regarding three strikes laws (and the death penalty if using the 90% confidence level),
when using the dichotomous measure the results are driven by the three strikes laws and
racial profiling but not the war on drugs or the death penalty (although the war on drugs
158

did achieve significance at the lower 90% confidence threshold). And whereas there is
continuity for the Black sub-group in the sense that none of the specific policies achieved
significance at the traditional level while using the interval measure and also when using
the dichotomous measure, there are inconsistencies if expanding the threshold to the 90%
confidence level because using the interval measure only racial profiling neared
significance, and when using the dichotomous measure only preferences regarding three
strikes laws neared significance.
The lack of continuity in the findings between the effects of meta-stereotyping
when using the old dichotomous measure, and this project’s interval measure (for this
study’s Black sub-sample at least) indicates that individuals have a hard time grasping the
abstract concept of meta-stereotyping and that the way researchers choose to measure this
concept is, therefore, vital.
III.

Using hypothetical scenarios to investigate whether there is a relationship
between perceptions of prejudice and racial policy preferences using OLS
regression analysis
Given the analyses in the first two sections of this chapter, there is no evidence to

suggest that meta-stereotyping impacts individuals’ support for, or opposition to, policies
designed to correct racial injustice. However, the 101-point measurement used in this
project is admittedly gauging a more abstract concept. While it was hypothesized that
meta-stereotyping would have a positive effect on levels of support for racial policy
preferences nonetheless, it was also noted that the abstract nature of meta-stereotyping
when asking about group attitudes toward another group as a whole could factor into
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whether or not the hypothesized results came to fruition. In order to determine whether
perceptions of prejudice affect those same racial policy preferences when individuals
think about them in a less abstract, more concrete way, the framing treatment conditions
included questions measuring perceptions of prejudice in a different way. Thus, while
these questions do not measure meta-stereotypes in the traditional way, they still measure
the individuals’ perceptions regarding the likelihood that white members of society
negatively stereotype Black members of society.
After members of the three framing sub-groups read through the hypothetical
scenarios, they were asked to answer the following questions (depending on which of the
three groups they were assigned to):
Criminal defendants issue frame- Which defendant do you think is more
likely to be viewed by the all-white jury as violence prone?
Loitering issue frame- Which pair of loiterers do you think is more likely
to be viewed as lazy by the police officers patrolling the area?
Hiring issue frame- Which job applicant do you think is more likely to be
viewed as unintelligent by the interviewer?
Thus, the questions are phrased quite differently than the meta-stereotype measures used
in this project or other projects, but they still get at a similar concept. Instead of asking
how many white Americans think about Black Americans with regards to a specific
stereotype, it instead asks how likely Black Americans are to be on the receiving end of
the stereotyping than their white counterparts. In this sense, the questions are still
measuring perceptions of the prevalence of racism, only they are doing so in a concrete
comparative fashion as opposed to an abstract numerical fashion. In this section,
regressions are run with the specific aim of pairing up the appropriate hypothetical
scenario with the policies that are related to that issue area.
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Table 5.9 reports the effects of white subjects’ responses to the aforementioned
questions on their preferences regarding affirmative action in the workplace and the
university setting (increased perceptions of prejudice in the hypothetical scenario bore no
significant effects for the Black sub-sample on either policy measure). In the white subsample the perception that the Black applicant is more apt to be viewed as unintelligent
by the interviewer is significantly related to their increased level of opposition to
affirmative action in the workplace; again, the direction of this relationship is opposite of
what was hypothesized in H1. These perceptions of increased prejudice did not
significantly affect preferences regarding affirmative action in university admissions one
way or the other; this could be a product of the issue frame, which specifically asked
subjects to imagine scenarios regarding hiring practices in the workplace.
Also included in these regressions were questions gauging subjects’ perceptions
of the prevalence of discrimination; these questions asked subjects to indicate whether
they thought a negative outcome in the hypothetical scenario was more or less apt to be
inflicted upon the Black characters in question than the white characters. These questions
specifically asked subjects to consider the following:
Criminal defendants issue frame- Which defendant do you think is more
likely to be found guilty by the all-white jury?
Loitering issue frame- Which pair of loiterers do you think is more likely
to be stopped by the police officers and searched for drugs?
Hiring issue frame- Which job applicant do you think is more likely to be
hired for the job?
Although perceptions that the Black applicant was more apt to be considered
unintelligent had no effect on white subjects’ levels of support for affirmative action, the
perception that the Black applicant was less likely to be hired for the job in question did
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have a significant impact—as individuals perceived higher discriminatory outcomes for
the Black applicant (i.e. that the white applicant was more likely to be offered the job)
they also became more apt to support affirmative action in both the workplace and the
university setting. Thus, while perception of prejudice may not be a significant factor, it
seems that perception itself still may play an important role in policy preferences. Not
only is the perception of increased discriminatory outcomes significantly linked to
increased support for affirmative action policies, but the substantive impact of this
variable is also quite large; in fact, it is the largest of all the potential factors in these
regressions and is more substantively impactful than the variables measuring difference
in group attachment toward Blacks and whites, and also the perceived negative
consequences of affirmative action for the Black community, both of which have proved
to be significantly important factors in other regressions. What’s more, the regression
results regarding affirmative action in university admissions processes also indicate that
the increased perception of a discriminatory outcome in the hypothetical hiring issue
frame increases the likelihood of supporting affirmative action for college applicants,
even though increased perceptions of prejudice in the hypothetical scenario did not. The
affirmative action preferences of the Black sub-sample, however, were unmoved by both
the perception of increased prejudice toward the Black applicant, and also the perception
of an increased discriminatory outcome for the Black applicant.
Unlike the significant effects of white subjects’ perceptions regarding the unequal
stereotyping of the Black and white applicants in the aforementioned hypothetical hiring
issue frame, subjects’ perceptions regarding the unequal stereotyping of Black and white
defendants in the hypothetical criminal defendant issue frame failed to produce a
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significant impact on levels of opposition to the death penalty and three strikes laws (both
of which are more directly related to questions of court room justice) in the white subgroup. However, the regression for the Black sub-group indicates a significant impact on
levels of opposition to three strikes laws which would lend some degree of credence to
H1, but failed to produce significant results regarding preferences regarding the death
penalty. The Black sub-group also shows significant effects of increased perceptions of
prejudice against the defendants on their levels of opposition to the war on drugs, which
while related to general racial problems in the criminal justice system, is not directly
related to the hypothetical in question, and which is certainly less directly related to the
hypothetical scenario than was the issue of the death penalty. In both cases reported in
Table 5.10, increased perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice were not only significant
in the hypothesized direction, but also were substantively impactful as well.
When considering the likelihood of increased prejudice in the case of the
hypothetical loiterers, subjects in both the Black and white sub-groups failed to have their
criminal justice reform preferences moved. That is, despite increased perceptions that the
police would view the Black loiterers as lazy, subjects did not moderate their preferences
regarding the war on drugs, racial profiling or three strikes laws on those perceptions’
account. However, as reported in Table 5.11, white subjects’ likelihood of opposing
three strikes laws was significantly impacted by increased perceptions of discriminatory
outcomes (in this case, that the Black loiterers would be more apt to be stopped and
searched by police) and were moved in the hypothesized direction with those more likely
to perceive a discriminatory outcome for the Black loiterers (in this case, being stopped
and searched for drugs) also being more opposed to three strike laws. However,
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perceptions of the prevalence of increased discriminatory outcomes did not impact the
Black sub-group.
The fact that only one policy within the criminal justice reform issue area was
impacted by perceptions of increased discrimination against Blacks (three strike laws)
suggests some disparity between white subjects’ proclivity to consider perceptions of
discriminatory outcomes in the case of affirmative action but not criminal justice reform.
This may be because affirmative action policies are more directly linked to race in the
American consciousness, whereas criminal justice policies are “colorblind” in their
design and adoption, even if they are not so “colorblind” in practice. It is also possible
that some white subjects are more inclined to believe that Black loiterers are up to no
good and should be searched by the police (the questions do not ask subjects whether
they find the increased likelihood of discriminatory outcomes to be problematic), whereas
they are not so inclined to believe that Black individuals are unfit for entry level
positions. Thus, individuals, even with the prodding of a hypothetical scenario pointing
out racial disparities, may be less apt to apply the theoretical logic of this study to
criminal justice reform policies as a whole.
Additionally, while Black subjects were moved by increased perceptions that they
are more violence-prone, they were unmoved by increased perceptions that they are more
lazy. This may have been due to the specific stereotype measured within this
hypothetical scenario (laziness) if subjects fail to see that specific trait as the reason that a
cop is more likely to stop and search the hypothetical Black characters. It is unclear why
they would remain unmoved by increased perceptions of discriminatory outcomes in both
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hypothetical scenarios, but the results are at least consistently in accordance with failing
to reject the null.
IV.

Discussion
Taken as a whole, the analyses in this chapter provide scant evidence to believe

that individuals’ levels of meta-stereotyping impacts their racial policy preferences. In
all but a few specific cases the analyses pertaining to meta-stereotyping’s potential effects
on these preferences resulted in a failure to reject the null hypothesis.
In order to gauge the causal effects of meta-stereotypes ANOVA analyses were
conducted in accordance with the experimental design of this project’s survey instrument.
However, neither the policy preferences of the priming group or the framing group were
impacted by their treatment conditions; thus, these analyses provide a firm rejection of
meta-stereotyping as a causal mechanism (and, therefore, a firm rejection of H3). Table
5.12 provides a recap of the tested relationships and the consistent failure to reject the
null.
Because it was possible that the experimental design simply failed to have the
treatment conditions manifest in the consciousness (or sub-consciousness) of the subjects,
a series of OLS regressions were undertaken in order to look for relationships between
individuals’ levels of meta-stereotyping and their racial policy preferences. After all,
rejecting meta-stereotypes as a causal mechanism (H3) does not automatically equate to a
rejection of the overarching hypothesis (H1) that posited that higher levels of metastereotyping would lead to increased support for racial policies designed to correct racial
injustices.
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However, the results of these regressions yielded few significant instances of
meta-stereotyping’s impact on racial policy preferences, and when significant results did
arise they were of a mixed variety—sometimes impacting white subjects, and other times
Black subjects; sometimes having an impact in the hypothesized direction, and other
times having an impact in the direction opposite of the hypothesis; sometimes results
would appear significant when using one measure of meta-stereotyping and not the other
measures. A recap of these results appears in Tables 5.13-5.15.
Thus, while the analyses in this chapter suggest we must reject H3 in its entirety,
the few instances wherein meta-stereotypes did reach significance cannot make up for the
general sense of discord when analyzing meta-stereotyping’s potential impact on these
policies and so we must reject H1 as well. It is true that in certain situations metastereotyping may be a significant factor leading to increased support for policies designed
to correct racial injustice (for example, for the white sub-sample’s support for affirmative
action when using the dichotomous measure, or the Black sub-sample’s support for
certain criminal justice reforms when looking at perceptions of the increased likelihood
that Black defendants will be viewed as more violence-prone), however, for each instance
where significance was achieved there are a multitude more instances where significance
was not achieved, or was achieved in a way that led to opposition to the policy in
question (even the same policy; such as opposition to affirmative action when using
perceptions of prejudice based on the hypothetical hiring scenario). The results are,
therefore, too inconsistent to accept that meta-stereotyping, as a generalizable concept, is
significantly playing a role in a broad array of racial policy preferences.
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Additionally, we must reject H2 as well since it appears that white individuals’
meta-stereotypes are more likely to have an impact on their racial policy preferences
(whether in the hypothesized direction or not). The Black sub-sample, after all, only saw
their racial policy preferences shift with regard to two specific criminal justice reform
policies and only with regard to the perception that the hypothetical Black character in
the criminal defendant issue frame was more apt to be viewed as violence-prone. While
the Black sub-sample did attain significance in the hypothesized direction at the 90%
confidence threshold in a few other cases, the lowered threshold does not justify a
rejection of the null.
Ultimately, more research may need to be conducted on the topic of metastereotyping’s potential impact on racial policy preferences, and two specific alterations
could be made to the research design: first, a more ideologically diverse sample could be
used, as the vast majority of subjects in both the Black and white sample identified as
independents or liberals (and also independents or Democrats) rather than conservatives
(or Republicans); second, questions could be added to the questionnaire in order to gauge
whether respondents believe the prevalence of prejudice/stereotyping is actually
problematic. Future investigation into whether the priming and framing treatment
conditions take effect when the issue at hand is meta-stereotyping would also add to the
discussion, since it is currently unknown how readily accessible meta-stereotypes are to
white individuals and since this project’s experimental design is built upon the
assumption that the priming and framing treatment conditions caused at least a subtle
shift in the thought process of subjects.
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However, although perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice failed to produce
significant results in most cases (and certainly failed to do so in a steady, consistent
fashion), thus resulting in the failure to reject the null (H1), perception itself does seem to
play a part for white subjects when the perception in question is the prevalence of
discriminatory outcomes (not simply prejudice), especially for overtly racial policies like
affirmative action. Table 5.16 recaps the findings of the OLS regressions pertaining to
the effects of subjects’ perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice when it is measured as
the perception that hypothetical Black characters are more or less likely to be on the
receiving end of discrimination (hence leading to discriminatory outcomes).
Increased perceptions of discriminatory outcomes in the hypothetical hiring issue
frame led to significant and substantive changes to the increased level of support for
affirmative action in both the workplace and the university setting for the white subsample. Additionally, this is the first analysis that produced significant results in the
hypothesized direction for a criminal justice reform policy within the white sub-sample
(although, still, the majority of criminal justice reforms were unaffected at a significant
rate in either direction using this measure). Thus, there is reason to believe that even
though meta-stereotypes cannot be accepted as a factor in determining individuals’ levels
of support for policies aimed at correcting racial injustice based on this project’s sample
and analyses, the role of perceptions of the prevalence of discrimination may nonetheless
be important, especially when the policy in question is of an overtly racial nature, such as
affirmative action practices. These effects are not seen within the Black sub-sample,
which provides yet another reason we must fail to reject the null for H2.
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When taken together, then, this project ultimately fails to reject all three
hypotheses set forth at the start of the study. It cannot be accepted that meta-stereotyping
plays a causal role in mediating individuals’ levels of support for policies aimed at
correcting racial injustice, nor can it be accepted that they even play a generalizable role
through non-causal relationships. Yet the project may still be instructive in some respects
for both racial justice advocates and social scientists.
Racial justice advocates might take away the importance of highlighting the racial
nature of specific policy issues, and also explain how the proposed policies aimed at
correcting the racial problem would be an actual solution. Amongst the white subsample—which are typically those who need to be won over by activists and
politicians—subjects were more apt to be moved by meta-stereotypes in the hypothesized
way and by perceptions of the prevalence of discriminatory outcomes when the issue at
hand was overtly racial and when the proposed policy solution was clearly identifiable as
correcting the racial injustice. It is possible that these effects would switch to becoming
significant (either at all, or in the hypothesized direction when they do occur) for white
Americans’ preferences regarding criminal justice reforms if those policies were more
clearly linked as a solution to the racial strife documented within that system. Racial
justice advocates might also do well to move away from arguments surrounding whether
or not somebody’s intentions were motivated by prejudice (since meta-stereotyping
didn’t yield enough steady and consistent results to accept that they are an important
factor in whether individuals support racial policies aimed at correcting injustice, even if
that injustice stems, in part, due acknowledged prejudices) and to instead embrace an
issue frame that highlights discriminatory outcomes as the end-game that needs
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correcting. Combining these two strategies could lead to the desired levels of support for
measures designed to combat racial injustice in a variety of settings.
To give racial justice advocates a better understanding of how these strategies
would work, future studies might choose to provide a brief explanation of how reforms to
the death penalty, the drug war and three strikes laws would provide a direct solution to
the problem of racial injustice that most white subjects admitted existed in our current
legal system (by way of their answers in the hypothetical criminal defendant and loitering
scenarios) so that they view the policies as being connected to the problem of
discriminatory outcomes in the first place. This project assumed that the connection
could be made, and that assumption may not have been warranted. They may also
include a wider battery of meta-stereotypes if framing the issue with hypothetical
scenarios because this project was limited in investigating perceptions of the prevalence
of prejudice in those analyses because each hypothetical group was only asked about one
potential stereotype—thus, if individuals don’t feel that laziness leads to police officers’
interactions with Black individuals, but they do believe that other negative stereotypes
lead to negative interactions, such relationships remain hidden in this project’s analyses;
likewise, if individuals don’t view lack of intelligence to be a motivating reason for
interviewers’ to negatively stereotype and discriminate against Black applicants, but they
do view other negative stereotypes to have an impact, those relations also remain hidden
in this project’s analyses.
Additionally, future research could look also try to obtain a more ideologically
diverse sample; as it is, it is unclear whether a more conservative sample would have led
to a wider range of answers regarding their perceptions of perceived prejudice and
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discrimination after reading the hypothetical scenarios (although subjects were provided
the option of electing that the hypothetical white characters would be stereotyped more
and negatively affected by discrimination more, the vast majority of subjects in both subsamples chose the neutral option or answered that the Black hypothetical characters
would be on the receiving end of more prejudice and discrimination; this may simply be a
reflection of the realities that are documented in Chapter 1, but it may also be the product
of a more ideologically liberal sample that more readily acknowledges racism).
Additionally, the project can be viewed by researchers as a warning over the
difficulties in isolating meta-stereotyping as a possible causal mechanism, and also as a
warning over the difficulties in how to conceptualize and measure meta-stereotyping in
the first place. The descriptive statistics in chapter 4 documented the inconsistencies
between subjects’ answers regarding the prevalence of prejudice when measured using
the three different types of variables, and the analyses in this chapter point to the fact that
such inconsistencies in answers will lead to inconsistencies in whether or not those
variables impact the dependent variables of interest (in this case, racial policy
preferences). Less clear is how to remedy this problem of inconsistencies between
measures of meta-stereotyping, but knowing that it is something that must be grappled
with is a valuable contribution in and of itself. Additionally, researchers who are
interested in perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice may also want to include
measures of perceived levels of discriminatory outcomes in their studies, since the latter
seems to have a strong impact for white Americans if the findings for this project’s white
sub-sample can be extrapolated more broadly. Although scholars of racism in the United
States know that individual prejudices can subconsciously lead to more institutionalized
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forms of discrimination, such a link may not be obvious to citizens who don’t often think
about racial issues in a scholarly way, and so both measures may contribute to
researchers’ better understanding of the phenomena they are investigating while using
meta-stereotyping as a potential factor.
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Table 5.1: Effects of three treatment groups on composite criminal justice reform and
affirmative action policy areas
White subjects
Policy area
Sum of
Degrees
Mean
F
Significance
squares
of
squared
freedom
Criminal
Between
23.28
2
11.64
0.92
0.4016
justice
groups
reforms
Within
3420.77
269
12.72
groups
Total
3444.06
271
12.71
Affirmative Between
9.52
2
4.76
0.74
0.4802
action
groups
Within
1740.42
269
6.47
groups
Total
1749.94
*Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level

Table 5.2: Effects of three generic treatment groups on composite criminal justice reform
and affirmative action policy areas
Black subjects
Policy area
Sum of
Degrees
Mean
F
Significance
squares
of
squared
freedom
Criminal
Between
17.38
2
8.69
0.86
0.4252
justice
groups
reforms
Within
2552.72
252
10.13
groups
Total
2570.10
254
10.12
Affirmative Between
5.90
2
2.95
0.71
0.4917
action
groups
Within
1043.96
252
4.14
groups
Total
1049.86
254
4.13
*Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level
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Table 5.3: Effects of treatment groups on support for affirmative action policies when
the framing group is presented with a hypothetical scenario featuring two similar job
applicants
White subjects
Policy
Sum of
Degrees
Mean
F
Significance
squares
of
squared
freedom
College
Between
2.74
2
1.37
0.74
0.4780
admissions groups
Within
295.52
160
1.85
groups
Total
298.26
162
1.84
Workplace Between
2.01
2
1.00
0.58
0.5624
promotions groups
Within
278.01
160
1.74
groups
Total
280.01
162
1.73
Black sub-sample
Policy
Sum of
Degrees
Mean
F
Significance
squares
of
squared
freedom
College
Between
5.64
2
2.82
2.24
0.1102
admissions groups
Within
186.34
148
1.26
groups
Total
191.97
150
1.28
Workplace Between
2.82
2
1.41
1.11
0.3331
promotions groups
Within
188.02
148
1.27
groups
Total
190.83
150
1.27
*Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level
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Table 5.4: Effects of treatment groups on support for specified criminal justice reforms
when the framing group is presented with a hypothetical scenario featuring two similar
pairs of loiterers
White subjects
Policy
Sum of
Degrees of Mean
F
Significance
squares
freedom
squared
War on
Between
4.16
2
2.08
1.07
0.4361
drugs
groups
Within
311.59
160
1.95
groups
Total
315.75
162
1.95
Racial
Between
1.26
2
0.63
0.47
0.6250
profiling
groups
Within
213.88
160
1.34
groups
Total
215.14
162
1.32
Three
Between
7.10
2
3.55
1.78
0.1713
strikes
groups
laws
Within
318.61
160
1.99
groups
Total
325.72
162
2.01
Black sub-sample
Policy
Sum of
Degrees of Mean
F
Significance
squares
freedom
squared
War on
Between
8.27
2
4.13
2.27
0.1066
drugs
groups
Within
274.79
151
1.82
groups
Total
283.06
153
1.85
Racial
Between
2.36
2
1.18
0.65
0.5257
profiling
groups
Within
275.36
151
1.82
groups
Total
277.71
153
1.82
Three
Between
4.51
2
2.26
1.13
0.3243
strikes
groups
laws
Within
300.40
151
1.99
groups
Total
304.91
153
1.99
*Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level
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Table 5.5: Effects of treatment groups on support for specified criminal justice reforms
when the framing group is presented with a hypothetical scenario featuring two similar
defendants

Policy
Death
penalty

Three
strikes
laws

Policy
Death
penalty

Between
groups
Within
groups
Total
Between
groups
Within
groups
Total

Sum of
squares
0.97

White subjects
Degrees of Mean
freedom
squared
2
0.49

367.11

163

2.25

368.08
0.31

165
2

2.23
0.16

333.08

163

2.04

333.40
Sum of
squares
0.80

165
2.02
Black sub-sample
Degrees of Mean
freedom
squared
2
0.40

Between
groups
Within
298.79
151
groups
Total
299.58
153
Three
Between
0.67
2
strikes
groups
laws
Within
308.40
151
groups
Total
309.06
153
*Indicates significance at the 95% confidence level
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F

Significance

0.22

0.8059

0.08

0.9259

F

Significance

0.20

0.8175

0.16

0.8490

1.98
1.96
0.33
2.04
2.02

Table 5.6: OLS regression of meta-stereotyping’s effects on affirmative action policy
preferences
White sub-sample
Black sub-sample
Coefficient
Standard
Coefficient
Standard
error
error
Meta.0002
.0017
Meta.0019
.0013
stereotype
stereotype
level
level
Age
.3028
.1819
Age
.1155
.1592
Gender
-.0965
.2701
Gender
.2608
.2571
Education
.0714
.0840
Education
.2420**
.0871
Personal
-.0022
.1428
Personal
-.1224
.1782
income
income
Household
-.1590
.1162
Household
-.0545
.1594
income
income
Ideology
-.2590*
.1149
Ideology
-.2345**
.0812
Partisanship
-.2293
.1262
Partisanship
-.1860
.1026
Live in south -.3766
.3671
Live in south -.1422
.3465
Grow up in
.1356
.3677
Grow up in
-.2795
.3474
south
south
Difference in .1587**
.0561
Difference in .0211
.0383
group
group
attachment
attachment
Consequences .2973**
.0532
Consequences .0759
.0442
of affirmative
of affirmative
action
action
Constant
4.8906**
.9847
Constant
7.3470**
.8841
n=272
n=253
Prob>F=.0000
Prob>F=.0001
R-squared=.3077
R-squared=.1447
*Indicates confidence at the 95% level; ** Indicates confidence at the 99% level
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Table 5.7: OLS regression of meta-stereotyping’s effects on criminal justice reform
preferences
White sub-sample
Black sub-sample
Coefficient
Standard
Coefficient
Standard
error
error
Meta-.0054*
.0021
Meta.0004
.0021
stereotype
stereotype
level
level
Age
-.3108
.2337
Age
-.0243
.2551
Gender
1.1371**
.3474
Gender
-.4521
.4098
Education
.4109**
.1081
Education
.1772
.1390
Personal
.0296
.1839
Personal
.0094
.2856
income
income
Household
-.2394
.1496
Household
-.3338
.2554
income
income
Ideology
-.7351**
.1466
Ideology
-.2589*
.1300
Partisanship -.2355
.1623
Partisanship .4973**
.1644
Live in south -.5307
.4720
Live in south -1.1085*
.5543
Grow up in
.6535
.4731
Grow up in
.5818
.5567
south
south
Difference in .3111**
.0716
Difference in .1880**
.0613
group
group
attachment
attachment
Constant
13.9300**
1.0134
Constant
7.8666**
1.2890
n=272
n=253
Prob>F=.0000
Prob>F=.0094
R-Squared=.4148
R-squared=.0965
* Indicates confidence at the 95% level; ** Indicates confidence at the 99% level
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Table 5.8: OLS regression of meta-stereotyping’s effects on affirmative action and
criminal justice reform policy preferences
(White subjects)
Affirmative Action
Criminal Justice Reforms
Coefficient
Standard
Coefficient
Standard
error
error
“Most
.1961*
.0919
“Most
-.3491**
.1140
whites” metawhites”
stereotype
metastereotype
Age
.3249*
.1806
Age
-.3527
.2325
Gender
-.1023
.2678
Gender
1.1508**
.3456
Education
.0813
.0833
Education
.4097**
.1075
Personal
.0067
.1409
Personal
-.0263
.1819
income
income
Household
-.1515
.1150
Household
-.2312
.1486
income
income
Ideology
-.2582*
.1137
Ideology
-.7143**
.1458
Partisanship
-.2304
.1251
Partisanship -.2290
.1615
Live in the
-.4350
.3649
Live in the
-.4561
.4703
south
south
Grew up in
.1661
.3646
Grew up in
.5767
.4704
the south
the south
Difference in .1882**
.0544
Difference in .3108**
.0697
group
group
attachment
attachment
Consequences .3270**
.0531
Constant
13.7498**
.9700
of affirmative
action
Constant
4.2074**
.9443
n=272
n=272
Prob>F=.0000
Prob>F=.0000
R-squared=.3197
R-squared=.4211
* Indicates confidence at the 95% level; ** Indicates confidence at the 99% level
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Table 5.9: OLS regression of increased perceptions of prejudice and discrimination in a
hypothetical hiring scenario on affirmative action policy preferences
(White subjects)
Workplace Hiring
University Admissions
Coefficient
Standard
Coefficient
Standard
error
error
Perception
-.5868*
.2696
Perception
-.3970
.2997
that Black
that Black
applicant is
applicant is
more
more
unintelligent
unintelligent
Perception
.6017*
.2394
Perception
.5944*
.2661
that Black
that Black
applicant is
applicant is
less likely to
less likely to
get job
get job
Age
.2257
.1983
Age
.2983
.2205
Gender
.4591
.2834
Gender
.1682
.3151
Education
.0685
.0987
Education
.1174
.1097
Personal
-.0185
.1420
Personal
.1781
.1578
income
income
Household
-.0819
.1142
Household
-.3730**
.1269
income
income
Ideology
-.2219
.1413
Ideology
-.2270
.1571
Partisanship
.1268
.1492
Partisanship
.1256
.1659
Live in the
-.6507
.3828
Live in the
-.7428
.4256
south
south
Grew up in
-.3958
.3293
Grew up in
-.0666
.3666
the south
the south
Difference in .1101
.0577
Difference in .1601*
.0642
group
group
attachment
attachment
Consequences .1230*
.0538
Consequences .1544*
.0598
of affirmative
of affirmative
action
action
Constant
1.6909
1.4037
Constant
1.3011
1.5607
n=53
Prob>F=.0005
R-squared=.5653
* Indicates confidence at the 95% level; ** Indicates confidence at the 99% level
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Table 5.10: OLS regression of increased perceptions of prejudice and discrimination in a
hypothetical criminal defendant scenario on preferences regarding three strikes laws and
the war on drugs
(Black subjects)
Three strikes laws
War on Drugs
Coefficient
Standard
Coefficient
Standard
error
error
Perception
.7433*
.3547
Perception
.8384*
.3575
that Black
that Black
defendant is
defendant is
more
more
violenceviolenceprone
prone
Perception
-.3411
.3673
Perception
.5049
.3703
that Black
that Black
defendant is
defendant is
more likely
more likely
to be found
to be found
guilty
guilty
Age
.0570
.2666
Age
-.2307
.2687
Gender
.6787
.4338
Gender
.2202
.4373
Education
.1951
.1332
Education
.0045
.1343
Personal
-.6043*
.2773
Personal
-.4735
.2796
income
income
Household
.2766
.2486
Household
.1431
.2506
income
income
Ideology
-.1082
.1242
Ideology
-.0464
.1252
Partisanship .0435
.1748
Partisanship -.0071
.1762
Live in south -.0816
.6463
Live in south .5725
.6515
Grow up in
-.0282
.6286
Grow up in
.0043
.6337
south
south
Difference in -.0096
.0785
Difference in -.0560
.0792
group
group
attachment
attachment
Constant
.3296
1.8480
Constant
4.1029**
1.0879

n=52
Prob>F=.2267
R-Squared=.2949

N=52
Prob>F=.2429
R-Squared=.2900

* Indicates confidence at the 95% level; ** Indicates confidence at the 99% level

181

Table 5.11: OLS regression of increased perceptions of prejudice and discrimination in a
hypothetical loitering scenario on preferences regarding three strikes laws
(White subjects)
Coefficient
Standard Error
Perception that Black
-.4709
.2981
loiterers are more lazy
Perception that Black
.7667*
.3133
loiterers are more apt to be
searched for drugs
Age
.2165
.2282
Gender
.3671
.3755
Education
-.0771
.1326
Personal income
.3787
.2342
Household income
-.1722
.1674
Ideology
-.2966
.1638
Partisanship
-.0906
.1891
Live in south
-1.1540**
.4253
Grow up in south
1.0868*
.4634
Difference in group
.1004
.0780
attachment
Constant
2.7317
1.3728
n=53
Prob>F=.0010
R-squared=.3793
* Indicates confidence at the 95% level; ** Indicates confidence at the 99% level
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Table 5.12: Recap of ANOVA analyses
White sub-sample
Black sub-sample
Composite scores for racial policy areas
Affirmative Action





Criminal Justice



Hypothetical hiring scenario
Affirmative actionWorkplace
Affirmative actionUniversity









Hypothetical loitering scenario





War on Drugs
Racial profiling
Three strikes laws





Hypothetical criminal defendant scenario
Death penalty
Three strikes laws




 indicates a failure to reject the null
 indicates a rejection of the null
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Table 5.13: Recap of OLS regressions using the interval 101-point measure of metastereotyping
White sub-sample
Black sub-sample
Outcome
Notes
Outcome
Notes
Composite scores for policy areas
Affirmative


action
Criminal justice
Significant in


opposite
direction of
hypothesis
Individual policies
Affirmative
Significant in


actionhypothesized
Workplace
direction at 90%
confidence level
Affirmative


actionUniversity
Death penalty


War on Drugs
Racial profiling

Three strikes
laws











Significant in
opposite
direction of
hypothesis
 indicates a failure to reject the null
 indicates a rejection of the null
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Significant in
hypothesized
direction at 90%
confidence level

Table 5.14: Recap of OLS regressions using the dichotomous, “most whites” measure of
meta-stereotyping
White sub-sample
Black sub-sample
Outcome
Notes
Outcome
Notes
Composite scores for policy areas
Affirmative


action
Criminal justice
Significant in


opposite
direction of
hypothesis
Individual policies
Affirmative


actionWorkplace
Affirmative
Significant in


actionhypothesized
University
direction at 90%
confidence level
Death penalty


War on Drugs
Racial profiling




Significant in
opposite
direction of
hypothesis
Three strikes
Significant in

laws
opposite
direction of
hypothesis
 indicates a failure to reject the null
 indicates a rejection of the null
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Significant in
hypothesized
direction at 90%
confidence level

Table 5.15: Recap of OLS regressions using “more/less likely” to be stereotyped answers
regarding hypothetical scenarios
White sub-sample
Black sub-sample
Outcome
Notes
Outcome
Notes
Perception that Black defendant is more likely to be viewed as violence-prone
Death penalty


War on Drugs
Racial profiling

















Three Strikes
Laws
Perception that Black loiterers are more likely to be viewed as lazy
Death penalty


War on Drugs
Racial profiling

Three Strikes
Laws
Perception that Black applicant is more likely to be viewed as unintelligent
Affirmative
Significant in
Significant in


actionopposite
hypothesized
Workplace
direction of
direction at 90%
hypothesis
confidence level
Affirmative


actionUniversity
 indicates a failure to reject the null
 indicates a rejection of the null
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Table 5.16: Recap of OLS regressions using “more/less likely” to receive discriminatory
outcome answers regarding hypothetical scenarios
White sub-sample
Black sub-sample
Outcome
Notes
Outcome
Notes
Perception that Black defendant is more likely to be found guilty
Death penalty


War on Drugs
Racial profiling

















Three Strikes
Laws
Perception that Black loiterers are more likely to be stopped and searched for drugs
Death penalty


War on Drugs
Racial profiling

Three Strikes
Laws
Perception that Black applicant is less likely to be hired for the job
Affirmative


actionWorkplace
Affirmative


actionUniversity
 indicates a failure to reject the null
 indicates a rejection of the null
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CHAPTER 6:
FINAL THOUGHTS AND FUTURE FRONTIERS
This project used an original experimental survey in order to investigate the
potential impact of meta-stereotyping on individuals’ racial policy preferences. Previous
chapters sought to provide an account of the importance of such an exploration—Chapter
1 introduced the break in reality between the American post-racial narrative and the
enduring racial injustices of the twenty-first century in order to justify the project’s
normative, real-world importance, while Chapter 2 introduced the theoretical
considerations underpinning such an investigation and the subsequent hypotheses in order
to justify the project’s place in the broader social science literature and its extension of
our knowledge of meta-stereotyping’s consequences into the realm of political science,
thereby justifying its importance as an academic pursuit.
The logic behind the use of an experimental procedure was discussed in Chapter
3, as was the design of the original survey instrument, followed by a descriptive account
of the data gleaned from the survey in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 used ANOVA
analyses to statistically deduce whether or not to reject the null hypotheses (outlined for
the first time in Chapter 2) and, failing to find significance on account of any of the three
hypotheses, moved to using OLS regression analysis to investigate whether a relationship
between meta-stereotyping and racial policy preferences exists.
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While most of the data produced insignificant results, and though the significant
results were often inconsistent, this project did produce a few interesting findings This
chapter, therefore, is broken into two sections—the first section asks what we might take
away from this project based on its normative, real-world implications; the second
section provides future avenues for researchers to explore by briefly discussing some of
the potential limitations of the research and by speculating about potential explanations
for the project’s inconsistent findings.
Below are the main findings of interest which will be alluded to in subsequent
sections:


Members of both the Black and white communities over-exaggerate the
prevalence of prejudice based on the self-reported stereotype scores within this
project and when compared to the data within similar surveys. However,
members of the Black community over-exaggerate this prevalence at a higher
degree. This is not surprising given the different types of socialization
experienced by Black and white Americans. When using a 101-point measure of
meta-stereotyping, however, the gap between Black and white responses shrinks
compared to the gap when using the dichotomous, “most” measure of metastereotyping. The rate of meta-stereotyping amongst the Black community has
held relatively stable over the past twenty years; white meta-stereotypes were not
measured in the 1991 study, so no assessment can be made regarding the levels of
levels of whites’ meta-stereotypes over time. Despite the levels of metastereotypes remaining fairly consistent in the Black community, self-reported
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levels of stereotyping in the white community have decreased during that twenty
year period.


Both Black and white subjects reported higher levels of meta-stereotyping when
asked about white attitudes regarding Blacks than when asked about white
attitudes toward any other racial or ethnic group (Hispanic, Asian, Arab and
White). While their meta-stereotypes were over-exaggerated, they do reflect the
reality that white subjects’ self-reported higher levels of negative stereotyping
(and lower levels of positive stereotyping) when the stereotypes were applied to
Blacks as a group.



Surprisingly, white subjects who identified as conservative and Republican
reported higher levels of meta-stereotyping than did their white counterparts who
identified as liberal and Democratic. This finding was not expected since
conservatives are generally thought to be more likely to accept the American postracial narrative. Ideology was also found to be related to the likelihood that an
individual would support policies aimed at correcting racial injustice (in the
expected direction, with liberals being more supportive of such policies), which
may have counteracted the impact of the meta-stereotypes and, therefore, be
partly responsible for the null results in the OLS regressions.



There were noticeable inconsistencies between subjects’ answers to the three
meta-stereotype questions; this was true of both the Black and white sub-samples.
In both groups, subjects tended to report higher meta-stereotypes when asked the
dichotomous, “most” question than when they were asked the 101-point measure.
Inconsistencies were also displayed when answering questions pertaining to the
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hypothetical scenarios (assessing whether the Black characters in the scenarios
were more or less likely to be stereotyped) and the dichotomous, “most” measure.
In those cases, both Black and white subjects were more likely to say that the
Black character in question was somewhat more or much more likely to be
negatively stereotyped than they were to report that they thought “most whites”
held the stereotype; this directional trend was true for the violence-prone and
laziness questions, however the direction was reversed for the unintelligence
question.


The ANOVA analyses failed to produce significant results; thus, meta-stereotypes
cannot be accepted as a causal factor in determining individuals’ racial policy
preferences. While this could have been a product of poor survey design, the
OLS regressions looking for a non-causal relationship also fail to produce
significant results in most cases and when significant results were achieved in the
white community they trended in the opposite direction as was hypothesized more
often than not.



When looking at the impact of perceptions of the likelihood that Blacks are
actively discriminated against more than their white counterparts (by way of
hypothetical scenarios, and in comparison to perceptions of the prevalence of
prejudice), white subjects’ racial policy preferences were finally consistently
impacted in the hypothesized direction, although significant results were still
produced in only a handful of the possible scenarios.
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I.

What can we take away from this project?
“Do you think your Republic colleagues in Congress are racist?”
“Not all of them. Of course not… [But] To a significant extent, the
Republican base does have elements that are animated by racism.”
-

CNN Correspondent Candy Crowley & Congressman Steve Israel
(Schwartz 2014)

On April 13th 2014, Representative Steve Israel (D-NY) not-so-boldly proclaimed
that “not all” Republicans are racist. In doing so, however, Israel interjected race into the
political discourse, implying that in many instances his political opponents are, in fact,
racially prejudiced. His remarks echoed those made by other Democratic figures Eric
Holder (Attorney General) and Nancy Pelosi (House Minority Leader), who indicated
that racism often infects the Republican way of thinking about current political issues.
On cue, opponents on the right accused Israel and his liberal brethren of playing the “race
card;” a catch-all phrase that insinuates that race, and its accompanying prejudice and
discrimination, is no longer really a part of the equation, and that a solution, therefore,
need not take racial history or current realities into consideration. The back-and-forth in
this recent scenario is predictable; after all, as described in Chapter 1, the U.S. is
currently in the crux of an ongoing debate concerning the validity of the American postracial narrative, wherein many—especially, though not limited to, those on the left—see
racial prejudice and discrimination as an enduring presence in twenty-first century
America, and many others—particularly, though, again, not limited to, those on the
right—see racism as a problem that the U.S. has finally, successfully put behind us.
This project, however, suggests that time and effort spent debating the merits of
the post-racial narrative may be misplaced. Just as an individuals’ belief, or lack thereof,
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in the post-racial narrative is inconsequential to whether or not racial injustice persists as
a reality, such beliefs counter-intuitively seem inconsequential to whether or not
individuals support policy preferences aimed at correcting the persisting racial injustices.
This isn’t to say that racial justice advocates should turn against the facts (see Chapter 1)
and cede the debate to those who firmly accept the post-racial narrative, but this project
does suggest that a new strategy may be needed for those who wish to see policies aimed
at correcting racial injustices backed by the American public and enacted by politicians.
While such an appraisal may be somewhat overstated given the unrepresentative
nature of this project’s sample, the project leaves much room to doubt the importance of
meta-stereotyping when deducing individuals’ levels of support for, or opposition to, two
specific policy areas designed at combating the problems of racial prejudice and
discrimination: affirmative action and criminal justice reforms. Meta-stereotypes were
used in this project as a way of operationalizing subjects’ belief in the post-racial
narrative; they measure an individual’s perception of the prevalence of prejudice
currently held by white Americans against their Black compatriots.
Meta-stereotypes have been previously documented to affect individuals in the
out-group (on the receiving end of prejudice) in a variety of psychological and
sociological ways (see Chapter 2); however, no research had been conducted to
investigate whether they also manifest in political ways. After using an original
experimental survey to try and isolate meta-stereotyping as a causal mechanism that
impacts individuals’ racial policy preferences, no evidence was found for a political
manifestation of meta-stereotypes’ consequences (see Chapter 5). Even when looking at
the potential impact of meta-stereotypes as a non-causal factor, as opposed to a causal
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factor, the results of this project failed to predict any consistent and meaningful role for
subjects’ increased meta-stereotypes as they relate to the hypothesized increased level of
support for policies aimed at correcting for racial injustice (see Chapter 5). Depending
on the measure of meta-stereotyping, the racial group being investigated, and the specific
policy in question, results at times proved significant and at other times insignificant;
likewise, at times results trended in the direction hypothesized, while at other times
results trended in the direction opposite this project’s hypotheses.
Instead, levels of support for affirmative action policies, and levels of opposition
to current racially-biased criminal justice policies, were impacted by a number of
expected variables, including political ideology and the difference in subjects’ levels of
group attachment for Blacks and whites. Considering the policies tested in this project
are directly aligned with the policy platforms of Democrats, it is not surprising that
political ideology would play a role, with those who are more liberal being more inclined
to support affirmative action and oppose current criminal justice practices. Additionally,
given the theoretical speculations regarding the role of linked fate (see Chapter 2), it is
not particularly surprising that levels of group attachment would yield significant results
either, with those who reported a larger gap in their levels of attachment for Blacks and
whites being less apt to support policies aimed at correcting racial injustice.
Additionally, however, a move away from examining perceptions of the
prevalence of prejudice to an examination of subjects’ assessments of the likelihood that
discriminatory outcomes exist (in a direction that is unfavorable to Black Americans)
indicates that white Americans may allow these perceptions to impact their racial policy
preferences in a more consistent fashion than do their perceptions of prejudice (see
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Chapter 5). Investigating perceptions of the proclivity of Blacks to be victimized by
discriminatory outcomes is the first measure to produce significant results (for the white
sub-sample) that trend in the hypothesized direction and only the hypothesized direction.
Additionally, it is the first time that a criminal justice measure produced significant
results in the predicted direction—white subjects allowed their level of opposition for
three strikes laws to raise as they reported a higher likelihood that the Black characters in
the hypothetical scenario were more likely to be stopped and searched by police. This
specific scenario may have been viewed by subjects as being more directly pertinent to
the discriminatory outcome at hand than the scenario concerning the death penalty; it is
somewhat unexpected that opposition to racial profiling would not be moved by a
perception that there is an increased likelihood of the Black characters being approached
by police, however that may be a result of the vast majority of subjects (90%) indicating
that they were either neutral toward, or opposed to, racial profiling when police officers
suspect individuals of possessing drugs.
While the Black subjects’ racial policy preferences remained unmoved by their
assessments of likely discriminatory outcomes, the Black community is generally less apt
to need convincing to support policies aimed at correcting racial injustice in the first
place, so politicians and activists may wish to adopt a strategy that is capable of moving
white public opinion regarding racial policy preferences more anyway. Thus, Democrats
in office, such as Israel, Holder and Pelosi, may benefit more by shifting their focus away
from alleging prejudice or “name calling”— by calling people, groups, actions, etc.
“racist”—and instead move toward focus on highlighting the outcomes experienced by
members of the Black community. In other words, politicians and activists may benefit
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by shifting away from a more accusatory tone, focused on the perpetrators’ motivations,
and instead focus more on highlighting the experiences of the victims, and therefore
promoting a clearer sense of why solutions are needed and what is motivating policies
aimed at correcting racial injustice in the first place.
Additionally, such a shift would allow members of the American public to
envision concrete, real-world scenarios when formulating their opinions on racial
policies, instead of making appeals that are built upon the more subjective and abstract
concepts of racial prejudice. After all, when individuals like Donald Sterling—owner of
the Los Angeles Clippers, who insisted his girlfriend stop bringing Black people to their
games—can state, with confidence and seeming sincerity, that he is not racist (Grad
2014), and “I’m not racist/prejudiced, but…” is accepted by many as a valid, mitigating
preposition to a derogatory statement, it becomes increasingly obvious that phrases like
“prejudiced” and “racist” have lost much of their meaning in American political
discourse. And because Americans may not be identifying prejudiced attitudes as such, it
may help explain why there is a seeming disconnect between perceptions of the
prevalence of prejudice and perceptions that Black Americans are more apt to suffer
discriminatory outcomes. What’s more, adopting such a strategy would paint a clearer
picture of how policies are related to the issue of race, thereby alleviating, or at least
diminishing, “race card” accusations, thus opening up the possibility of a more honest
debate.
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II.

Where can the findings in this project take us?
Although the results of this project regarding meta-stereotyping’s causal effects

proved null, the results of this project pave way for further exploration of the role of
perceptions—either perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice or discrimination— on
racial policy preferences. Much speculation has been stated in this chapter’s previous
section, and that speculation should be tested before politicians and activists make any
decisions about how to approach garnering support for policies aimed at correcting racial
injustice, especially those policies that aren’t immediately, obviously linked to racial
prejudice and discrimination.
Additionally, given the inconsistencies in subjects’ levels of meta-stereotyping
depending on how the concept is measured, and given the inconsistencies that were
wrought as a consequence when determining the impact of those meta-stereotypes on
racial policy preferences, scholars have reason to extend this research in ways that allow
us to better understand what Americans’ perceptions regarding the prevalence of racism
really look like. After all, it is difficult to make any real headway on the potential effects
of meta-stereotyping if it is unclear that we are getting accurate depictions of individuals’
meta-stereotypes based on the way questions have been phrased. This point is important
for not only understanding possible political consequences of meta-stereotyping, but also
to make sense of the research that has been conducted in other fields using a limited
measure of meta-stereotypes.
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i.

How does the socialization process impact meta-stereotypes?

One possible avenue for further exploration is an investigation of how metastereotypes form in the first place within the white community. Researchers have
investigated the role of socialization in the Black community; however, this project had
to speculate over whether the levels of meta-stereotyping would differ between the two
racial groups because little has been done to link various socialization mechanisms to
levels of white meta-stereotypes. Indeed, as was expected given the theoretical
discussion in Chapter 2, Black subjects reported higher levels of meta-stereotyping than
did subjects in the white sub-sample; however, it is unclear how much of this difference
is due to the experiences of Black subjects (in comparison to the lack of racialized
experiences of white subjects) and how much of this difference is due strictly to the
socialization process dictated by family, friends, and other societal institutions. Given
some of the inconsistencies between some white subjects’ tempered meta-stereotypes and
their increased proclivity to acknowledge discriminatory outcomes, it would also be
worth exploring how the socialization process is linked to perceptions of the likelihood of
discrimination against Blacks, as opposed to perceptions of the prevalence of prejudice
against Blacks.
Because Black subjects, who were likely socialized to reject the post-racial
narrative, failed to have their racial policy preferences moved by their levels of metastereotyping, it is possible that any results indicating an impact on white subjects’
preferences (whether in the hypothesized direction or not) were driven by those white
subjects who had not received any socialization on the topic. It is also possible that the
white subjects who were moved by their meta-stereotypes were socialized to reject a
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post-racial narrative, and that they merely needed their meta-stereotypes activated in a
way that was unnecessary for Black individuals who readily have meta-stereotypes on
their minds. Alternative, it is worth investigating whether the white socialization practice
of ignoring race or denying it as a central component of life in contemporary America is
linked to this project’s results that link increased meta-stereotyping with decreased
support for policies aimed at correcting racial injustice, a development that countered this
project’s main hypothesis. If white individuals are socialized to believe one thing, and
are later asked to consider another, they may become more defensive and policy
preferences could reflect a backlash of sorts.
Thus, further research on the socialization process of white Americans regarding
the topic of race and racism may allow for a clearer understanding of whether the process
works in a similar way as it does in the Black community, or whether the socialization
process manifests differently in the minds of white Americans and Black Americans, and
therefore impacts levels of meta-stereotyping and the consequences of those metastereotypes differently in the two racial communities.
ii.

Is there a difference in the way meta-stereotypes come into play when
dealing with issues directly tied to race and those that are only
indirectly tied to race?

Because this project only tested two broad policy areas—affirmative action and
criminal justice reform—it is difficult to make generalizations about the findings herein;
however, it does seem that those policies that are more clearly linked to race (in this case
affirmative action) are more apt to be significantly impacted by meta-stereotypes and
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perceptions of discriminatory outcomes (whether in the hypothesized direction or not),
and so future researchers may wish to test such speculation by including more issue
areas, and possibly by using an experimental nature to frame those issues that are less
directly related to race in the public imagination in a way that makes the relationship
abundantly clear. Thus, it would be beneficial to include hypothetical scenarios
pertaining to more than just a few issues, and that address those issues in more than just
one hypothetical manner since no issue can be boiled down to a single, specific type of
encounter with the real-world. For example, discrimination in the work place not only
happens in an interview setting, but also in recruiting, sifting through resumes, and in
promotions. Discrimination within the educational system—the justification for some
affirmative action programs—was not tested in this study at all. As for criminal justice
reforms, the death penalty (one issue tested for in this project) results not merely from the
decisions of a potentially racially biased jury, but also due to a host of other factors
within the criminal justice system (see Chapter 1); the same holds true for other criminal
justice outcomes as well.
Additionally, researchers who use such a framing technique may want to offer a
wider range of meta-stereotypes for inclusion, as the hypothetical scenarios in this project
asked subjects about only one meta-stereotype for each scenario. For example, those in
the hypothetical hiring scenario were asked whether the Black or white applicant was
more/less apt to be viewed as unintelligent, and those who were in the hypothetical
loitering scenario were asked which pair of loiterers were more/less apt to be viewed as
lazy. However, in both cases subjects may have felt that there were other negative
stereotypes that dictated an increased likelihood that the Black applicant and loiterers
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were more apt to be discriminated against. This, too, may help explain some of the
disconnect between subjects’ answers to the meta-stereotype and discriminatory outcome
questions that is discussed below.
iii.

Can we make sense of the disconnect between perceptions regarding
the prevalence of prejudice and those regarding differences in
discriminatory outcomes?

A third avenue for further investigation is the seeming disconnect between
Americans’ perceptions regarding the prevalence of prejudice and their perceptions
regarding the likelihood of discriminatory outcomes affecting racial groups at different
rates. This disconnect (documented in Chapter 4) seems to point to a dampened ability of
Americans to see problematic racial attitudes when compared to their ability to see
problematic racial actions, and such a disconnect could be partly responsible for the
mixed results when investigating racial preferences using this project’s measure of
individuals’ assessments of the likelihood of prejudice and discrimination occurring in
hypothetical scenarios.
It is important to better understand this disconnect—to know whether it is truly a
disconnect that is more generalizable to the white community as a whole, or whether it is
an artifact of this particular survey sample, and also to know why such a disconnect exists
(is it a product of the scenarios and questions themselves, or does it point to a disconnect
that occurs outside of the research setting and into the real world?)—so that researchers
better know how to approach these concepts and so that politicians and activists can
choose appropriate strategies in their outreach efforts.
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Part of this disconnect may be related to a shift in the way racial discourse is
presented in American politics and even within our day-to-day lives. Whereas the oldschool racism of the mid-twentieth century is usually reserved to small, extreme and/or
older portions of the U.S. population, and is generally frowned upon by the vast majority
of Americans, new forms of racism continue to persist. Sometimes called symbolic or
modern racism (Henry & Sears 2008) and other times called laissez-faire racism (Bobo &
Smith 1998), racism in America has shifted from being overt and unapologetic to being
masked in rhetoric that blames racial inequalities on supposed cultural deficiencies that
violate the traditional white American values that are necessary for success; the latter,
while still racist, is more palatable to modern voters. Politicians and the public also know
how to use racially coded language that underlies these new forms of racism while
avoiding actual racial words. For example, when Congressman Paul Ryan (R-WI)
proposed legislation that would address poverty by focusing on men “in the inner-cities”
who demonstrate a “real culture problem” (Volsky 2013), he was able to avoid bringing
race into the conversation directly, while painting imagery that was racial nonetheless.
Comments like Ryan’s are often greeted with as much acceptance and encouragement, as
they are outrage or condemnation, such as that displayed by Representative Israel. It is
possible that those who accept these modern forms of racism as valid points in political
discourse are less aware of the prevalence of prejudice because they are so constantly
surrounded by it, and because most people do not consider themselves or their friends to
be prejudiced; the status quo may, therefore, lead to a type of blindness. And if that is the
case, it may explain why politicians who approach racial political problems from the
standpoint that prejudice or racism is a root cause are deemed to be playing a “race card”
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rather than speaking to reality, and why such appeals therefore fall on deaf ears in many
cases.
Additionally, it may prove fruitful to investigate whether the seeming disconnect
exists more for those individuals who don’t believe in the institutional nature of racism.
The hypothetical scenarios offered within this project’s survey asked about very specific
cases, which is potentially different than the way individuals may think about
institutionalized racism outside of a research setting. Even though institutions are made
up of individuals, and even though prejudiced individuals, when aggregated, would seem
to create an institutionalized form of racism, it is possible that the disconnect between
seeing prejudice and seeing discrimination, also extends to a disconnect between seeing
discrimination in specific instances and seeing discrimination as a general trend. Because
only three of the racial policies observed within this project came back significantly
affected by an increased perception of the likelihood that Black characters would
experience discriminatory outcomes, it is worth investigating whether those who were
impacted were more apt to link the specific scenarios with broader institutional problems.
iv.

Can we remedy the inconsistencies between subjects’ levels of metastereotyping when using various measures?

Another inconsistency that needs investigating is the inconsistency with which
subjects’ answered the three different types of meta-stereotype questions (see Chapter 4).
This trajectory is perhaps the most important of those listed within this section since these
inconsistencies led to inconsistencies when looking at the relationship between metastereotypes and their impact on racial policy preferences as well. Thus, understanding
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what individuals really think about the prevalence of prejudice in twenty-first century
America is vital to understanding anything about its consequences, and those potential
consequences are really what are of normative importance given the underlying issues
that accompany the post-racial narrative.
While the inconsistencies between subjects’ answers to the more abstract
questions and the questions that followed the more concrete, real-world hypothetical
scenario were more expected (hence the inclusion of the framing effects via the
hypothetical scenarios in the first place), the inconsistencies between subjects’ answers to
the old, dichotomous “most” questions and this project’s 101-point measure were
somewhat surprising given the degree to which these inconsistencies occurred. To sort
out these inconsistencies follow-up questions pointing out the inconsistencies may be
necessary, whether those questions come via indirect surveys or face-to-face interviews.
Additionally, some of the inconsistencies may have occurred due to respondents’
proclivity to answer quickly, without really thinking about their answers, or their
inclination to disengage from questions of a somewhat controversial nature, so a research
design that asks subjects to be more invested in the answers they provide could alleviate
the inconsistency problem. One potential way of addressing this issue would be to
introduce some sort of incentive for correctly identifying the percentage of white
Americans who hold each stereotype in question; under such a set-up subjects would
likely give more time and thought to their answers, and would respond in ways that really
reflect what they feel the true rate of stereotyping is, and not an answer that they may
deem more socially desirable or that may have been politically motivated. If researchers
get a better grasp of whether or not the meta-stereotypes in this study, using the 101-point
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scale, accurately reflected subjects’ actual levels of meta-stereotyping then it becomes
easier to identify which measure of meta-stereotyping is the root of the inconsistencies.
Doing so would then allow researchers to grapple with how to explain those
inconsistencies, and would also provide researchers with an indication of which measure
would be most useful for studying the potential consequences of meta-stereotypes in
future studies, whether those consequences pertain to politics or other psychological or
sociological issues.
v.

Final thoughts

Although this project casts doubt on the expectation that meta-stereotyping
impacts individuals racial policy preferences, there are enough mixed signals to warrant
further exploration. Such exploration should begin with sussing out what measure of
meta-stereotyping best reflects individuals’ actual perceptions regarding the prevalence
of prejudice, and whether individuals even have fully formed, consistent meta-stereotypes
in the first place. If future research indicates that individuals consistently formulate
meta-stereotypes, research should then shift to whether meta-stereotypes are equally
accessible to the white community as they are to the Black community. From there,
researchers can choose what particular political consequences may be impacted by the
presence and levels of individuals’ meta-stereotyping. While this study looked at racial
policy preferences, other political consequences could include things such as political
efficacy and trust, levels of political participation, and differences in the types of political
activities individuals engage in. If future research finds that racial meta-stereotypes do
have political consequences then researchers may choose to expand the scope of metastereotype research to include other racial and ethnic groups, as well as the way they may
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affect political issues pertaining to religion, gender and sexuality. However, if this
project demonstrates anything it is that researchers interested in the topic of metastereotyping have an uphill climb, as gauging accurate levels of subjects’ metastereotypes is no easy feat, albeit one that may prove to be important in understanding
certain political phenomena if social science research in other areas is any indication.
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APPENDIX A—EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Table A.1: Visited pages per experimental group
1
2
3
4
5
6

Group 1: Control Group
Introduction - Informed
Consent
Demographic questions
Demographic questions
(cont.)
Self-characterization
questions
Stereotype questions
Policy Preference
questions

Group 2: Priming Group
Introduction – Informed
Consent
Demographic questions
Demographic questions
(cont.)
Self-characterization
questions
Stereotypes questions
Meta-stereotype
questions- Dichotomous
“most whites” measure
Meta-stereotype
questions- Interval, 101point scale measure
Policy preference
questions

7

Consequence questions

8

Meta-stereotype
questions- Dichotomous,
“most whites” measure

9

11

Meta-stereotype
questions- Interval, 101point scale measure
Self-identity and Group
attachment questions
Implicit Association Test

Self-identity and Group
attachment questions
Implicit Association Test

12
13

Comments
Debriefing

Comments
Debriefing

10

Consequence questions
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Group 3: Framing Group
Introduction – Informed
Consent
Demographic questions
Demographics questions
(cont.)
Self-characterization
questions
Stereotypes questions
Meta-stereotype
questions- Dichotomous
“most whites” measure
Meta-stereotype
questions- Interval, 101point scale measure
Meta-stereotype
questions- Ordinal,
hypothetical “more
likely” measure
Policy preference
questions
Consequence questions
Self-identity and Group
attachment
Implicit Association Test
Comments
Debriefing

APPENDIX B: SUBJECTS’ DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Table B.1: Demographic information for white and Black subjects

Male
Female

18-24
25-44
45-64
65+

Very liberal
Liberal
Slightly liberal
Neither
Slightly conservative
Conservative
Very conservative

White subjects
n=267
Gender
123
(46%)
144
(54%)
Age
155
(58%)
68
(25%)
36
(13%)
8
(3%)
Political Ideology
55
(21%)
102
(38%)
46
(17%)
33
(12%)
10
(4%)
15
(6%)
6
(2%)
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Black subjects
n=255
103
(40%)
152
(60%)
45
(18%)
123
(48%)
74
(29%)
13
(5%)
37
(15%)
69
(27%)
34
(13%)
70
(27%)
20
(8%)
17
(7%)
8
(3%)

Strong Democrat
Democrat
Weak Democrat
Neither
Weak Republican
Republican
Strong Republican

Yes
No

Yes
No

Yes - Full time
Yes - Part time
No- But looking
No- And not looking
No- Retired

White subjects
n=267
Partisanship
31
(12%)
65
(24%)
49
(18%)
98
(37%)
6
(2%)
15
(16%)
3
(1%)
Live(d) in the South
178
(67%)
86
(33%)
Grew up in the South
186
(70%)
81
(30%)
Employment
145
(54%)
60
(22%)
26
(10%)
28
(10%)
8
(3%)
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Black subjects
n=255
80
(31%)
81
(32%)
29
(11%)
55
(22%)
5
(2%)
4
(2%)
1
(<1%)
126
(49%)
127
(51%)
126
(49%)
129
(51%)
93
(36%)
41
(16%)
48
(18%)
35
(14%)
38
(15%)

Some high school
High school/GED
Trade school
Some college
Associates Degree
Bachelors Degree
Some graduate
school
Masters Degree
Professional Degree
PhD

<$25,000
$25,001-$50,000
$50,001-$75,000
$75,001-$100,000
$100,001-$250,000
$250,001-$500,000
>$500,001

White subjects
n=267
Education
3
(1%)
11
(4%)
1
(<1%)
69
(26%)
24
(9%)
83
(31%)
22
(8%)
42
(16%)
5
(2%)
7
(3%)
Personal Income
125
(47%)
73
(27%)
36
(13%)
22
(8%)
8
(3%)
2
(<1%)
1
(<1%)
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Black subjects
n=255
3
(1%)
59
(23%)
1
(<1%)
77
(30%)
28
(11%)
54
(21%)
9
(4%)
21
(8%)
2
(<1%)
1
(<1%)
121
(47%)
72
(28%)
31
(12%)
22
(9%)
5
(2%)
3
(1%)
1
(<1%)

<$25,000
$25,001-$50,000
$50,001-$75,000
$75,001-$100,000
$100,001-$250,000
$250,001-$500,000
>$500,001

White subjects
n=267
Household Income
41
(15%)
76
(28%)
60
(25%)
43
(16%)
42
(16%)
3
(1%)
2
(<1%)

242

Black subjects
n=255
79
(31%)
83
(33%)
39
(15%)
33
(13%)
18
(7%)
1
(<1%)
2
(<1%)

APPENDIX C– SURVEY INSTRUMENT
Introduction & Consent
Study of Social & Political Attitudes
Estimated time is 25 minutes
This study is interested in your attitudes toward a variety of social and political issues.
Before taking this study, you must agree to the following:
You are being asked to complete this survey because your social and political attitudes
will help us understand the attitudes held by Americans as a whole. The following survey
is being administered for use in a political science dissertation. Therefore, it is important
that you answer each question as accurately as possible. All information provided will
remain anonymous, including all answers to the questions asked within. It is important
that you answer each question in the survey. If you feel you need to further explain an
answer you have provided, we welcome you to provide open-ended explanations at the
end of the survey.
In accordance with University of South Carolina at Columbia’s human subjects
guidelines, as outlined by the Institutional Review Board of the Office of Research
Compliance and the Investigator’s Handbook, you, as a volunteer for the Dissertation
Study of Political Attitudes, fully understand that you retain the following rights and
agree to the following stipulations:
(1) The study is completely voluntary and thus you have the right to refrain from
participating at the outset or to discontinue your participation at any point during the
survey.
(2) This study requires all participants to be over the age of 18.
(3) This study requires all participants to identify racially as white, Black/African
American, or mixed-race wherein Black/African American is one of the options selected.
(4) On average this study will take approximately 25 minutes, but individual times may
vary;
(5) Any information provided will be completely anonymous. As such, any research
publications or presentations associated with this study’s data will ensure the anonymity
of the study’s subjects.
(6) Some participants may feel mild stress or discomfort when answering questions
dealing with controversial subjects. However, it is our hope that you find this experience
to be interesting and worthy of your time and effort.
(7) Participants may contact the Principal Investigator to request a copy of the
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dissertation when it becomes available; the dissertation will include the results of this
study.
Refer any and all questions to the Principal Investigator, Alexandra Reckendorf:
PoliDissertationStudy@gmail.com
(803) 777-3109
Department of Political Science, Gambrell Hall, 817 Henderson St., Columbia, SC
29208.
You may also direct questions to Dr. Thomas Coggins, Director, Office of Research
Compliance:
(803) 777-4456.
For your information, Dr. David Darmofal, University of South Carolina, is serving as an
advisor to this study.
Thank you very much for your participation in this study.
Once you click agree, the study will begin. It must be completed in one sitting.
<<Cancel>>

<<Agree>>
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Self characterization questions
This section is interested in understanding more about the adjectives you might use to
describe yourself. For each adjective, you will be shown a seven-point scale in order to
judge how well each adjective describes you.
1. On the following seven-point scale, 1 means that you think you are “hard
working,” 7 means that you think you are “lazy”, and a score of 4 means that you
are not toward one end or the other. Where would you place yourself on this
scale?
2. On the following seven-point scale, 1 means that you think you are “not violence
prone,” 7 means that you think you are “violence prone”, and a score of 4 means
that you are not toward one end or the other. Where would you place yourself on
this scale?

3. On the following seven-point scale, 1 means that you think you are “intelligent,”
7 means that you think you are “unintelligent”, and a score of 4 means that you
are not toward one end or the other. Where would you place yourself on this
scale?
4. On the following seven-point scale, 1 means that you think you “prefer to be selfsupporting,” 7 means that you think you “prefer to live off welfare”, and a score
of 4 means that you are not toward one end or the other. Where would you place
yourself on this scale?

245

Stereotype questions
This section will ask you questions about different groups in our society. For each
question, you will be shown a seven-point scale on which the characteristics of people in
a group can be rated. Remember that your responses are anonymous.
1. For the first question, a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people
are “hard working.” A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the
group are “lazy.” A score of 4 means that you think that the group is not towards
one end or the other. You may choose any number in between that comes closest
to where you think people in the group stand.
Whites, NonHispanic

Hispanics

African
Americans

Asians

Arabs

1 (Hard
Working)
2
3
4
5
6
7 (Lazy)
2. For the second question, a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people
are “not violence-prone.” A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in
the group are “violence-prone.” A score of 4 means that you think that the group
is not towards one end or the other. You may choose any number in between that
comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.
Whites,
NonHispanic

Hispanics

1 (Not
ViolenceProne)
2
3
4
5
6
7 (ViolenceProne)
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African
Americans

Asians

Arabs

3. For the third question, a score of 1 means that you think almost all of the people
are “intelligent.” A score of 7 means that you think almost everyone in the group
are “unintelligent.” A score of 4 means that you think that the group is not
towards one end or the other. You may choose any number in between that
comes closest to where you think people in the group stand.
Whites,
NonHispanic

Hispanics

African
Americans

Asians

Arabs

1 (Intelligent)
2
3
4
5
6
7
(Unintelligent)

4. For the last question in this section, a score of 1 means that you think almost all of
the people “prefer to be self-supporting.” A score of 7 means that you think
almost everyone in the group “prefer to live off welfare.” A score of 4 means that
you think that the group is not towards one end or the other. You may choose any
number in between that comes closest to where you think people in the group
stand.
Whites, NonHispanic

Hispanics

African Americans

1 (Prefer to be
selfsupporting)
2
3
4
5
6
7 (Prefer to
live off
welfare)
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Asians

Arabs

Meta-stereotype questions- Dichotomous “most whites” measure
What we would like you to do to begin this section is tell us whether you think most
white people think that the following characteristics in each question can be applied to
the different groups.
1. Do you think that most white Americans think that Black Americans are lazy?
a. Yes
b. No
2. Do you think that most white Americans think that Black Americans are more
likely to commit acts of violence?
a. Yes
b. No
3. Do you think that most white Americans think that Black Americans are
unintelligent?
a. Yes
b. No
4. Do you think that most white Americans think that Black Americans would rather
live off of welfare than be self-supportive?
a. Yes
b. No
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Meta-stereotype questions- Interval, 101-point scale measure
What we would like you to do next is guess the percentage of white people who you
think would say that the characteristics in each question can be applied to the different
groups.

5. Please guess: What percentage (0-100%) of white people do you think would say
that each group is “lazy” (i.e. that they answered 5, 6 or 7 on the scale of “hard
working” to “lazy”)?
Whites, NonHispanic

Hispanics

African
American

Asians

Arabs

% of whites
that say each
group is
Lazy:
6.

Please guess: What percentage (0-100%) of white people do you think would say
that each group is “violence prone” (i.e. that they answered 5, 6, or 7 on the scale
of “not violence-prone” to “violence-prone”)?
Whites, NonHispanic

Hispanics

African
American

Asians

Arabs

% of whites
that say each
group is
Violence
Prone:
7.

Please guess: What percentage (0-100%) of white people do you think would say
that each group is “unintelligent” (i.e. that they answered 5, 6 or 7 on the scale of
“intelligent” to “unintelligent”)?
Whites, NonHispanic

Hispanics

% of whites
that say each
group is
Unintelligent:
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African
American

Asians

Arabs

8.

Please guess: What percentage (0-100%) of white people do you think would say
that each group “prefers to live off welfare” (i.e. that they answered 5, 6 or 7 on
the scale of “prefer to be self-supporting” to “prefer to live off welfare”)?
Whites, NonHispanic

Hispanics

% of whites
that say each
group Prefers
to live off
welfare:
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African
American

Asians

Arabs

Meta-stereotype questions- Hypothetical “more/less likely” questions
For this section, respondents assigned to the framing group will also be randomly
assigned to one of the following three hypothetical situations—they will not be asked to
answer questions regarding all three hypothetical scenarios.
For this section we would like you to imagine the following hypothetical situations prior
to answering the questions below.
Hypothetical I:
Case A: Imagine a court case wherein the defendant is a Black male. The defendant has
been charged with assault, but has pleaded ‘not guilty’ and the prosecution has failed to
produce any solid evidence against the defendant. The jury in this case consists of twelve
white individuals.
Case B: Imagine that in a similar court case a white male has been charged with assault.
Like the other case, this defendant has pleaded ‘not guilty’ and the prosecution has failed
to produce any solid evidence against the defendant. Again, the jury in this case consists
of twelve white individuals.
1. Which defendant do you think is more likely to be viewed by the all-white jury as
violence-prone?
a. The Black defendant (Case A) is much more likely to be viewed as violenceprone
b. The Black defendant (Case A) is somewhat more likely to be viewed as
violence-prone
c. Neither the Black defendant (Case A) nor the White defendant (Case B) is
likely to be viewed as violence-prone
d. The White defendant (Case B) is somewhat more likely to be viewed as
violence-prone
e. The White defendant (Case B) is much more likely to be viewed as violenceprone
2. Which defendant do you think is more likely to be found guilty by the all-white
jury?
a. The Black defendant (Case A) is much more likely to be found guilty
b. The Black defendant (Case A) is somewhat more likely to be found guilty
c. Neither the Black defendant (Case A) nor the White defendant (Case B) is
likely to be found guilty
d. The White defendant (Case B) is somewhat more likely to be found
guilty
e. The White defendant (Case B) is much more likely to be found guilty
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Hypothetical II:
Case A: Imagine that on a suburban street corner, during typical work hours, two Black
males are loitering—hanging around, talking and laughing—but generally minding their
own business. A business owner has called the police complaining about loiterers. The
police officers patrolling that particular block are two white officers.
Case B: Imagine that on a similar suburban street a few blocks away, also during typical
work hours, two white males are also loitering—hanging around, talking and laughing—
but generally minding their own business. Like the other case, a business owner has
called the police complaining about loiterers. Again, the police officers patrolling their
particular block are two white officers.
1. Which pair of loiterers do you think is more likely to be viewed as lazy by the
police officers patrolling the area?
a. The Black men (Case A) are much more likely to be viewed as lazy
b. The Black men (Case A) are somewhat more likely to be viewed as lazy
c. Neither the Black men (Case A) nor the White men (Case B) are likely to
be viewed as lazy
d. The White men (Case B) are somewhat more likely to be viewed as lazy
e. The White men (Case B) are much more likely to be viewed as lazy
2. Which pair of loiterers do you think is more likely to be stopped by the police
officers and searched for drugs?
a. The Black men (Case A) are much more likely to be stopped and
searched for drugs
b. The Black men (Case A) are somewhat more likely to be stopped and
searched for drugs
c. Neither the Black men (Case A) nor the White men (Case B) are likely to
be stopped and searched for drugs
d. The White men (Case B) are somewhat more likely to be stopped and
searched for drugs
e. The White men (Case B) are much more likely to be stopped and
searched for drugs
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Hypothetical III:
Case A: Imagine that a company is hiring for an entry level position. The interviewer is
a white individual and the person applying for the job is a Black male.
Case B: Imagine that a similar company is hiring for an entry level position as well.
Again, the interviewer is a white individual, but this time the person applying for the job
is a white male.
1. Which job applicant do you think is more likely to be viewed as unintelligent by
the interviewer?
a. The Black applicant (Case A) is much more likely to be viewed as
unintelligent
b. The Black applicant (Case A) is somewhat more likely to be viewed as
unintelligent
c. Neither the Black applicant (Case A) nor the White applicant (Case B) is
likely to be viewed as unintelligent
d. The White applicant (Case B) is somewhat more likely to be viewed as
unintelligent
e. The White applicant (Case B) is much more likely to be viewed as
unintelligent
2. Which job applicant do you think is more likely to be hired for the job?
a. The Black applicant (Case A) is much more likely to be hired
b. The Black applicant (Case A) is somewhat more likely to be hired
c. Neither the Black applicant (Case A) nor the White applicant (Case B) is
likely to be hired
d. The White applicant (Case B) is somewhat more likely to be hired
e. The White applicant (Case B) is much more likely to be hired
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Policy preference questions
For this section we would like to get your opinion on a variety of current political issues.
Please pay attention to the detail within each question as some of them seem similar but
are actually asking different things. Remember that your answers will be anonymous.
1. What are your feelings about laws that seek to combat the “obesity epidemic” in
America by banning the purchase of certain items, such as the ban on cups of soda
larger than 16 ounces or the ban on trans fats?
a. I am very supportive of laws that seek to combat the “obesity epidemic”
by banning certain items
b. I am somewhat supportive of laws that seek to combat the “obesity
epidemic” by banning certain items
c. I do not have an opinion regarding laws that seek to combat the “obesity
epidemic” by banning certain items
d. I am somewhat opposed to laws that seek to combat the “obesity
epidemic” by banning certain items
e. I am very opposed to laws that seek to combat the “obesity epidemic” by
banning certain items
2. What are your feelings about laws that seek to limit corporations’ emission of
greenhouse gases in order to combat climate change and Global Warming, such as
the proposed “cap and trade” policy or the proposed “carbon tax”?
a. I am very supportive of laws that seek to limit corporations’ emission of
greenhouse gases
b. I am somewhat supportive of laws that seek to limit corporations’
emission of greenhouse gases
c. I do not have an opinion regarding laws that seek to limit corporations’
emission of greenhouse gases
d. I am somewhat opposed to laws that seek to limit corporations’ emission
of greenhouse gases
e. I am very opposed to laws that seek to limit corporations’ emission of
greenhouse gases
3. What are your feelings about the plan to expand drilling for oil into the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) which would increase the production of
domestic (U.S.) oil but would also destroy a natural habitat?
a. I am very supportive of the plan to expand drilling for oil into the ANWR
b. I am somewhat supportive of the plan to expand drilling for oil into the
ANWR
c. I do not have an opinion regarding the plan to expand drilling for oil into
the ANWR
d. I am somewhat opposed to the plan to expand drilling for oil into the
ANWR
e. I am very opposed to the plan to expand drilling for oil into the ANWR
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4.

What are your feelings about affirmative action programs that attempt to increase
diversity in the work place through hiring practices?
a. I am very supportive of affirmative action in the hiring process.
b. I am somewhat supportive of affirmative action in the hiring process.
c. I do not have an opinion regarding affirmative action in the hiring process.
d. I am somewhat opposed to affirmative action in the hiring process.
e. I am very opposed to affirmative action in the hiring process.

5. What are your feelings about affirmative action programs that attempt to increase
diversity in the work place through promotion practices?
a. I am very supportive of affirmative action in the promotion process.
b. I am somewhat supportive of affirmative action in the promotion process.
c. I do not have an opinion regarding affirmative action in the promotion
process.
d. I am somewhat opposed to affirmative action in the promotion process.
e. I am very opposed to affirmative action in the promotion process.
6. What are your feelings about affirmative action programs that attempt to increase
diversity in university settings through scholarship practices?
a. I am very supportive of affirmative action in university scholarship
practices.
b. I am somewhat supportive of affirmative action in university scholarship
practices.
c. I do not have an opinion regarding affirmative action in university
scholarship practices.
d. I am somewhat opposed to affirmative action in university scholarship
practices.
e. I am very opposed to affirmative action in university scholarship practices.
7. What are your feelings about affirmative action programs that attempt to increase
diversity in university settings through admissions practices?
a. I am very supportive of affirmative action in the university admissions
process.
b. I am somewhat supportive of affirmative action in the university
admissions process.
c. I do not have an opinion regarding affirmative action in the university
admissions process.
d. I am somewhat opposed to affirmative action in the university admissions
process.
e. I am very opposed to affirmative action in the university admissions
process.
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8. What are your feelings about the legalization of medical marijuana; for example,
legalized use by patients with cancer, glaucoma, etc. who have an official
prescription from their doctor?
a. I am very supportive of the legalization of medical marijuana
b. I am somewhat supportive of the legalization of medical marijuana
c. I do not have an opinion regarding the legalization of medical marijuana
d. I am somewhat opposed to the legalization of medical marijuana
e. I am very opposed to the legalization of medical marijuana
9. What are your feelings about the federal government’s War on Drugs?
a. I am very supportive of the War on Drugs
b. I am somewhat supportive of the War on Drugs
c. I do not have an opinion regarding the War on Drugs
d. I am somewhat opposed to the War on Drugs
e. I am very opposed to the War on Drugs
10. What are your feelings about the use of the death penalty in the U.S. criminal
justice system?
a. I am very supportive of the use of the death penalty
b. I am somewhat supportive of the use of the death penalty
c. I do not have an opinion regarding the use of the death penalty
d. I am somewhat opposed to the use of the death penalty
e. I am very opposed to the use of the death penalty
11. Some states have enacted “Three Strikes Laws” which require mandatory life
sentences for those who are convicted of serious criminal offenses on three or
more separate occasions. What are your feelings regarding the adoption of Three
Strike Laws?
a. I am very supportive of Three Strike Laws
b. I am somewhat supportive of Three Strike Laws
c. I do not have an opinion regarding Three Strike Laws
d. I am somewhat opposed to Three Strike Laws
e. I am very opposed to Three Strike Laws
12. Racial profiling refers to the use of an individual’s race or ethnicity by law
enforcement personnel as a key factor in deciding whether to engage in
enforcement (such as making a traffic stop or an arrest). What are your feelings
regarding the use of racial profiling by law enforcement in the following
situations?
a. Stopping suspicious individuals in their car to see whether they have drugs
in their vehicle?
a. I am very supportive of racial profiling
b. I am somewhat supportive of racial profiling
c. I do not have an opinion regarding racial profiling
d. I am somewhat opposed to racial profiling
e. I am very opposed to racial profiling
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b. Stopping suspicious individuals in the airport to see whether they have
weapons in their possession?
a. I am very supportive of racial profiling
b. I am somewhat supportive of racial profiling
c. I do not have an opinion regarding racial profiling
d. I am somewhat opposed to racial profiling
e. I am very opposed to racial profiling
c. Stopping suspicious individuals in their car to see whether they are in the
country legally?
a. I am very supportive of racial profiling
b. I am somewhat supportive of racial profiling
c. I do not have an opinion regarding racial profiling
d. I am somewhat opposed to racial profiling
e. I am very opposed to racial profiling
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Consequences questions
For this section we would like to get your opinion on a few possible consequences of the
policies described in the previous sections.
1.

Do you agree or disagree: Affirmative action programs cause white Americans
to think that minorities are incapable of making progress in the work place and
university setting without these policies in place.
a. Strongly Agree
b. Somewhat Agree
c. Neither Agree or Disagree
d. Somewhat Disagree
e. Strongly Disagree

2.

Do you agree or disagree: Affirmative action programs cause white Americans
to think that anyone who is a minority and is hired, promoted, accepted, etc. is a
product of affirmative action policies rather than because they earned it.
a. Strongly Agree
b. Somewhat Agree
c. Neither Agree or Disagree
d. Somewhat Disagree
e. Strongly Disagree

3.

Do you agree or disagree: Affirmative action programs cause white Americans
to be resentful of minorities.
a. Strongly Agree
b. Somewhat Agree
c. Neither Agree or Disagree
d. Somewhat Disagree
e. Strongly Disagree
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Demographic questions
1. What is your age?
Drop down box: 17-99
2. What is your gender?
Drop down box: Female/Male
3. Do you identify as being a person of Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin? < From
2012 U.S. Census>
Drop down box: No, not of Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin/Yes, Mexican,
Mexican American or Chicano/ Yes, Puerto Rican/ Yes, Cuban/ Yes, another
Hispanic, Latino or Spanish origin (write in)
4. For this survey, Hispanic origins are not races. What is your race? <From 2010
U.S. Census>
Drop down box: White/ Black or African American/ American Indian or Alaska
Native/ Asian Indian/ Chinese/ Filipino/ Other Asian (write in)/ Japanese/ Korean/
Vietnamese/ Native Hawaiian/ Gaumanian or Chamorro/ Samoan/ Other Pacific
Islander (write in)/ Some other race (write in)
5. What is your religion?
Drop down box: Christian/Jewish/Muslim/Buddhist/Unitarian/Hindu/Native
American/Atheist, Agnostic or No Religion/Other (write in)
5a. If you selected Christian, do you identify with a specific denomination?
(write in)
6.

How do you identify ideologically?
Drop down box: Very Liberal/ Liberal/ Slightly Liberal/ Neither Liberal or
Conservative/ Slightly Conservative/ Conservative/ Very Conservative

7. How do you identify politically?
Drop down box: Strong Democrat/Democrat/ Weak Democrat/ Neither a
Democrat or a Republican/ Weak Republican/ Republican/ Strong Republican
8. In which state(s) have you resided within the last 12 months? (Select as many as
applicable)
Drop down box: (All 50 states)
9. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
Drop down box: Some High School, High School Diploma, Some College,
Associates Degree, Bachelors Degree, Some Graduate School, Masters Degree,
PhD/Law Degree/Medical Degree, Other (write in)
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10. Are you currently employed?
Drop down box: Yes, full time/ Yes, part time/ No, looking for a job/ No, not
looking for a job but not retired/ No, retired
11. What is your current level of income?
Drop down box: (breakdowns TBD)
12. What is the current level of your household income?
Drop down box: (breakdown TBD)
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Self-identity & Group attachment questions
For this section we would like to get your opinion on how close you feel to a variety of
groups.
1. When you think about yourself, which of your identifying characteristics do you
think are most important to understanding who you are as a person? Please rank
these characteristics, where a ranking of 1 means it is the most important
characteristic, a 2 is the second most important characteristic, etc.
ONLY ONE descriptor (left hand side) per ranking (right hand side)
Click the description on the left and drag it to the corresponding value on the right
Rank order: Age/Gender/Race/Ethnicity/Religion /Social Class
2. When you first meet white people, which of your identifying characteristics do
you think that they think are the most important to understanding who you are as
a person? Please rank these characteristics, where a ranking of 1 means it is the
most important characteristic, a 2 is the second most important characteristic, etc.
ONLY ONE descriptor (left hand side) per ranking (right hand side)
Click the description on the left and drag it to the corresponding value on the right
Rank order: Age/Gender/Race/Ethnicity/Religion/Social Class
3. On a scale of 0-10, where 0 represents having no feeling of group attachment and
where 10 represents feeling extremely linked to the group in question, please
place where you fall on the scale for each group.
a. Whites, non-Hispanic
b. Hispanics
c. Blacks
d. Asians
e. Arabs
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Implicit Association Test
Finally, this section asks you to complete seven different tasks. You will receive
instructions on each task as you go. The goal is to try to complete these tasks as quickly
as possible! Please read the instructions carefully as you work through the tasks. This
section should take about five minutes. This is the last section you are required to
complete.
The following is a breakdown of the seven tasks respondents will be asked to complete;
respondents complete tasks by placing fingers on the E and I keys of their keyboard and
matching given stimuli (20 total) to one of two categories as fast as possible.
Task 1: Match faces to the categories “Black” or “White”
Task 2: Match words to the categories “Positive” or “Negative”
Task 3: Match words or faces to the categories “Black or Positive” or “White or
Negative”
Task 4: (Repeat Task 3) Match words or faces to the categories “Black or Positive” or
“White or Negative”
Task 5: Match faces to the categories “White” or “Black”
Task 6: Match words or faces to the categories “White or Positive” or “Black or
Negative”
Task 7: (Repeat Task 6) Match words or faces to the categories “White or Positive” or
“Black or Negative”
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Comments
This section is optional.
We would like to know whether you have any comments regarding the topics discussed
within this survey. Again, your comments will be anonymous. While we welcome and
value your comments, they are not required. If you wish to skip this section, please select
the “Next” button. Once you have finished this section, the survey will be complete.
<<Finish>>
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Debriefing
Thank you for completing this study!
The results from this study are being used in a political science dissertation at the
University of South Carolina. The dissertation looks at the link between individuals’
perceptions of the prevalence of racial prejudice in American society and individuals’
levels of support or opposition for policy measures designed to correct racial injustice.
Racial prejudice is still common in American society. Sometimes it is obvious, but many
times prejudice is either very subtle or even subconscious. Even individuals who believe
in equality and are actively involved in trying to deter discrimination can harbor
subconscious levels of prejudice. Because of this many people don’t recognize the
prevalence of racial prejudice in 2013.
This project hypothesizes that individuals who perceive higher levels of racial prejudice
in the U.S. will also be more apt to support policy measures designed to correct racial
injustice. In this study these policies were affirmative action (which is commonly
associated with race) and criminal justice reforms (which are less commonly associated
with race, although the reforms are proposed and enacted in large part to combat racial
discrimination within the system). This project also hypothesizes that those effects will
be stronger for Black/African American individuals than for white individuals since
Black/African American individuals are the racial out-group on the receiving end of
prejudice. This project also hypothesizes that individuals who perceive higher levels of
ethnic prejudice against other out-groups (Hispanics and Arabs) will also be more apt to
support policy measures designed to correct those injustices (such as the laws requiring
individuals to show proof of citizenship in Arizona, or calls for profiling Arabs at
airports); however, it is expected that these effects will not be as high for Blacks/African
Americans as they were when the policies in question were designed to correct injustices
for their own racial in-group.
Participants in this study were broken into three groups: some participants were placed in
a control group, while other participants were primed to consider their perceptions of the
prevalence of prejudice prior to answering questions about policies, and other participants
were primed and also received one of three possible hypothetical scenarios to help frame
the policies as having a racial component to consider.
All participants were required to take an Implicit Association Test (IAT). It should be
noted that answering tasks incorrectly during this IAT does not mean you are overtly
racist or that you are a bad person. In fact, most Americans who take an IAT answer
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tasks incorrectly. Instead, the IAT measures subconscious links between negative words
and, in this case, Black/African American individuals. You can find more information on
Implicit Association Tests if you’d like by doing a simple keyword search using your
online browser.
Again, thank you very much for your participation in this study. Hopefully the answers
provided by you and your fellow volunteers will begin to help us understand the process
by which individuals’ form preferences on policies designed to correct racial injustice. If
we can begin to understand the nature of that relationship, we may see an improvement in
the way opposing political factions deliberate concerning the means to combat racial
injustice in America.
If you have any further questions about this study please feel free to contact the Principal
Investigator, Alexandra Reckendorf:
PoliDissertationStudy@gmail.com
803-777-3109
Department of Political Science, Gambrell Hall, University of South Carolina, Columbia,
SC 29208
You may also direct questions to Dr. Thomas Coggins, Director, Office of Research
Compliance:
803-777-4456
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